UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-9-2011

CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund Clerk's
Record v. 2 Dckt. 38492

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 38492" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3551.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3551

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

(VOLUME II)
IN THE

SUPRE

COURT
OF THE

TATE OF IDAHO
CD DAIRY Q EN, INC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, U£
OFSALMO ,
Plaintiffs-AppelJan
-~

-

THE IDAHO Sf TE IN
CE FUND,
J
M. ALCORN in his official
capacity i Manager, and WILLIAM
DEAL WAYNE MEYER, GERALD GEDDFS,
JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN MARK
000
, RODNEY A. mGGINS,
TERRY GE'STRIN and
BLACK and
in their capacity
Membe of the Board fDirectors of the
tate Insurance und

o

Defendants-It! pondents.
Appealed from tbe D· riet of tbe Tbird Judicial District
for tb tate of Idaho In and for Canyon ounty

Hon rable RENA J. HOFF District Judge

Philip Gordon aod Bruce S. Bistline

GORDON LAW OFF1CES
ttome) ror ppellan

Richard E. HaD and Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &: BLANTON PA

-COpy
AY - 9 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO

CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC
OF SALMON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vsTHE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official
capacity as its Manager, and WILLIAM
DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, GERALD GEDDES,
JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, MARK
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS,
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the
State Insurance Fund,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 38492

Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho.
HONORABLE RENAE J. HOFF, Presiding

Donald W. Lojek, Lojek Law Offices
Philip Gordon and Bruce S. Bistline, GORDON LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Appellants

Richard E. Hall and Keely E. Duke, HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON PA
Attorneys for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.

Vol. No.

Register of Actions

1-5

Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial,
filed 12-24-09

6-22

First Amended Class Action Complaint, etc., filed 6-10-10

23-40

Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint
And Demand for Jury Trial, filed 7-1-10

41-53

First Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Class
Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 7-21-10

54-67

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 9-23-10

68-70

Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment, filed 9-23-10

71-79

Affidavit of Philip Gordon in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment, filed 9-23-10

80-179

Affidavit of Philip Gordon ,etc., filed 9-23-10 (Continued)

180- 203

II

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Defendants' 14th Affirmative Defense, filed 10-18-10

204- 206

II

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

207 - 209

II

Affidavit of James M Alcorn in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

210- 218

II

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

219 - 267

II

Affidavit of Philip Gordon Re: Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed 11-30-10

268 - 282

II

Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed 12-6-10

283 - 312

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued
Page No.

Vol. No.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, filed 12-6-10

313 - 350

II

Second Affidavit of Donald W Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 12-6-10

351- 356

II

Order, filed 12-28-10

357 - 359

II

Judgment, filed 1-4-11

360- 362

II

Appellants' Notice of Appeal, filed 1-27-11

363 - 366

II

Certificate of Exhibit

367

II

Certificate of Clerk

368

II

Certificate of Service

369

II

INDEX
Page No.

Vol. No.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

219 - 267

Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment, filed 9-23-10

71-79

Affidavit of James M Alcorn in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

210 - 218

II

Affidavit of Philip Gordon ,etc., filed 9-23-10 (Continued)

180 - 203

II

Affidavit of Philip Gordon in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment, filed 9-23-10

80-179

Affidavit of Philip Gordon Re: Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed 11-30-10

268 - 282

Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint
And Demand for Jury Trial, filed 7-1-10

41-53

Appellants' Notice of Appeal, filed 1-27-11

363 -366

II

Certificate of Clerk

368

II

Certificate of Exhibit

367

II

Certificate of Service

369

II

Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial,
filed 12-24-09

6-22

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

207 - 209

First Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Class
Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 7-21-10

54-67

First Amended Class Action Complaint, etc., filed 6-10-10

23-40

II

II

II

INDEX, Continued
Page No.

Vol. No.

Judgment, filed 1-4-11

360- 362

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 9-23-10

68-70

Order, filed 12-28-10

357 - 359

II

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Defendants' 14th Affirmative Defense, filed 10-18-10

204- 206

II

Register of Actions

1-5

Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed 12-6-10

283 - 312

II

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, filed 12-6-10

313 - 350

II

Second Affidavit of Donald W Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 12-6-10

351- 356

II

II

·,

..'
.. j."

.STATE INSURANCE FUND

!

!

i

1216W. STATE GTREET • P.O. BOX 8372Q • BOISE, IDAliO 1!3720.oo«

!!

PHONE (208) 332·2100 • (BOO) 334·2370

i

I

:MEMORANDUM

t:

Date:

December 9, 2002

From:

J amos M. AlcOP.l. Manag r

Subject: Dividend Formula fOl' Polic'

f

i!

!

i
f

i

1

th Inception Date;; of July.!, 2000 to June 30, 2001
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1

Loss Adjustment Expense 18% fQr aU policies

f

Underwliting Expem~e
100%
75%

l>l'CmiUlU Size

<2,500
2,501 to 5,000

15%

70%
65%

25%

20,001 to 50,000
50,001 to 100,000
100,001 to 200,000

65%

32%

60%
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40%
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STATE INSURANCE FUND
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Date:

DccembOl' 17, 2004

II

From!

James M. Alcorn, Mana er

I

I

Inception Dates of'July 1, 2002 to June 30, ~003

Subject:

I

Loss Adjustment Bx~enso 18% for nIl policies
Premium Size

~~~<21500
.
.1:/ ;v
2,501 to 5,000'

, ;51

• .3~

Retention
100%

Return Percentago

0%

75%

15%

5,OOlto 10.000
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2(),OO 1 to 50.000
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67%
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Date:

December 21, 2005

From:

James M. Alcorn, Manager.

Subject: Dividend Fonnula for

POIici~S

I
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Ith Inception Dates of July I, 2003 to June 30, 2004

J

Loss Adjustment Expense 18% for all policies

I
Premium Size

Retention

<2,500

100%

0%

2,501 to 5,000

75%

15%

5,OOlto 10,000

72%

25%

10,001 to 20,000

67%

28%
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Sixtieth Legislature

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
First Regular Session - 2009
IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1166
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

5

AN ACT
RELATING TO THE STATE INSURANCE FUND; TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT;
REPEALING SECTION 72-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO DIVIDENDS;
DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING A RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVE
DATE.

6

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State ofIdaho:

1

2
3
4

29

SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. (1) Historically, the State Insurance Fund has
exercised its discretion, pursuant to Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to determine the annual
amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive.
(2) On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v. Idaho
State Insurance Fund, S. Ct. 35144, in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho Code, and
ruled that the State Insurance Fund cannot exercise its discretion in determining how much of
a dividend to pay to each policyholder because the statute requires a pro rata distribution of
dividends to all policyholders. The result of the decision is to require that the State Insurance
Fund pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's
ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders.
(3) In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that, if it has become prudent to alter the
statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the Legislature is
the appropriate venue for such change.
(4) It was the intent of the Legislature in passing House Bill No. 774, As Amended of
the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, effective on April 3, 1998,
that the State Insurance Fund should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject to
regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provisions set forth in Chapter
28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to April 3,
1998. will conform with that intent. Section 73-10 L Idaho Code, permits such retroactive
repeal as long as it is "expressly so declared" in legislation.
(5) The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, will reconcile conflicts in the
existing laws governing the State Insurance Fund and will allow the fund, like other insurance
companies, to issue dividends pursuant to Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code.

30

SECTION 2. That Section 72-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby repealed.

31

SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to
exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval,
and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to April 3, 1998.
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Sixtieth Legislature

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
First Regular Session - 2009

Moved by
Seconded by

Davis

----------------------Cameron

---------------------

IN THE SENATE
SENATE AMENDMENT TO S.B. NO. 1166
1

2

3
4

5
6
7
8

9
10

AMENDMENT TO SECTION I
On page 1 of the printed bill, in line 24, delete "April 3" and insert: "January 1"; in line
25, delete "1998" and insert: "2003"; and following line 29, insert:
"(6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply to
any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or before December
31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the aforementioned case of Farber
v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently pending with respect to those policy holders paying
annual premiums of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).".
AMENDMENT TO SECTION 3
On page 1, in line 33, delete "April 3, 1998" and insert: "January 1,2003".

000101
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MINUTES

SENATE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE

DATE:

April 7, 2009

TIME:

1:30 p.m.

PLACE:

Room 117

MEMBERS
PRESENT:

Chairman Andreason, Vice Chairman Coiner, Senators Stegner,
Cameron, Goedde, Lodge, Smyser, Sagness (Malepeai) , and LeFavour

MEMBERS
ABSENT!
EXCUSED:
GUESTS:

See attached sign-in sheet.

NOTE:

The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained
with the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and
will then be located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services
Library.

CONVEN~D:

Chairman Andreason called the meeting to order at 1:48 P.M.

MINUTES:
H218

Relating to Building Codes
Lee Gagner, spoke in support of H218. Since 1he passage of 2004
Building Code passage there have been many changes. Through the
passage of Building Codes in conjunction with the Fire Industry they have
created standards of ingress and egress requirements out of windows in
basements, upper levels which have reduced safety issues. Another
major fire safety improvement was the smoke detectors systems being
required to be hardwired in new housing. Any code amendments should
be decided in the Legislature, rather than by the local jurisdictions. Two
reasons he is supporting the bill: 1) He can not identify the need for the
bill; and 2) Single-family and duplex dwellings should be exempted.
Senator Goedde stated there has been a proposal to send this bill to the
amending order and opt out the single-family and duplex dwellings. Mr.
Gagner responded that he would be in support of the amendment.

MOTION:

Senator Goedde moved that H218 be referred to the 14th order for
amendment. The motion was seconded by Vice Chairman Coiner. The
motion carried by Voice Vote.

S1166

Relating to the State Insurance Fund
Senator Goedde, presented S1166, relating to the State Insurance Fund
(SIF). The purpose of this legislation is to repeal Idaho Code, Section 72915, and will serve to offset an adverse decision of the Idaho Supreme
Court regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code, Section 72-915 which
SENATE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES
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could subject the SIF to pay dividends on policies that are not financially
profitable, thereby restricting the SIF's ability to reduce premiums and pay
dividends to profitable policyholders. The proposed repeal of Idaho Code,
Section 72-915 will clarify the law regarding the payment of dividends by
the SIF by making it clear that in passing H774aa in 1998, it was the
intent of the Legislature to have the SI F operate like an efficient insurance
company subject to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the
dividend provision set forth in Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho Code. Repeal of
the law effective April 3, 1998 is necessary because on that date laws
were enacted which subjected the SIF to regulation under the Insurance
Code, Title 41, Idaho Code. This legislation will allow the SIF to issue
dividends in the same manner as other insurance companies operating
within the State of Idaho (Attachment A).
Senator Goedde stated that historically the SIF has exercised its
discretion, pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-915, to determine the
annual amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive .
Dividends have never been distributed on a pro rata basis. It was the
intent of the 1998 Legislature in passing H774aa, effective April 3, 1998,
that the SIF should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject
to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provision
set forth in Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The SIF does not have
stockholders so dividends are returned to the policyholders.
On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v.
Idaho State Insurance Fund in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho
Code, and ruled that the SIF cannot exercise its discretion in determining
how much of a dividend to pay to each policyholder, because the statute
requires a pro rata distribution of dividends to all policyholders. The result
of the decision is to require that the SIF pay dividends on policies that are
not financially profitable, thereby restricting the SIF's ability to reduce
premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. Senator Goedde
stated that in making this decision, the Court ignored Idaho Code, Section
72-901, which requires the SIF to operate as an efficient insurance
company, and Idaho Code, Section 41-2844, which allows for distribution
of dividends. The Court interpreted 72-915 in a manner inconsistent with
other laws governing the SIF and past practices that go back to the1980s.

Senator Goedde advised that Idaho Code, Section 73-101 specifically
allows for retroactive enactment of legislation. Repealing Section 72-915,
Idaho Code, retroactive to April 3, 1998 when H774aa was enacted, will
reconcile conflicts in the existing laws governing the SIF and will allow the
SIF, like other insurance companies, to issue dividends pursuant to
Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. He stated that it is not his intention in
bringing this bill to circumvent the Supreme Court's decision, and in fact
the Supreme Court stated in the Farber case that if it has become
prudent to alter the statutory language related to the requirements for
distribution of dividends, the Legislature is the appropriate venue for such
change.
Currently the judgment against the SIF is estimated at $5 million and
SENATE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES
April 7, 2009 - Minutes - Page 2
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there is potential for another $24 million in additional judgments if this
legislation is not passed. Large businesses right now support the small
businesses that are written by the SIF. He stated the SIF generally takes
a loss on policies issued under $1,500. If the SIF does not have the
discretion to offer dividends and premium deviations to large businesses,
they will go to the private sector for those benefits, and it will further erode
the base of the SIF. This could also substantially impact the state
agencies and public entities insured by the SIF.
In response to questions of the Committee, Senator Goedde disclosed
that as a member of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance SIF he
was named in the Farber lawsuit. However, he was never served nor
deposed in the case . He called upon Rich Hall, attorney for the SIF to
respond to a legal question. Mr. Hall stated that the Supreme Court did
rule in the 2000 case of Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, that
the Worker's Compensation statutes became a part of the contract of
insurance between the State Insurance Fund and the policyholder.
TESTIMONY:

Phillip Gordon, attorney, representing plaintiffs , a class of 30,000 Idaho
employers, in the Farber case spoke in opposition to 51166. He advised
that the action was brought because his clients believe that the SIF had
misinterpreted Idaho Code, Section 72-915 and had departed from its
traditional historic interpretation of that statute. He stated that up until and
including the policy year 2000, the SIF had always paid dividends pro rata
as commanded by the statute. The SIF took the position after the 2000
policy year that it was the intent of the Legislature that the SIF comply
with the provisions of the Idaho Insurance Code, Title 41 , Idaho Code.
However, the Supreme Court held in the 2000 case of Kelso & Irwin, P.A.
v. State Insurance Fund, that the SIF is not a public mutual insurance
company .
The Farber case was filed in 2006 and the Supreme Court decided
unanimously on March 5, 2009, that Idaho Code, Section 72-915, means
that if you pay dividends to one, basically you pay them to all pro rata.
He stated that if this legislation is passed and Idaho Code , Section 72915 is repealed there would be no guidance and no statute whatsoever
that would allow the SIF to pay dividends. He stated that when you
purchase a contract of worker's compensation insurance with the SIF you
. get three things: 1) insurance in the event one of your employee's is hurt;
2) a defense if a lawsuit is brought by an injured employee; and 3) a right
to share pro rata in dividends. The State and Federal Constitutions have
provisions forbidding the passage of laws which impair the obligations of
contracts. Mr. Gordon stated that this legislation impairs the obligations
of contracts inasmuch as the 2000 Supreme Court decision clearly held
that Idaho Code , Section 72-915, is part of the contract of insurance
between the SIF and all of its policyholders. To effect that retroactively
impairs the obligations of contracts.
Senator Goedde inquired of Mr. Gordon whether he thought a policy
holder that spends $150 on a premium and incurs $10,000 in costs in that
year because of an injured employee should receive a dividend. Mr.
Gordon responded that it was his understanding that the SIF may
SENATE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES
April 7, 2009 - Minutes - Page 3
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consider losses and is not obligated to pay a dividend in that instance.
However, he could not cite case law to sUbstantiate his position.
TESTIMONY:

Don Lojek, attorney, also representing plaintiffs, spoke in opposition to
S1166. He stated that Idaho Code, Section 72-915, was enacted in 1917.
Under that statute the manager of the SIF has the ability to declare a
divided if he or she thinks there is a sufficient amount of money to
support dividends to policyholders. Once the manager declares the
dividend, then the statute requires that the manager of the SIF distribute
those dividends on a pro rata basis . He stated that in recent years that
was changed unilaterally by the SIF without seeking legislative approval.
The SIF drew a line at $2,500 and said that the employers whose
premiums were less than $2,500 would receive no dividend whatsoever.
Dissatisfaction with that policy resulted in the class action lawsuit being
filed in 2006, and the Supreme Court issued its decision in favor of the
plaintiff's on March 5, 2009. This case is still in litigation as the SIF has
filed a motion for a rehearing. He stated that this legislation is premature
and if passed wiJI leave the SIF without authority to pay dividends.
In response to questions of the Committee, Mr. Lojek advised that if this
bill were to pass, the Supreme Court would then have to decide whether
or not it has any jurisdiction because the statute would be repealed. This
would likely lead to more litigation. He stated he is unaware of dividend
policies by other domestic stock and mutual insurance companies, but is
aware that there are shareholders and stockholders that are entitled to
dividends under Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho Code, but stated that the SIF
is a different kind of entity governed by the State of Idaho and code.
Senator Cameron stated that his concern with this legislation would be to
keep the SIF as a viable and responsible entity. He stated he does not
see this bill as necessarily reversing the decision of the Supreme Court,
but merely affects the amount of money the SIF would have to payout.
He inquired whether Mr. Lojek would financially gain should this bill not
pass, and should the Supreme Court's decision be upheld. Mr. Lojek
responded that according to its financial disclosure at the end of 2008,
the SIF had a $198 million surplus. If the policy holders that he and others
represent prevail, the judgments could be between $10 million and $15
million. That amount will be governed by the Court below when it
considers plaintiff's .attorney's fees incurred over the last two and one half
years. Mr. Lojek was asked if his opposition to this legislation was mainly
the retroactive nature of this bill. He responded that it was.
Senator Goedde asked Mr. Lojek to clarify how the SIF is going to pay
dividends from this day forward if the legislation is adopted without a
retroactive date. He stated that it was his feeling that the SIF manager
could use his discretion prospectively to decide whether or not to declare
a dividend, but that it would open up a constitutional question to go back
and change contracts.
Senator Coiner stated that Title 72 , Chapter 9, Idaho Code states that
the SIF shall be deemed a mutual insurer, subject to Idaho Insurance
Code, Title 41, Idaho Code. Mr. Lojek advised that the 2000 case of
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Kelso v. State Insurance Fund said that although it kind of looks like the
SIF is a mutual insurance company, it really is not and therefore it does
not fit in Title 41, Chapter 28.
TESTIMONY:

Richard E. Ha", attorney for the SIF, spoke in support of 51166. Mr. Ha"
advised that the previous statement by Mr. Gordon that prior to the year
2000, dividends were distributed pro rata was incorrect, and that has
never really been the case . In the past, losses were taken into account in
the payment of dividends. The ability of the SIF to offset dividends with
losses is unclear in the 2009 Supreme Court decision. This could result in
a dividend distribution to a policyholder who pays a $1,500 premium but
has a $3 million loss. This does not make sense, but is one of the
potential problems that has been created by the Supreme Court decision.
Mr. Hall stated that managing an insurance company right now is a
tremendous task, and what this decision of the Supreme Court does is
that it takes away the discretion that would give the SIF the opportunity to
be able to compete in a viable way with the insurance companies that are
not regulated in this way. He stated that we need to pass this legislation
in order to financially protect the SIF. Senator Stegner commented that it
should not be the role of the Legislature to pass legislation to save
someone who has gotten themselves into a financial mess. He asked Mr.
Hall why this should be different. Mr. Hall responded that in this particular
case the Supreme Court specifically said that if the parties think their
decision is inappropriate they should go to the State Legislature, which
was really in effect an invitation to say that this is a type of issue that the
Legislature ought to deal with. He pOinted out that in this situation we are
dealing with a State agency which is governed by legislation. The
decision is based upon a statute that was written in 1917. -The insurance
code has been changed numerous times since then but this one statute
has been left on the books. He believes it is of such a significant financial
impact that it is a reasonable way to handle this particular situation.
Senator Sagness asked Mr. Hall to expand on the effect not passing this
legislation will have on the SIF. Mr. Ha" responded that the Supreme
Court's decision makes it very clear that they feel there should be a pro
rata distribution based upon premiums paid. They do not mention
anything with regard to whether or not a loss would be calculated into that
dividend. He stated that because of all the factors related to how the SIF
is managed, how dividends are calculated, how premiums are calculated,
how rates are calculated, and how classifications are made, he is unable
to give the specifics of what the financial implications will be. He advised
he does believe they will be significant, and by that he means important
and very difficult for the SIF to absorb. He confirmed that the cost of
current judgments and future potential litigation would be between $18
million and $24 million.

MOTION:

Senator Cameron made a motion, seconded by Senator Goedde, that
S 1166 be sent to the floor with a do pass recommendation.
In discussing his motion, Senator Cameron stated that he participated in
the 1998 group convened by Governor Batt to update the State Insurance
SENATE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES
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Fund Code. The intent at that time was to try and move the SIF away
from being a state run program so that it could actively compete and work
in the market place along side aIJ the other companies that were offering
worker's compensation insurance. He stated that they did a pretty good
job, but obviously missed Section 72-915. The question before us today is
first, what is the role that you want the SIF to play. If you want the SIF to
still be a viable entity who wiIJ compete ·for business with every other
carrier you must vote for this bill. The second issue is the retroactive
nature of the bill. The minimal impact of not passing this legislation is $24
million. The long range impact is what you do to the SIF. If you make the
SIF non competitive with other worker's compensation products then you
have just spelled the doom or the end of which will cause harm to aIJ of
our constituents who are currently purchasing that product because of its
competitive pricing . That is the major catastrophe - not the $24 million.
SUBSTITUTE
MOTION:

Senator Stegner made a substitute motion, seconded by Senator
LeFavour, that S1166 be held in Committee.
In discussing his substitute motion, Senator Stegner stated that in his
opinion the Legislature has every right to look at this issue, but we do not
do it by proposing legislation in the last hours of the session . He stated a
statewide debate would be more appropriate, not a half hour hearing.
Senator Goedde stated that this does affect every little policyholder in
this state. The SIF is their only avenue and if we jeopardize the viability of
the SIF those $150 policy holders wiff be required to pay $500 to $750
premiums for the same coverage. He further stated that the interpretation
of Section 72-915 is in direct conflict with the dividend statute in Title 41
and that causes a severe problem for the SIF. He urged passage of this
bill to fix the omission of the 1998 bill.

VOTE ON
SUBSTITUTE
MOTION:

The voice vote on the substitute motion to hold the bill in Committee was
in doubt, and Chairman Andreason requested the secretary take a roll
caIJ vote. Chairman Andreason, Senators LeFavour, Sag ness,
Smyser and Stegner voted Aye; total of five. Senators Lodge,
Goedde, Cameron, and Coiner voted Nay; total of four. The substitute
motion passed five to four.

H202

Relating to the State Fire Marshall
Jeanne Medley, Land Developer, testified stating she was in support of
H202. The International Fire Code (IFC) has given rural fire chiefs
absolute control and has taken away democracy and power of the people
in Idaho County. The local government has no say on how the IFC is
interpreted and enforced in their county.
Dean Ellis, President of the Idaho Fire Chiefs Association, stated in
the interest of time he deferred to Ron Anderson, representing the
Idaho Fire Chiefs Organization. Mr. Anderson stated the fix that is
being proposed in H202 does not solve the problem , in fact, it creates
more problems. Under H202 if the International Fire Code (IFC) is
adopted, it will take the adoption out of the hands of the State Fire
MarshaIJ and gives each city and county fire district the ability to adopt the
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code. Currently, out of 35 cities only 13 of these cities have adopted the
code. If this legislation were to pass, there would be a great number of
cities throughout the State where there would be no code in effect. The
bill takes the authority away from the State Fire Marshall and his
assistants to inspect anything other than State owned or leased buildings
or governmental agencies. As a Fire Chief in the City of Meridian along
with the Chiefs of Boise, Idaho Falls, Wood River and a few-other chiefs
in this room today, it would take away our ability to inspect other than
State buildings. Section §41-256 in the State Statute states that every
fire chief in the State is considered an assistant to the Fire Marshall, and
will not have the authority to inspect any business. This would mean day
cares, schools, bars, restaurants, etc. would not be inspected for fire
safety. The proposed bill creates a number of issues for fire chiefs
statewide.
The Fire Chiefs propose that an impartial appeals board be created that
is not affiliated in any way with the fire department which would act with
impartiality to fire code enforcement cases . The fire chiefs also propose
that an interim committee would be created, chaired by the Association of
Idaho Cities, to bring back legislation next year that will address some of
these issues. Finally, training be put in place for smaller rural fire
departments to standardize the application and enforcement of the IFC
(Attachment B).
Tim Vargas, Fire Commissioner from Jerome County, State's
President Fire Commissioners, stated there are a number of reasons
the Idaho State Fire Commissioner Association (ISFCA) stands opposed
to H202. The Association feels it takes away local control. Fire
Commissioners are elected by the taxpayers in their districts and as duly
elected officials, they are charged with overseeing a budget that will
guarantee that the equipment and the manpower is in place for fire
suppression. In addition, we are charged with the duty of enforCing the
provisions of the International Fire Code as well as fire prevention
activities within our districts. This bill eliminates the commissioners from
performing their duties. It would prevent them from plan review on new
construction for commercial and private properties. The commissioners
would only be accountable for State owned structures or their political
subdivisions. They would only have jurisdiction over their own fire
stations in their district. ISFCA proposes that the Legislature consider a
State Fire Code Board that would function in much the same manner as
the State Building Code Board and it may even be possible to have this
Board service the Fire Code. This Board would adopt the code and write
the necessary amendments to tailor the code to the needs of Idaho. One
of the main complaints they hear is how inflexible the code appears to be
in the enforcement process. The Board would also serve as the appeals
board for fire code enforcement cases. ISFCA stands prepared to work
with the interim task force this summer, fire chiefs, Idaho Association of
Cities, and insurance companies to develop the legislation. They hope to
bring back a solid bill that will meet the needs of all Idaho citizens
pertaining to the enforcement of the IFC, fire protection and prevention
issues that are encountered on a daily basis.
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issues that are encountered on a daily basis.
ADJOURN:

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 3:40 p.m .

Carol Deis
Secretary

~~

Lois Bencken
Assistant Secretary
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MINUTES

SENATE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE

DATE:

April 14, 2009

TIME:

1:30 p.m.

PLACE:

Room 117

MEMBERS
PRESENT:

Chairman Andreason, Vice Chairman Coiner, Senators Stegner,
Cameron, Goedde, Lodge, Smyser, Sagness (Malepeai), and LeFavour

MEMBERS
ABSENTI
EXCUSED:
GUESTS:

See attached sign-in sheet.

NOTE:

The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained
with the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and
will then be located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services
·Ubrary.

CONVENED:

Chairman Andreason called the meeting to order at 8:15 a.m.

MINUTES:
S1166

Relating to the State Insurance Fund
Senator Davis stated th~ fiscal impact of this legislation is a substantial
concern to the State budget. Absent advancement of this legislation will
require the State to find some economics which the State does not have
built into the budget. The principle concern of the Committee was the
impact of current and pending litigation. Senator Davis asked if the
Committee would consider sending the bill to the floor for possible
amendment with the commitment to the Committee that together with the
sponsors of the bill a set of amendments would be written that would not
adversely impact the current and pending litigation.
Senator LeFavour inquired about the settlements that had been awarded
and wanted to make sure the bill would not impact the fund settlements.
Senator Davis clarified that if there is a lawful claim currently pending
they would be entitled to pursue whatever remedy. If there has already
been a settlement, it is not our intent to write any amendments that would
require any expunging.

MOTION:

Senator Cameron moved that S1166 be referred to the 14th order for
amendment. The motion was seconded by Senator Lodge. The motion
carried by Voice Vote.
Senator Stegner advised he was aware of the efforts to negotiate this bill
and to find some remedy that would be agreeable to him, and he finds no
objection to this action.
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H231

Relating to the Public Employee Retirement System
Senator Cameron stated that H231 is designed to fix the problem that
has occurred with one of the city council members in the City of Jerome.
A council member who was a former State employee ran for city council
and he is fine until his number of months serving on the council exceeds
the number of months he was a State employee. The result would be a
significant cut in PERSI benefits to that council member. The council
member would have to resign from his seat on the city council prior to
that month that would lower his benefits. This legislation could potentially
impact 100 to 150 active individuals who are elected officials but had
some previous State service or some other entity that is a PERSI
participant.
Senator Cameron walked the Committee through his presentation to
clarify how the benefit would fluctuate with this public service (Attachment
A). There are three methods of calculating this split benefit and Senator
Cameron explained two. Example 1: Shows an individual who has 120
months of general service and 119 months of elected service, they stayed
1 month below the PERSI split benefit. Their monthly retirement benefit
would be $1195. Example 2: Shows an individual who has 119 months of
general service and 120 months of elected service the retirement benefit
drops to $605. The proposed change in the bill allows city elected
officials and others the same split benefit protection as legislators so the
elected service would not count against their PERSI benefits. We do not
want to prohibit those that have served either as an employee of the State
of Idaho, county, city or hospital from being able to serve as an elected
official.

MOTION:

H248

Vice Chairman Coiner moved that H231 be sent to the floor with a do
pass recommendation: The motion was seconded by Senator
LeFavour. The motion carried by Voice Vote. Senator Cameron will be
the sponsor of the bill.
Relating to the Employment Security Law
Bob Fick, Legislative Affairs, Department of Labor, stated that H248
before the Committee today takes advantage of a provision in the
stimulus package that benefits both unemployed workers and
businesses. Under this proposal the State will adopt three expansions of
unemployment insurance benefits. Upon certifying to the federal
government that the State has adopted these expansions the State will
receive $32.3 million from the Reed Act into the unemployment insurance
trust fund. The expansions are relatively minor in the grand scheme of
things: 1) Allows the most recent quarter of wages prior to lay-off to be
used in calculating benefits if the traditional benefit calculation method,
which is the first four of the last five quarters, fails to qualify the individual.
This will cover approximately 8% of claimants. A large number of the
claimants actually qualify later by waiting an extra quarter; 2) Benefits for
claimants that work part-time and were laid-off from a part-time job and
only want to continue to seek a part-time position. Under the current
formula the system does not care whether you work part-time or full time
per week. It is set-up to look at how much time you made in the quarter.
To continue receiving benefits the claimant must be seeking part-time or
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full time work; and 3) Extended benefits for workers who have exhausted
all their other benefits and are in a State approved training program. As
long as they continue with successful progress in the program they can
receive additional benefits. A number of unemployed workers who are
covered by the Trade Adjustment Systems Act already are eligible for
these benefits. This picks up those in State approved training and that is
the control the State has when it approves this training. It allows the
workers to receive this extended benefit, and this is less than 1% of
claimants. The total cost for all three expansion benefits is $3 million.
Upon certifying that we have expanded these benefits the State will
receive $32.3 million into the Reed Act Account. That infusion of cash
immediately into the trust fund will reduce the amount of money the fund
will have to borrow later this year when it is depleted. Eventually, once
the rates adjust themselves, it will mean that rate increases to employers
will be 10 to 15% less than they would be had the infusion not occurred.
This legislation has been endorsed from ICAC, AFLO-CIO, small
business and the Restaurant and Retailers Association.
H248

Senator Stegner moved that H248 be sent to the floor with a do pass
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Cameron. The
motion carried by Voice Vote. Senator Stegner will be the sponsor of
the bill.

S1214

Relating to Unemployment Benefits
Bob Fick, Legislative Affairs, Department of Labor, stated that S1214
allows the State to adopt a formula for triggering federal state extended
benefits for a longer period than the current formula allows. This is
provided for in the stimulus bill. The federal state extended benefits have
been around since World War II. They are up to thirteen weeks of
,
additional benefits for unemployed workers who have exhausted all their
other benefits. Up until now they have been paid 50% from the State
Trust Fund and 50% from the federal government. Under the stimulus bill
the federal government has agreed to pay 100% of those benefits
through the end of this year and have agreed to allow states to adopt
triggers on these benefits. Currently the benefits are triggered by the
insured unemployment rate rising above 5%. The rate rose above 5%
the beginning of February. It is expected to trigger down below 5%
about the middle of June. The new formula allowed in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Stimulus Act) lets the states
use the seasonally adjusted total unemployment rate. When that rate
exceeds 6.5% on a three month rolling average the extended benefit
period triggers on and stays on until the rolling average falls below 6.5%.
Under the current situation the 6.5% three month rolling average was hit
the last week of April 1, 2009. It will stay above 6.5% for the rest of this
year. In cases where the federal government is paying 100% of federal
state extended benefits the state can use this total unemployment rate
calculation. As soon as the federal government stops paying 100% they
will convert back to the more conservative 5% seasonally insured
unemployment rate. The effect of this is an additional $14 to $20 million
into the Idaho economy during the second half of 2009.

MOTION:

Senator LeFavour moved that S1214 be sent to the floor with a do pass
SENATE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES
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recommendation. The motion was seconded by Vice Chairman Coiner.
The motion carried by Voice Vote. Senator LeFavour will be the
sponsor of the bill.
MOTION:

Senator Sagness moved to approve the minutes of March 24, 2009.
The motion was seconded by Vice Chairman Coiner. The motion
carried by Voice Vote.

MOTION:

Senator Smyser moved to approve the minutes of March 26,2009. The
motion was seconded by Senator Lodge. The motion carried by Voice
Vote.

MOTION:

Senator LeFavour moved to approve the minutes of April 2, 2009. The
motion was seconded by Vice Chairman Coiner. The motion carried by
Voice Vote.

ADJOURNED:

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 8:34 a.m.

Carol Deis
Secretary
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The ollicers 01 this reporting entity being duly swom, each depose and say that they are the described officers 01 said reporting entity, and that on the reporting period
stated above, ali 01 the herein described assets were the absolute property 01 the said reporting entity, Iree and clear from any liens or claims thereon, except as
herein stated, and that this statement, together with related exhibits, schedules and explanations therein contained, annexed or referred to, is a lull and true statement
01 all the assets and liabilities and of tha, condition and affairs of the said reporting entity as of the reporting period stated above, and of its income and deductions
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1 _ _ _~~~~~c~u~~nty~ear--~--~----_r--~P'~norry~ear---

,..

i

2

3
Net Admitled

4

(C~~~~~ 21

Admltt~:~ssets

.. ....... , .... 479,295,791

..............503,123,999

Assets
1 1.
2.

I

3.

Bonds (Schedule D)............................................................................................................ .. ............479,295,791
Slacks (Schedule D):
2.1

Preferred stocks ..................................................................................................... ..

2.2

Common stocks ....................................................................................................................... .71,487,691 I................................. .. .............;...71.487,691 .................53,854,771

................................. 0

Mortgage loans on real estate (Schedule B):

.........................................................................

3.1

First liens................................................................................................................ ..

3.2

Other than flrstliens................................................................................................. .. ..................................

.. ............................... 0

.................................0

Real estate (Schedule A):
Properties occupied by the company (less $.......... 0
encumbrances) ...........................................................................................................................2, 173, 127

...................2,173,127 ...................2,380,879

4.2

Properties held for the production of income (less $..........0
encumbrances)........................................................................................................ .. ..................................

................................. 0

4.3

Properties held for sale (less ~.

.. ...........................,.....0

4.1

0

................................... .

5. Cash ($ .....34,788,521, Soh. E·Part 1), cash eqUivalents ($..........0,
Sch. E·Part 2) and short·term investments ($ ..... 9,202,396, Seh. DA) ..............................................43,990,918
6.

Contract loans (including

$..........0 premlumn00011°1.5<1) ............................................................. 1....................................

................ .43,990, ~18 .................29,254,796
.................................... .................................. 0
......................933,3"'9 ................... 1,079,889

7. Other Invested assets (Schedule Ro",01,' .................................................................................. 1......................933,350
8.

Receivables for ••••"O"UI"III••,.'<....................................................................................................... 1.................. .3,674,258 .................................... .. .................3,674,258

9.

Aggregate write·ins for

o .

0

10. Subtotals, cash and Invested assets (Lines 1 to 0.1) ............................................................. 1 .............. 601,555,135 .................................0 ..............601,555,135
11. Title plants less $.......... 0 charged off (for THie insurers onh,

.

.................................... ....................................

...................7,872,984

n..

.. ............................... 0

. ..... 0

..............597,567,318
....................................

.................. .4,B35,303 ................... 5,482,948

12. Investment Income due and .a"c"c,'ruecl .................................................................................... 1...................4,835,303

113. Premiums and considerations:
13.1 UnCOllected premiums and agents' balances In course of collection ..................... ...................5,158,315 ................... 1,841,274 ...................3,317,040 ...................4,107,108
13.2 Deferred premiums, agents' balances and installments booked but deferred
and not yet due (Including $ ..........0 earned but unbilledp"~relmnr'''urmn·s') .....................,.. t ..........................9,784

..........................9,764 ........................14,336

13.3 Accrued retrospactive premiums .............................................................................

.................................0 I ....................................

Reinsurance:

14.1 Amounts recoverable from reinsurers .............................................................................................84.327

........................ 84,327 ........................ 28,920

14.2 Funds held by or deposited with reinsured ~conm1pnoa"'1101e·S ............................................ I ......................396,357

......................396,357 ..................... .464,549

14.3 Other amounts receivable under reinsurance cc""n"u'..
',·c'
' ts· .......................................... I .................................. ..
Amounts receivable relating to uninsuredpo"oaro1s'......................................................................................................

.. ...............................0

6.1 Current federal and foreign Income tax recoverable and

.. ...............................0

"m,h1'ee"rr·p.e·u(MlO"....................... .................................... .................................... ... ,.............................0

.. .................................. 1......................................

116.2 Net deferred tax ',"0' ..

17. Guaranty funds receivable or on deposL........................................................................ ....................................

.................................0
.. ............................... 0

18. Electronic data processing equipment and software .......................................................................... 14,889,199 ................. 14,396,519 ......................492,681 ......................372,208
19. Furniture and equipment, Including health care delivery assets ($ ..........0) .............................................89,065 ........................89,065 .................................0 .................................0
20. Net adjustment In assets and liabilities due to foreign exchange rates ................................................................

.. ...............................0

21. Receivables from parent, subsidiaries and affiliates......................................................... ....................................

.. ...............................0

I

22. Health care ($ .......... 0) and other amounts receivable...................................................... .................................... .................................... .. ............................... 0 I ....................................
23. Aggregate write·lns for other than Invested assets ...........................................................

I

24.

~:~~:~!=~~I~~~~ ;~::~~~~.~.~~~~~~:.:.~.~.:~~~~~~.~.:~~.~.~~.~.~~~~.~~~~...........

1==""""".i.:t.6lli144~
. 505*===::!.A!l!!!.001;'!40="'."'."'."'.;.111..@
2Blldlj
. 3643==.",.",..:i41,·tlli
140)lli
. 120~

.. . . . . . . 631 ,631

,969

1 .................

16,815,000 .............. 614,816,970 .............. 612,177,507

25. From S~parate Accounts, Segregated Accounts and Protected Cell Accounts............... t .....................................

I 26.

O~ 1,631,969

TOTALS (Lines 24 and 0<;'

.. ...............................f: .......................................

.....~~ .......... 16,815,000 .............. 614,816,970

I ..............612,177,507

DETAilS (IF WRITE·INS

I~:~::

I

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::

903 ..........................................................................................................................,..................

.................................0 I ............·....................·.. ..
.................................0 ................................... ..

.................................... ................................. 0

v998. Summary of remaining write·lns for Line 9.'rom overllow page........................................ .. ...............................0 .................................0 .................................0 .................................0
n.n
. ..,
..
0
'"
0

10999. Totals (Lines 0901 Ihru 0903 Dlus 09981 (Une 9 oho"o'

301. Ceded Reinsurance Deposit..............................................................................................

1700 nnn ................................... . .. ................. 1,706,000 ................... 1,342,030

/2:::: ~:~:::~~:r~::~:~:~e•..I~ ;: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ..........:.....:.:.~:....:::;:

.......................... 2,487 .......................... 2,443

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

...................2,417,876 ...................2.795,647

00011.?

Afini.ialS~aii.im&n!foiihe)'ear200soflhij Idaho State Insurance .Fund

LIABILITIES, SURPLUS AND OTHER FUNDS
2
Current Year

PriorYear

t.

Losses (Part2A, Line 35, Column 8) ...................................................................,............................................................................:...................,...317,254,569 ...................323,013,370

2.

Reinsurance payable onpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses (Schedule F, Part 1, Column 6) ................................................................:..........................:.....................................

3.

Loss adjustment expenses (Part 2A, Line 35, Column 9) .... :................................................................................................................ .....................36.813,380 .....................36.787,992

4.

Commissions payable, contingent commissions and other similar charges .............................................................................................................................................c............................ .

5.

other expenses (excluding taxes, licenses and fees)........................................................................................................................... .. .....................7.B43,44i .......................2,407,825

6.

Taxes, licenses and fees (excluding federal and foreign Income taxes) ......................................................................................................................1,921,692 .......................2,302,246

7.1

Current federal and foreign Income taxes (Including $..........0 on realized capital gains (losses)) ........................................................................................................................................

7.2 Net deferred tax liability.......................................................................................,.. ,..................................,.................,.,....................".. •.. ,.............,... "." .....,........, ............." ........,...•. ,." .......,
8,

Borrowed money $, .. ,......0 and Interest thereon $..........0....,..................,.,.,.,",...,...,................................................................,.. ,......, ., .........,...,.............,'.......,.. ............,........,.,......,." ... ,.,.

9,

Unearned premiums (Part 1A, Line 38, Column 5) (after deducting uneamed premiums for ceded reinsurance of
$..........0 and including warrenty reserves of $..........0)..............................................................................................................................................18.815,096 .....................25.049,609

10.

Advance premium..........................................................................................................................................................................................................2.661.630 .......................2,529.230

1t.

Dividends declared and unpaid:
11, 1 Stockhoiders..........................................................................................:........................................................................................ .........................................
11.2 Policyholders ..................;......................................................................................................................................................:........ •...........:........14,045;t36 .....................13,58B,21j2

. 12.

Ceded reinsurance premlunis payable (net·of ceding commissions)...............................................................................................,... •......................1,494,707 ...:...................1,179,234

13.

Funds heid by company under reinsurance ·treaties (Schedule F, Part 3. Column 19)........................................................................ ......................................... .........................................

14.

Amounts withheld or retained by company for account of olhers...........,............................................................,................................ .. ........................524.968 .........................312.159

15,

Remittances and Items not allocated ................................................................................................................,.................................... ..........................165, 187 ............................31.027

16,

Provision for reinsurance (Schedule·F. Part 7) .........................................,............................,...........................,...............................,... .;........................" ...... "..... .........................................

: 17.

Net adjustinents In assets alid liabilities due to foreign exchange rates..........,........................................................................,.................:..........:................................................................

18.

Drafts outslanding .....................................................,......................................,................,......................'.. ,........................................... ..'.......,.............,.. ,............. .,...........,...........................

19.

Payable to parent subsidiaries and affiliates.................,.......,...............................,............,..... ':.......................................................... •..........................,.............. ..•• ,..............,.....................

20.

Payable for securities., •• ,., ...........,...,.................,.....,..............:...... '................,... ,., ...................,...............................,............................. ..,..................11,286.821 .........,........... 10.565.139

21,

L1ablilly for amounts held under uninsured plans....................................................................................................................................................................................................................

22.

Capital noles $...........0 and Interest thereon $..........0.....,...,...,....,................,.....................,...........,......................" ........................,... ..................,..............,....... .............,.........................,.

23.

Aggregate wrlte·lns for IlablUties...................................................................................................................................................,........ .. ...............,... ..4 049 955 .......................351 B 024

24,

Total liabilities excluding protected celillabUities (Lines 1 through 23) ....................................................................................................................416,876,685 ...................421,282.117

25.

Protected celi llablltlies, .............,................:.,................................,...:................:...,................................................................................,...,.........,.. ,.......... '.•....... ,' •• ,.• ,•. ,.......,.•...• :.,., ••:......,.,.

26.

TotalliablHtIes (Lines 24 and 25)................:............................:................................................................. :............................................ .. ............... ..416 876 585 ...................421282'117..·

27.

Aggregate write-Ins for special surplus funds.................................................................................................................................~............................................0 ......................................0

28,

Common capital stock......................................................................................................" ............... "........ " ..... "' ....." .................,, .......................................,.......................................;,~ .......

29.

Preferred capital slock. ............................................................................................................................................................................"..;.................................. " ........................................

30.

Aggregate wrlte·lns for other than special surplus funds ............................................" ............,.:"................................." .... " .............. " .................." ................0 ....................................,,0

31.

Surplus notes.................:......................................." ...................." ..............................................."......................................................." ....... " .............." ............." ..........................." .... " ......

32.· Gross paid In and contributed surplus....,..............".......................,................,.................................,,,....................................,........... .. ..............................,........ •..............................,.........
33.

34.

Unassigned funds (surplus)., ..............,...............................,...,.............................................;..........................................,............,................,,,.........197,940.384· ................,..190.895.389
Less treasury stock, at cost
34,1 .......;..0.000 shares common (value Included In Line 2B $..........0) .............;........................................................................:.................................................................." ...................
34.2 ..........0.000 shares preferred (value Included In Une 29 $..........0) .............." ....................................................................................."." ............" ............... " ..................."." .... "."."

35.

Surplus as regards policyholders (Lines 27 to 33, less 34) (Page 4, Line 39) ....................................................................................... p"""'
..."'
..."'
..."'
...."'
.. 1"'9"'7",94",0",38""4,+"..",,,.,,,,,..,,,,,,.,,,,
.. ,,,,.,,,,,,.1,,,90,,,8,,,95,,,3,,,8"'-19

36.

TOTALS (Page 2. L1ne'26, Col. 3), ..........:...................................................." ................................. i."; ........................... ,.,, .................... ;................614.816.970 ...................612.177.507
DETAILS OF WRITE-INS

2301. Credits Due Policyholders........................................................................" ..................................................................................................................4,049,955 .......................3,518.024
2302.

• ................................................................, ............................................................. , .......................................................... , ........ , •••• : ••••~..

.........................................

• .......................... 1............ .

2303.

239B. Summary of remaining write-Ins for Une 23 from overflow page.......................................................................................................... •.....................................0 ......................................0
2399. Totals (Lines 2301 thru 2303 ollis 2398HLlne 23 above\.. ..........................................................................................................................................4 049 9SS· ........... "" ..... ".3518024
2701,

............................................................................................................................:..............................................;......................................................................................................................

2702.
2703.
2798, Summary of remaining write-Ins for Line 27 from overllow page ........:......................................................................"... " .......... "" ........................................" ..0 ......................................0
2799. Totals (Unes 2701 thru 2703·01us 2798) (Line 27 abovel..." ................................................." ........................................................." ........... ,.........,.................0 ....................................,,0
3001,
3002......................................................................................................" .. " .........................................................................................................................................................................:.............
3003..........................................................................................................................." ...........................,.................................................;.....: ..................................................................................
3098. Summary of remelnlng write-Ins for Line 30 from overllowpage ................................................................................................................................................0 ......... " ...........................0
3099. Tolals (Lines aodl thru 3003 Ius 3098\ fUne 30 above\.. .............................................................,.......,........................:.....,.........................."., ......................0 ..........,........ ,..................0
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Sixtieth Legislature

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
First Regular Session - 2009
IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1166, As Amended
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

5

AN ACT
RELATING TO THE STATE INSURANCE FUND; TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT;
REPEALING SECTION 72-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO DIVIDENDS;
DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING A RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVE
DATE.

6

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State ofIdaho:

1
2

3
4

34

SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. (1) Historically, the State Insurance Fund has
exercised its discretion, pursuant to Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to determine the annual
amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive.
(2) On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v. Idaho
State Insurance Fund, S. Ct. 35144, in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho Code, and
ruled that the State Insurance Fund cannot exercise its discretion in determining how much of
a dividend to pay to each policyholder because the statute requires a pro rata distribution of
dividends to all policyholders. The result of the decision is to require that the State Insurance
Fund pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's
ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders.
(3) In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that, if it has become prudent to alter the
statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the Legislature is
the appropriate venue for such change.
(4) It was the intent of the Legislature in passing House Bill No. 774, As Amended of
the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, effective on April 3, 1998,
that the State Insurance Fund should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject to
regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provisions set forth in Chapter
28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to January
1, 2003, will conform with that intent. Section 73-101, Idaho Code, permits such retroactive
repeal as long as it is "expressly so declared" in legislation.
(5) The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, will reconcile conflicts in the
existing laws governing the State Insurance Fund and will allow the fund, like other insurance
companies, to issue dividends pursuant to Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code.
(6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply to
any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or before December
31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the aforementioned case of Farber
v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently pending with respect to those policy holders paying
annual premiums of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).

35

SECTION 2. That Section 72-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby repealed.

36

SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to
exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval,
and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to January 1, 2003.
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Donald W. Lojek ISBN 1395
LOJEK LAw OFFICES, CHTD
623 West Hays Street
PO Box 1712
Boise, 10 83701
Telephone: 208-343-7733
Facsimile:
208-345-0050
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, 10 83702
Telephone: 208/345-7100
Facsimile: 208/345-0050

F I LED
if;.J P.M

_ _ _A.M.

(leT 1 I a010
CANYON OOUNty OI.,.J;RK

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class

D.BUTLER,OEPUTV

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF
SALMON,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official
capacity as its Manager, and WILLIAM
DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, GERALD
GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS,
RODNEY A. HIGGINS, TERRY
GESTRIN AND MAX BLACK AND
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the
State Insurance Fund,

CASE NO. CV 09-13607-C
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DEFENDANTS' 14TH AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS' 14TH AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE -1

000204

COME NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel of record,
and pursuant to Rule 56(a) , I.R.C.P., move for summary judgment on the Defendants'
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense.
This Motion is supported by the Acknowledgment of Service from the Office of
the Idaho Attorney General and a Memorandum in Support of this Motion, both of which
are being filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this

/1"/4 day of October, 2010.

GORDON LAW OFFICES

By

~--<-S
,(6~rv ~
Philip Gordon
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

By----,dJJ=--=-=---e:L=---_
Donald W. Lojek
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS' 14TH AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE-2

000205

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lfflday of October, 2010, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated
below, and addressed as follows:
[]

Hand Delivery
[~U.S. Mail, postage paid
[]
Overnight Express Mail
[]
Facsimile Copy:

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for State Insurance Fund

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS'14TH AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE - 3
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Richard E. Hall

_F____' A.k ~M 0 9M.

ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com

Keely E. Duke
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585

OCT 2 6 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN. DEPUTY
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF
SALMON,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 09-13607-C

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his
official capacity as its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WA YNE MEYER,
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS,
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the
State Insurance Fund,
Defendants.

COME NOW defendants, The Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn in his
official capacity as its Manager, and William Deal, Wayne Meyer, Gerald Geddes, John Goedde,
Elaine Martin, Mark Snodgrass, Rodney A. Higgins, Terry Gestrin, Max Black, and Steve

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

000207

Landon in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund
(collectively, "SIF"), by and through their counsel of record Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton,
P.A., and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, hereby move this Court for an order
dismissing plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial with
prejudice, on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that SIF is entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law on all of plaintiffs' claims.
Specifically, SIF is entitled to summary judgment because the repeal of I.C. § 72-915
bars Plaintiffs' action as the emergency repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 was signed May 6,2009, and was
made retroactive to January 1, 2003, thereby barring Plaintiffs' action. Furthermore, contrary to
Plaintiffs' position, the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is constitutional, both under the U.S. and Idaho
constitutions.
This motion is based upon the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of James M. Alcorn in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, which are filed herewith, as well as all pleadings and papers on file in this
action.
SIF requests oral argument.
DATED this zr!day of October, 2010.
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

000208

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

zCe~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of October, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd.
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintifft
Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

t>Z

~

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Email

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Email
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Richard E. Hall
ISB #1253; reh@haUfadey.com
Keely E. Duke
ISH #6044; ked@hallfarlcy.colll

F I

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BlANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1211
Boise, Idaho 83701

A.k tJh;~ 9.M.

/OCl 262010

Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W:IJ\3.0461,9\PLSADlNGS\MSJ-Alf·AIcom.cIoc

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THlRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNfY OF CANYON

CDA DAIRY QUEEN, TNC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF
SALMON.
Plaintiffs,
vs.

, Case No. CV 09-13607-C
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN
, IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT
'tHE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his
official capacity as its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL) WAYNE MEYER,
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK
SNODGRASS, ROnNEY A. HIGGINS,
TERRY OESTRIN and MAX BLACK and
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the
State Insurance Fund,

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

COllIlty of Ada

)

AFFIDAVIT OF JA.M.ES M. ALCORN IN SUPPORT Of'DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR S\JMMARY
JUDGMENT -1
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I, James M. Alcorn, being first duly swom, depose and state:
1.

I am the Manager of the SIF and have been since Apn1199S.

2.

I have had extensive experience with the ~ance industry since 1970 as a licensed

insurance agent and owner of independent pro~ and casualty insurance agencies and
currently hold the prof~sional designation of Certified Insurance Counselot'3.

1 served as the Director of the Idaho DepartIp.ent of Insurance from May 1994 to January
i

1995, and as its Deputy Director from January 1995 to December 1995, and then again served as
Director of the Department from December 1995 until ApriJ of 1998.
4.

My past experience as a licensed insurance" ag~t and Director of the Idaho Department

of Insurance has caused me to be familiar with the laws regulating the insurance industry and
insurance industry practices.

5.

As the Manager of-the State Insurance Fund (SIP), I am familiar with its history and its
,

day to day operations and am Tequired by law to conduct the business of the SIF and do all things
I

convenient and necessary to manage the SIP so that it is run as an efficient insurance company.
remains actuarlaUy sound and maintains the public purposes for which it was created.
i

6.

I

The SIF was created by the Idaho Legislature in 1917 for the purpose of providing a

stable source of worker's compensation insurance for Idaho employers and their employees.
I

7.

I

Idaho Law generally provides tha.t all i Idaho employers must maintain worker's

compensa.tiQIl insurance coverage for their employees, other than those specifically exempted by
I

I.C. §72-212.

8.

Since the enactment of 41-1601 et seq. in 1~61, Idaho's worker's compensation insurance

rates have been regulated by the Depflrlment of Insurance which approves worker's

compensation rates based upon the rate filings of an authorized rating organization (National

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMES M. ALCORN IN SUPPOR.T OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUl\'J1\IlARY

JUDGMENT - 2
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Council on Compensation lnsu!ance !Ika NCCl). Idaho is an administered pricing state whlch
means that the rating organil!:a.ti.on files the entire rate. Companies may file with the Department
of Insuranoe for approval to dcviate from the filed rate by individual rate or for all rates.
Companies may also use schedule credits on specific policies. Companies may not use both a
deviation and scheduled credits.
9.

SIF is currently deviating by 9% from all filed rates. Therefore, the premiums for all SIF

policyholders are calculated beginning with a rate' 9% below the rates approved by the

Department of Insurance. This deviation is applied across the board for all policyholders
regardless of premium Sl2:e or losses occurring on an insurance policy.
10.

Idaho is a competitive state which means that the SIP is not a monopoly and must

compete for business against the private worker's compensation insut'ance car.riers.
11.

Jdaho also bas a woIker's compeI1Sation assigned risk pool whlch insures employers who

cannot otherwise secure workers compeIlSation coverage, but employers insuring through the
assigned risk pool are subject to rates 50% above the standard rate.
12.

Idaho employers are not required to insure through the SIFt they may insure with

fl.

private carrier Or if they are declined coverage by two private caniers and the SIF then coverage
can be obtained throu.gh the assigned risk pool which is the carrier oflast resort
13.

The SIF has a public purpose to provide worker's compensation iDsumnce to Idaho

employers and while it is not the insurer of last resort, the SlF maintains an underwriting policy
that seeks to insure all employers regardless of size so that most Idaho employers who cOuld not

otherwise obtain coverage through a private carrier COl:lld obtain coverage with the SIP and avoid
the extra costs associated with acquiring an insurance policy through the assigned risk pool.

AFFIlJAVIT OF JAMES 1\1. ALCORN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR S~y
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SIF Manager> I am required to Ill!rinta1n the solvency of the SIF and make de~sions

regarding the level of surplus and reserves n~ed by ~e Fund,to remain actuarially so~d so
there continues to be a stable and available source of worker's compensation insurance coverage.
15.

The maintenance of adequate surplus and reserv~ is an important aspect ofmanagiug the

SIF because unlike all other worker's compensation carriers operating in Idaho the Fund is
prccluded by statute (I.C. §72-901(4») from being a member of the Idaho Insurance' Guaranty
Association.

16.

The Idaho :Insurance Guaranty Association guaranties payment of insurance benefits in

the event that an insurance carrier cannot pay its insurance claims or becomes insolvent
17.

All insurers in the state belong to the Idaho ~urance Guaranty Association e]t.cept the

SIF which is barred by law.
18.

Since the SIP cannot like other carriers rely on'Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association to

pay benefits in the event of insolvency, the SIF must be managed such that it maintains sufficient
surplus and reserves to provide Ii stable ongoing source of worker's compensation insurance to

protect Idaho workers.
19.

The duty of the Manager and the Board of DirEictors to maintain the financial integrity of

the SIF is panunO'UIlt because if the SIF were to become inSolvent, the availability of worker's

compensation insurance in Idaho would be. critically jeopardized since the SIF insures

approximately 36,000 employers, which is approximately 70% of the market Many
especially the smaller employers, cannot get

coverag~

of whom,

from other ins\.U"ers whose underwriting

policies are not as liberal as the SIF.

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ·4
I
I

"

F

,i

00021.3

10/26/10

~

..

--~-

.. ,

-_ - '

16:31 FAX 208 395

------

HALL FARLEY

- ... _._.._- ,.... ...
,-~

,.'

~006/010

:-i--- - - - - - - - - - -

..

- ..

to operate and manage the St:F and to decide the appropriate

20.

level of surplus, reserves and ,H",t1"'nrl", has b~ the duty of its Manager and subject to his or her
discretionary authority.
,

21.

The SIF surplus is

'

of the SIF and dividends, if any, are paid from what the

lID

Manager determines to be

that is safely available·after taking into consideration various

factors including, but not

to, present and future SIP operating expenses, the required

reserves, projected investment

market forces, and industry trends.
are not the same as dividends paid by to stockholders of a

22.

company. SIF dividends are

related to o~nership or the sharing of profits. SIP dividends are

the return of unused premium.

23.

The detennination as

one is not a science, but is

knowledge of the insurance
24.

whether to declare a dividend, how much, and who will receive
decision

niakmg process that. is based

upon experi~ce and

industiy trends, and market forces.

The declaration of a rl1l'<r't1 .... t'I is a multi-step process ~at starts with deciding how much

surplus is safely available to

declared as 11 dividend, then there is a determination as to how it

. . ""''''l,UlL the cbst of writing an insUrance policy and considering thc
losses that lIlay have been inCl~ld on the P9licy,
,
I

25.

The SIF, through

.

previous m~gers and the C~eht Manager, bas issued diVidends
I

continuously since at least 1

using essen,tia11y the sam~ dividend fonnula as is used presently,
~

!

a percentage of paid premi~ ;have always differentiated by the
I
I

size of the premium talcing

account th~ losses incurred on, :the insunmce pollcy such that the

SIF has always returned

Wier per~tage of paid pr~um to the large policy holders, as
.,
I
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,

,

'

opposed to the smaller sized poHcyholders,; This: is ~nmsterit with workers compensation
,:

,

::

insurance industry practices.

;: ;
.

"

!

26.

'

I

•

\

f"

WoIker's compensation ,coverage is! a unique fo~ ,of; insurance in that it provides
:

l'j

.'

;

,

unlimited coverage to its policyholder regardless of the p~Utn; sUie. The SIP provides a $300
:
I

,I

I

Ii·,
:

I

':.

•

I

:1

;

':

" ,

! I

\
:

policyholder with the same amount of UPPct cov~ge ~':a ~590,OOO policyholder, but either
i
:1: ,,:
policy can have extensive losses well abo~e their, ptemium:'~aunt. Losses in excess of a
•

,

million dollars on a claim are not unheard of im~ have b~ ~aid
I

:

27.

eertaifi ~~on during the policy years in

The decision to distnoute dividend~ in a
I

question was made by considering and

'by the SIF.

!":

,I

I

I

~eighing
;

~e' ~ors
. ': ;'. ~

all

i

set forth above and was

!
i!

consistent with the law, and industry practice, aIld was done witp. the knowledge of the Board of
,

Directors.
!

28.

!I

':.:

I

•• :

,I

,'

:,

':.

i

:

t

: :'

!

'

If the Court were to find that Idaho <pode Section'72-~r~
has not, or cannot, be repealed
,
,
!

:'
.
II.

:

1

as intended by the Jdaho Legislature, the ~IF' Manager ~oU1d! lack the discretion to declare a
. .
: .
:'; :;::;1
d1Vldend that can be safely and properly divitled with regm;6 to prior paid premiums.
I

,I

29.

,

!,'
' ,
"II:':

t

,:i:,

,

Attached hereto as Exlnbit A is a tnI~ and correct~.Y 6fthe SIF's internal Underwriting
t
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true ropy of the foregoing document, by the method ,;1nd.ilcat<~
the following:
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I caused to be served a
and addressed to each of

Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd.
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys/or Plaintijft
Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise, 10 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345~0050
Attorneys for Plaintijft
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Richard E. Hall
ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com
Keely E. Duke
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF
SALMON,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No. CV 09-13607-C

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his
official capacity as its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS,
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the
State Insurance Fund,
Defendants.

STATEOFIDAHO )
) ss
COUNTY OF ADA )
I, Bryan A. Nickels, being first duly sworn, depose and state:
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-l

00021.9

1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Idaho, and am an attorney

with the law firm of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., attorneys for defendants in this
action, and make this Affidavit on my personal knowledge and belief.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the "Memorandum

Decision Upon Motions for Summary Judgment," filed December 26, 2007 in the matter entitled
Randolph E. Farber, et ai. v. The Idaho State Insurance Fund, in the District Court for the Third

District of Idaho, Canyon County, Case No. CV06-7877 (Judge Morfitt and Judge Ryan,
presiding)("Farber").

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the "Amendment to the

Court's Memorandum Decision upon Motions for Summary Judgment," filed February 15,2008,
in the Farber litigation.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of the legislative history,

engrossed text, and Statement of PurposelFiscal Note regarding the 2009 repeal of I.C. §72-915
(SB 1166, as

amended), as maintained on the Idaho

State Legislature website at

http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislationl2009/S 1166 .htm.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the "Memorandum

Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," filed
November 4,2009, in the Farber litigation.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the "Supplemental

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, or In the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment," filed September 21, 2009, in the Farber litigation, as was referenced in the
"Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment," which is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-2
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7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the "Remittitur" issued

by the Idaho Supreme Court on May 27, 2009, in the Farber litigation.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Bryan A. Nic
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

CAln4tl. day of October, 2010 .

.

N~~'O~

I

Residing at Boise, Idaho
' " _~f _ ~
My Commission Expires:_.;;...~-=-_~_..L---'--"~"--_

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Z~ day of October, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
'

Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd.
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Email

Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Email
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CANYON 'COUNTY CLERK
P. SALAS, DEPUTY

;
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J

i
~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

iI

1 ..

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT
ALAN BECKER and CRITTER
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional
Association.
Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its
Manager, and Wll.LIAM DEAL,
WAYNE MEYER, MARGUERITE
McLAUGHLIN, GERALD GEDDES,
MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN OOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK
SNODGRASS in their capacity
as member of the Board of
Directors of the State
Insurance Fund
Defendants.

)
)
)

) CASE NO. CV 2006-07877*C
)
)

) MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON
) MOTIONSFORS~Y
) JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

'This matter came on for hearing upon plaintiffs' second motion for summary judgment and
upon defendants' motion for summary judgment. Presenting oral argument for the plaintiffs was

MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

000224

j
1
•t-

!1
!

Bruce Bistline, attorney at law. Presenting oral argument for the defendants was Richard Hall,

I
~.

attorney at law.

j

The court has reviewed the written briefs submitted on behalf of the parties, the affidavits
submitted and considered the oral arguments presented and finds as follows:

I!
I

PROCEDURAL lDSTORY

J,.

This is a class action law suit. The class is defined as all Idaho employers who pay annual

i
f

premiums of $2,500 or less to the Idaho State Insurance Fund, hereinafter "SIP", for workers
j

compensation coverage. The complaint declares that I.C. §72-915 authorizes the SIP manager to
readjust the rates of a particular class of employment or industry, in other words, to pay dividends.
Since 2003, the fund has paid dividends to only those subscribers who pay more than $2,500 of
annual premiums into the fund.
Plaintiffs allege that those in their class comprise 80 to 95 % of the subscribers to the SIP.
The number of policies issued by the SIP is claimed to be 29,789 in 2002 and 32,320 in 2003. So
the class is very large.
Count I of the complaint calls for the court to use its power to declare the rights, status, and
other legal relations of parties pursuant to 1. C. §10-1201, in other words, to make SIP pay dividends
to the members of the class by Declaratory Judgment.
Count II of the complaint asks the court to enjoin the defendants from ever again paying out
dividends to some but not all of the SIP subscribers.
Count ill asks the court to award damages to the class in the amount that would have been
paid to them in dividends in previous years.
The defendants in the case are SIP itself, its manager, James Alcorn and the board of
directors (nine in number).
Both sides have filed Motions for Summary Judgment.
The plaintiffs filed theirs on January 5, 2007 asking the court to rule that I.C. §72-915 is the
only authority that exists re: dividends paid by SIP and that it provides no discretion to the SIP
manager to select particular classes of subscriber to receive dividends. Alternatively, if the manager
2
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has the discretion to select classes of subscriber, it does not allow the class to be detennined by the
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amount of premium paid. The court has not yet ruled on this motion.
The defendants filed theirs on February. 13,2007 asking the court to rule that, as a matter of
law, I.C. §72-915 does allow the SIP manager the discretion to allocate dividends as he deems

!
j

,

appropriate. Further, that the court needed to resolve issues of standing and the applicable statute of
limitations to this case. On the latter issues, the court has ruled that the plaintiffs do have standing
and that the applicable statute of limitations is three years in this case where the gravaman of the
plaintiffs' claim is a statutory violation.
Plaintiffs' second motion for summary judgment asks the court for its judicial determination
that the words set out in the last several lines of 72-915 clearly and unambiguously express a

legislative intention that any dividend which the manager decides to distribute must be distributed

1

l'

The plaintiffs argue that the Court must use the literal meaning of the words of the statute
unless it would be contrary to other clearly expressed legislative intent or would lead to an absurd
result. Plaintiffs initially argue that the words set out in the last lines of 72-915 unambiguously
express a legislative intent relative to the calculus to be used in allocating a dividend and that the
calculus requires any dividend which the Manager may decide to distribute, must be distributed in
direct proportion to the amount of premium paid in the dividend period by each policyholder who

meets the longevity requirement and falls within the classes of employment sharing in the dividend.
Plaintiffs argue that the following framework is established by 72-915:
The second sentence of the statute provides for a readjustment process which involves
crediting back to qualified subscribers excess funds which involves two phases:
a) the phase leading to the declaring of a dividend
Step 1: Manager must determine if there are available funds
Step 2: Manager must determine if those funds may be safely and properly

divided
b) the phase in which distribution of the dividend is accomplished.
Step 1: Manager must determine if he will proceed with a dividend Statute
provides that having found funds available for division, the Manager may in
3
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in direct proportion to the amount of premium paid in the dividend period by each policy holder.
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his discretion proceed with the distribution.
Step 2: Manager must determine which policyholders are qualified to share
in the distribution
•

To be a qualified policyholder, a subscriber must be a member of
"such class" which refers to any class of employment or industry
as to which there were excess funds

•

I

Further, the policyholder must satisfY the longevity requirement

t1

which requires subscription for 6 months or more prior to the

1

The use of the following phrase "as he is properly entitled to, having regard

I
!j

to his prior paid premiums" demonstrates an intention for the respective

•

time of readjustment
Step 3: Manager shall "credit to each" qualified policyholder their share.

t

1

r

share of "each" to be calculated solely with reference to the amount of
premiums paid.
Plaintiffs further argue that the term "class of employment" cannot, considering the section
as a whole, rationally be read to allow differentiation between employers based upon the amount of
the annual premium paid. If "classes of employment" is instead ambiguous, the legislature intended
the term to refer to employment groupings for rating and accounting purposes and was not intended
to refer to the amount of premium paid by the employer.

The defendants counter with their own summary judgment motion arguing that if the court
considers the entire statutory framework of the SIF, it will see that the legislature clearly and
unambiguously provided the SIF and its manager the discretion to determine how declared
dividends should be distributed. By its motion for summary judgment, the defendants want the
court to declare this to be true as a matter oflaw.
Defendants argue that the SIF was set up in 1917 to provide workers compensation
insurance to Idaho employers who could not otherwise get it from private carriers. In order to
provide the security necessary to insure that payments are made on all deserving claims, the SIF
must be managed such that it maintains sufficient surplus and reserve totals to provide a stable and
ongoing source of workers' compensation insurance to Idaho workers. The duty of insuring the
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financial integrity of the SIF is left to the board of directors and the fund manager.
They further argue that the decision to pay a dividend to only those subscribers who pay
premiums in excess of $2,500 is based upon a marketing strategy. That is, the larger accounts are
generally more profitable and the dividends to them keeps them in the SIF instead of going to
private insurers and this allows the SIP to fulfill its public policy objective of providing a source of
insurance for the smaller, less profitable accounts. The defendants declare that providing larger

policy holders with a larger dividend is a good business practice and is consistent with insurance
industry standards as well as the statutory mandate of 72-901(3) to run the SIF as an efficient
insurance company.

In the end, the court has before it motions for summary judgment filed by both parties each
asking the court to interpret the meaning ofIdaho Code §72-915.
FINDINGS OF LAW

"Statutory construction is a question of law. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d
1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v.

Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978
P.2d 214,219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). The
language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho
at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the ~urt
to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d
at 67.
When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the
legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To
ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but
also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id It
is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. Slate
v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646,22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.App.2001). Construction ofa statute that leads
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to an absurd result is disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275,92 P.3d 521,525 (2004); State

v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004); State v. Burtlow, 144 Idaho 455, 163 P.3d

t

I
I

244,245 -246 (Ct.App., 2007).

!

"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. Robison v.

Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207,210, 76 P.3d 951,954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative
intent is the words of the statute itself," the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal
words of the statute. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992);

accord Mclean v. Maverick Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810,813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006).
Whe~

j
j

the statutory language is unambiguous, the Court does not construe it but simply follows the

law as written. McLean, 142 Idaho at 813, l35 P.3d at 759. The plain meaning of a statute
therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning
leads to absurd results. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 (2004). In
determining its ordinary meaning "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so
that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d
308,309 (2006) (quoting In re Winton Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136,63 P.2d 664, 666
(1936».
If the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable construction it is
ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84. 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655,658
(2006). An ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean.
Id To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but

the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative
history.Id" State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (20
It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that statutes should not be construed to

render other provisions meaningless.
As stated in Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 757 P.2d 664 (1988):

[O]ur prior cases have held that statutory or constitutional provisions
cannot be read in isolation. but must be interpreted in the context of
the entire document. Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 476, 725 P.2d
179, 181 (1986) ('Statutes must be read to give effect to every word,
clause and sentence. '); Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688,
690, 692 P.2d 332, 334 (1984), reh'g denied December 31, 1984
(' We will not construe a staw,te in a way which makes mere
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surplusage of the provisions included therein.); •.. Bastian v. City of
Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307,310,658 P.2d 978, 981 (Ct.App.1983),
petition for review denied 1983 ('The particular words of a statute
should be read in context; and the statute as a whole should be
construed, if possible, to give meaning to all its parts in light of the
legislative intent.'). 114 Idaho at 403-04, 757 P.2d at 666-67.
Emphasis added.
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The Court's primary duty in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent
and purpose of the statute. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 605, 990 P.2d 1213, 1216
(1999);

Bannock County v. City of Pocatello, 110 Idaho 292, 294, 715 P.2d 962,964 (1986). The

legislature's intent is ascertained from the statutory language and the Court may seek edification
from the statute's legislative history and historical content at enactment. Adamson, 133 Idaho at
605, 990 P.2d at 1216." Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network,

Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 225,108 P.3d 370, 372 (Idaho, 2005).
A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction. Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 335, 48 P.3d 659, 664 (2002). "
Ambiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations are presented to a court;
otherwise, all statutes subject to litigation would be considered ambiguous." Hamilton, 135 Idaho at
571, 21 P.3d at 893. ''The interpretation should begin with an examination of the literal words of
the statute, and this language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning." Williamson

v. City of McCall. 135 Idaho 452, 455, 19 P.3d 766, 769 (2001)." Porter v. Board of Trustees,
Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (Idaho,2004).

I

t

I
I

ANALYSIS

I

In filing their 2nd motion for swnmary judgment, the plaintiffs are seeking a ruling from the

court on four narrow issues:
1.

!

I
j

that the words of 72-915 clearly and unambiguously express a legislative intent as
to the "calculus to be used in allocating a dividend."

2.

I

premiums paid by the various policyholders;

I
j

I
I
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that the calculus referred to above requires distribution of dividends in proportion to
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3.

that the tenn "class of employment" as used in 72-915 cannot be used to form a
class based upon amoWlt of premiums paid;

4.

1

t

i

that if the tenn "classes of employment" is ambiguous, then the legislature intended
the tenn to refer to employment groupings for rating and accoWlting purposes and
that classes were differentiated by the "hazards" associated with each employment
grouping so that "rates of premiums" could be fixed and not by the amoWlt of
premium paid by the employer.

I.e. § 72-915 provides:

I

I
I
II
I

1
l

!i

DIVIDENDS. At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in
his discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of
the several classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate
balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry which the
manager deems may be safely and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit
to each individual member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the
state insurance fimd for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of such
readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having
regard to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates.

i

i

i-

1
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I

I
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i

In filing their motion for summary judgment, defendants are seeking a ruling from the court

that their interpretation of the meaning of
1.

le. §72-915 is the correct interpretation.

Specifically:

le. §72-915 Wlambiguously grants the SIF manager the discretionary authority to
issue dividends as he deems may be "safely and properly divided", or
alternatively,

2.

I.e. §72-915 is ambiguous and therefore the court must look to other sources to
determine legislative intent, such as the other statutes within the act which'declare
that the paramoWlt goal of managing the SIF is achieving and maintaining a
solvent insurer for the various policy holders.

The court detennines that plaintiffs' first two issues are intertwined with the whole of
defendants' motion for summary judgment and will therefore discuss them together.
Plaintiffs emphasize the language "credit to each individual member of the class" supports
their argument that the manager, if he declares a dividend, must pay everyone in the class
something. Further, that from 1917 Wltil 2003, this was interpreted to mean a pro rata distribution
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to all policyholders.

i

Defendants emphasize that whether the statute is determined to be clear or ambiguous, the
manager has the discretionary authority to exclude the low premium policyholders from the
dividend distribution.
The court has considered the analysis of both parties arguing that I.C. §72-915 is clear and
unambiguous. However, the court cannot make that finding.

There are too many different

interpretations of that statute which can be reasonably made which renders it ambiguous.

r

I
1

I

i

I

i

For instance, the language ofI.C. §72-915 states that if the SIF manager deems a dividend

I

may be safely made. "he may in his discretion, credit to each individual member . . . such

~:i

proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums" .

L

This could be interpreted to mean what the plaintiffs claim that it means. That is, that if a
dividend is declared by the fund manager, every subscriber must receive a share of the total amount
of dividend in direct proportion to the amount of premium that subscriber paid as a percentage of
the total premiums paid by all subscribers.
It can also be interpreted to mean that the manager could distribute the dividend as he has
done in this case because he has decided that giving regard to prior premiums paid, it is the larger
premium paying subscribers who are properly entitled to receive the dividend.
A third interpretation could be that every subscriber must receive a portion of the dividend,
but it does not have to be in direct proportion to the amount of premium the subscriber paid relative
to the whole. Giving regard to the amount of premiums paid allows for the manager to give the
subscribers who paid a smaller premium less of a percentage than the larger subscribers.
All of these interpretations seem reasonable to the court. If the language of the statute is
capable of more than one reasonable construction it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille

Sch Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804,807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). It is the opinion of this court that
the statute is ambiguous.
Therefore, we turn to the interpretation of I.C. §72-915 which may include analysis of:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

the text of the statute itself, or its four comers; and,
the dictionary;
legislative history;
public policy;
reasonableness of proposed construction;
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f) other statutes within the Act, as well as other relevant statutes

I

contained outside the Act;
g) decisions of sister courts which have resolved the same or
similar issues;
h) other relevant extrinsic evidence leading interpretative assistance
submitted through affidavits, testimony, etc.
An ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean.
To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but the
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and the legislative
history. Carrier, supra; State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007).
The overriding theme of the Act which creates the State Insurance Fund is the maintenance
of the Fund's solvency so as to avoid liability on the part of the state and the creation of "an
independent body corporate politic ... for the purpose of insuring employers against liability for

i

I

r
{

3

i

I
1
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r'

The powers and duties of the state insurance manager are based upon conducting the
business of the state insurance fund "and do any and all things which are necessary and convenient
in the administration thereof: I.C. §72-902. Said manager is appointed by the members of the
board of directors who have the duty ''to direct the policies and operation of the state insurance fund
to assure that the state insurance fund is run as an efficient insurance company. remains
actuarially sound and maintains the public purposes for which the state insurance fund was
created." I.C. §72-901(3), emphasis added.

The manager, James Alcorn, in his affidavit, explains his rationale for declaring and issuing
dividends only to subscribers who have paid an annual premium in excess of $2,500. Essentially,
he claims that a primary need of the Fund in maintaining solvency is to be able to compete with
other insurance carriers to retain large employers/subscribers. Accordingly, he, with the approval of
the members of the board of directors, decided to issue dividends to those larger subscribers only to
provide them greater incentive to stay with the SIF.
The plaintiffs argue that there is no basis to conclude that any of the infonnation discussed
by the manager is his affidavit was known to or within the contemplation of the legislature at the
time that it acted in 1917. The facts presented to the court in support of plaintiffs' argument are
contained in the affidavit of George Bambauer. Therein, he declares that when he was employed
10
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compensation under this worker's compensation law. .. I.C. §72-901.
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with the SIP, the amount of dividend distribution was based upon a formula which took into
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account the amount of premiums paid by a policyholder but did not include a minimum premium

r

cut off. Nothing in his affidavit addresses the claims of the manager that the decision confonns to

t

industry practice and is based upon running the SIP as an efficient insurance business. . The
defendants' position is not only supported by the affidavit of the SIF manager but also the affidavit
of their insurance expert, Michael Camilleri.
It seems to this court that the plaintiffs' argument is based upon the principle that as
subscribers, they have an interest in the dividend distribution and are entitled to a pro rata share of
the distribution. Our supreme court has stated that the SIP cannot be analogized to a trust creating
property rights in policyholders. Rather, the SIF has no fiduciary duties to its policyholders.
Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. V. Alcorn, et ai, 141 Idaho 388, 401-402, 111 P.3d 73 (2005).
Other states have adopted dividend distribution practices similar to the method that
plaintiffs complain about in this case. See Mont. Code Ann. §39-71-2323 (2005) in conjunction
with Mont. Admin. Rule 2.55.502 (2006) and N.D. Cent. Code § 65-04-19.3 (2005) in conjunction
with N.D. Admin. Code §92-01-02-55 (2005). That is, the states of Montana and North Dakota
specifically provide for the exclusion of policyholders who pay smaller premiums from receiving
dividend distributions.
Plaintiffs seek a further determination that the term "class of employment" as used in 12915 cannot be used to form a class based upon amount of premiums paid and that if "classes of
employment" is ambiguous, then the legislature intended the term to refer to employment groupings
for rating and accounting purposes and that classes were differentiated by the "hazards" associated
with each employment so that "rates of premiums" could be fixed and not by the amount of
premium paid by the employer.
The use of the term "class of employment" in 12-915 by its phrasing "any class of
employment or industry" is ambiguous. By the use of "or", this Court is not convinced that
plaintiffs' proposed interpretation that it refers to grouping classes based solely on type of industry
is the only reasonable interpretation. That phrase could reasonably be interpreted to mean that the
classes could be determined by industry, by size of employer, by premium amounts paid by
employer, etc. As the term is ambiguous, this Court is free to examine not only the literal words of
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the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and
the legislative history.
Therefore, it is this court's conclusion that, as a matter oflaw, the language ofl.C. §72-915,

in context with the directives of other statutes set forth in the Act, the laws of our sister states and
the decisions of our supreme court, allows the fund manager, with approval of the board of
directors, to distribute the dividends in the manner they have adopted since 2003.
The defendants' counsel is directed to prepare an order of summary judgment consistent
with this Memorandum Decision.

1ay of J)eUf41Jer , 2007.
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Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hayes Street
Boise, ID 83702

{

If
I

I

Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, CHID
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Keely E. Duke
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A.
702 West Idaho, suite 700
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701
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RECEIVED BY MAIL

FEB 202008
HALL. FARlEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANTON. P.A.

_F__
IA.~~ ~~ 9.M.
i)

FEB 15 2008
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, OEPUTY

IN THE DISlRICT COURT OF THE TIflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
RANDOLPH E. FARBE~ SCOTT
ALAN BECKER and CRfITER
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional
Association.
Plaintiffs,
vs.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its
Manager, and WILLIAM DEAL,
WAYNE MEYE~ MARGUERITE
McLAUGHLIN, GERALD GEDDES,
MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK
SNODGRASS in their capacity
as member of the Board of
Directors of the State
Insurance Fund
Defendants.

)
)

).
) CASE NO. CV 2006-07877*C
)

) AMENDMENT TO THE COURT'S
) MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON
) MOTIONSFORS~Y
) JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

The Court, upon reviewing the proposed order for summary judgment submitted by the
defendants and the arguments of the parties relating to that proposed order and the plaintiffs'
AMENDMENT TO TIlE COURT'S
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1
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request for a Rule 54(b) certificate, has reconsidered the language set forth in that decision and
finds that the final two paragraphs need to be amended in order to more clearly conform to the

Court's opinion. The language of those paragraphs in the Memorandum Decision of December 26,
2007 is as follows:

Therefore, it is this court's conclusion that, as a matter of
law, the language of IC. §72-915, in context with the directives of
other statutes set forth in the Act, the laws of our sister states and the
decisions of our supreme court, allows the fund manager, with
approval of the board of directors, to distribute the dividends in the
manner they have adopted since 2003.
The defendants' counsel is directed to prepare an order of
summary judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision.
That language is amended to read that it is this Court's conclusion that, as a matter oflaw,
the language ofI.C. §72-915, in context with the directives of other statutes set forth in the Act, the
laws of our sister states, and the decisions of our Supreme Court, allows the fund manager, with the
approval of the board of directors, to use his discretion to distribute dividends to policyholders in a
manner that is consistent with the legislative purpose and directives set forth in Article 72, Chapter
9, Idaho Code, which establishes the State Insurance Fund. SpecificaIly, to assure that the State
Insurance Fund is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound, and maintains
the public purposes for which the Fund was created

1.

i

The Court will prepare an Order upon motions for summary judgment which conforms to

!

the Memorandum Decision and this amendment
Dated this

11'.#lday ofFebruary, 2008.
Thomas J. Ryan
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery:
Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hayes Street
.Boise, ID 83702

Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, CHID
1199 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701-1712
Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A.
702 West Idaho, suite 700
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701

DeputyCl~V
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Sixtieth Legislature

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
First Regular Session - 2009
IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1166, As Amended
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

4
5

AN ACT
RELATING TO THE STATE INSURANCE FUND; TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT;
REPEALING SECTION 72-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO DIVIDENDS;
DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING A RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVE
DATE.

6

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

1

2
3

34

SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. (1) Historically, the State Insurance Fund has
exercised its discretion, pursuant to Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to determine the annual
amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive.
(2) On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v. Idaho
State Insurance Fund, S. Ct. 35144, in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho Code, and
ruled that the State Insurance Fund cannot exercise its discretion in determining how much of
a dividend to pay to each policyholder because the statute requires a pro rata distribution of
dividends to all policyholders. The result of the decision is to require that the State Insurance
Fund pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's
ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders.
(3) In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that, if it has become prudent to alter the
statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the Legislature is
the appropriate venue for such change.
(4) It was the intent of the Legislature in passing House Bill No. 774, As Amended of
the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, effective on April 3, 1998,
that the State Insurance Fund should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject to
regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provisions set forth in Chapter
28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to January
1, 2003, will conform with that intent. Section 73-101, Idaho Code, permits such retroactive
repeal as long as it is "expressly so declared" in legislation.
(5) The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, will reconcile conflicts in the
existing laws governing the State Insurance Fund and will allow the fund, like other insurance
companies, to issue dividends pursuant to Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code.
(6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply to
any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or before December
31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the aforementioned case of Farber
v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently pending with respect to those policy holders paying
annual premiums of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).

35

SECTION 2. That Section 72-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby repealed.

36

SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to
exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval,
and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to January 1,2003.
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REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS18877Cl
Repeal ofIdaho Code Section 72-915 will serve to offset an adverse decision ofthe Idaho Supreme
Court regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code Section 72-915 which could subject the State
Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting
the Fund's ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. The proposed
repeal of Idaho Code 72-915 will clarify the law regarding the payment of dividends by the State
Insurance Fund by making it clear that in passing House Bill 774aa in 1998, it was the intent of
the legislature to have the State Insurance Fund operate like an efficient insurance company subject
to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provision set forth in Title 41,
Chapter 28, Idaho Code. Repeal of the law effective April 3, 1998 is necessary because on that
date laws were enacted which subjected the State Insurance Fund to regulation under the Insurance
Code, Title 41 of the Idaho Code. This legislation will allow the State Insurance Fund to issue
dividends in the same manner as other insurance companies operating within the State ofIdaho.

FISCAL NOTE
The State of Idaho and public entities, which are insured by the State Insurance Fund, face losing
all or part of their future dividends and deviations as a result of uncertainties as to the effect of
a recent Supreme Court decision. Based on dividends and rate reduction deviations provided by
the State Insurance Fund over the past two years, that number could exceed $5,000,000 annually.
Private businesses may also, due to the same uncertainties, experience the loss of future dividends
and deviations since, according to the Court's decision, the Fund has no option when distributing
dividends, other than to use a pro rata formula.

Contact:
Name: Senator John W. Goedde
Office:
Phone: (208) 332-1322

S 1166

Statement of Purpose I Fiscal Note
REVISED

REVISED

REVISED

REVISED
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIlE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF CANYON

)

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTI'
ALAN BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC,

)

an Idaho Professional Associatio~

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

)
)

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN,
its Manager. and WILLIAM DEAL,
WAYNE MEYER, MARGUARITE
McLAUGHLIN, GERALD GEDDES,
MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK
SNODGRASS in their capacity as
member of the Board of Directors of the

)

State Insurance Fund,

Defendants.

Case No. CV 2006-7877·C

)
:MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
._)

MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON PLAOOlFPS'
REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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On July 16, 2009, the plaintiffs f1led a renewed request to the Court asking that partial

summary judgment be entered upon their revised second motion. Specifically, they seek a
holding as a matter of law that:

1. I.C. §72-915 clearly and unambiguously expresses a legislative
intent relative to the calculus to be employed for allocation of
any amount which the manager, in his discretion, determines
should be distributed as dividend;
2. That the legislature intended by the language that it used in I.C,
§72-915 to provide that, after excluding policyholders who do
not meet the longevity requirement and who are not within the
classes of employment sharing in the dividend, any dividend
which was declared must be distributed among all remaining
policyholders in direct proportion to the amount of premi1..lIn
each paid in the dividend period.
In its opinion filed May S, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court did specifically find that
"section 72-915 sets forth a specific method for determining how the manager is to distribute
dividends." Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,208 P,3d 289, 295 (2009).

Further, the opinion set forth that "the Legislature viewed section 72-915

as requiring a

pro rata distribution of dividends." Farber, 208 P.3d at 294. That is "[T]he statute contemplates

,dividing the aggregate balance proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid

premiums relative to aU paid premiums." Id. Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "[f]he
inclusion of the words 'proportion' of the balance, and 'having regard to' the policyholder's
'prior paid premiums' can only mean that the distribution of dividends must be done on a pro

rata basis." Farber, 208 P.3d at 293.
The plaintiffs argue that the Idaho Supreme Court established that once the manager
declared a dividend1 the distribution of the dividend to polioyholders shall be in direct proportion
to the amount of premium each paid in the dividend period.

:z

MEMORANDUM DECISION {)PON PLAINTIFFS'
REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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.. ... . .. .......

The defendants argue that once each policyholder's account is given credit for it's pro
rata

share of the declared dividend. then the SIF should be able to evaluate each account to

detennine what amount each policyholder is properly entitled to by taking into account the losses

and expenses.
This Court disagrees with SIF's intelpretation that it has the ability to go beyond a simple
pro rata distribution of the dividend based upon premiums paid. In so fmding. this Court refers
to the language of the Idaho Supreme Court which stated that "[T]he Manager's discretion is
therefore limited to the decision of whether or nQt to distribute a. dividend in the first place."

Farber, 208 P.3d at 294. Also, the language that the "statute contemplates dividing the
aggregate balance proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid premiums relative
to all paid premiums." Id.
Thus, the proper method of calculation is as set forth in subsection "B" entitled "The
Applicable Fonnula Governing the Pro Rata. Dividend" contained in pages 4 through 9 of the
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposjtion to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Revised
Second Motion for PBl1ial Summary Judgment, or In the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment.

DATED this

tf~ day of November, 2009.
Thomas J. Ryan
District Judge

MEMORANDUM DBCISION UPON PLAINTIFFS'
REVISED SECOND MOTION fOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and co:qect copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Reyised Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was forwarded
to the following persons via U.S. Mall, postage prepaid, on this 1-\ day of November, 2009.
Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices
P.O. Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
PhWp Go.-don
Bruce S. BistUne
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise,ID 83702
Richax'd E. HaD
KeeJyDuke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton
702 W. State St. Ste. 700

Boise7 Idaho 83701

William H. HU;{St
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk
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702 West Idaho, Suite 700
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho
Professional Association,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND. JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager,
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN,
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON. JOHN
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member
of the Board of Directors ,of the State
Insurance Fund,

Case ~o. CV06-7877

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO RENEW PLAINTIFFS'
REVISED SECOND MOTIO~FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
COME NOW the defendants, Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn, Manager of
the,State Insurance Fund, and the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund ("SIF"), by and

,SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RENEW
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 1
.
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through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and, as per the Court's
request as stated at oral argument on August 20,2009, respectfully submit the following.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Following the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in this matter, the Plaintiffs filed a request to
renew their Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, specifically seeking a ruling that
"pursuant to the terms of I.C. §72-915, after excluding policyholders who do not meet the
longevity requirements and who are not within the classes of employment sharing in the
dividend, any dividend which was declared must be distributed among all remaining
. policyholders in direct proportion to the amount of premium each paid in the dividend period."
The SIP opposed such motion, contending that Plaintiffs' Motion was not a proper summary
judgment motion, sought an advisory ruling of the Court, and otherwise failed to provide a
precise equation to calculate such dividends.
A hearing was held on August 20, 2009, and, at the hearing, the Court requested
additional briefing on the subject of the appropriate measure of damages, in light of the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision on appeal. The following is the additional briefing requested by the
Court.
As discussed herein, and at the August 20, 2009 hearing, SIF asserts that the Supreme

Co~' s decision in the appeal did not rule out taking into consideration the losses on a policy or
expense factor when distributing a dividend. However, if this Court does not agree with SIF's
position that losses and expenses should be considered when distributing a dividend, then the
Court must use the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of Idaho Code §72-915 to determine
the formula that is to be used in the determination of the Plaintiffs' share of the previously
declared dividends. The formula can be simply stated as follows:

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RENEW
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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(Total Annual Declared Dividend I All Paid Premiums for the Year) X Individual Policyholder Premium

ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS
A.

The Idaho Supreme Court Did Not Rule Out the Consideration of Losses and the
Expense Factor When Distributing Dividends.
As has previously been explained by defendants, SIP dividends, if any, are distributed

based upon what the Manager determines to be available surplus that can be safely and properly
distributed to policyholders that are "properly entitled to," after the Manager evaluates a myriad
of factors, including, but not limited to, present and future SIP operating expenses, the required
reserves, investment income, market forces, and industry trends. l The declaration of a dividend
is a multi-step process that starts with deciding how much surplus is safely available to be
declared as a dividend, followed by the determination as to how it is to be properly divided,
taking into account such factors as the costs associated with writing the insurance contract, and
any losses that may have been incurred on the insurance contract. 2 The SIP asserts such is the
case given the language of Idaho Code Section 72-915 which provides that once the Manager has
declared the annual dividend, he must then "credit to each individual member . . . such
proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, have regard to his prior paid premiums ..
.." As such, based on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in this case, the SIF is to credit to
each policyholders' account their pro rata share of the declared dividend. Once that occurs, and
it is the SIF's position that is as far as the Supreme CoUrt's decision goes, each account is
evaluated to determine what amount each policyholder is properly entitled to by taking into
account the losses and expenses.

) See Affidavit of James M. Alcorn ("Alcorn Afl"), orlginiilly filed with this Court on February 13,2007, 1[ 21.
See Alcorn Aff., 1[ 24.

2
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Although SIF maintains that consideration of the losses and expense factor bears on the
determination of which policyholders are entitled to a dividend, this Court has indicated it feels
the Idaho Supreme Court does not permit losses and expenses to be considered. As such,
assuming arguendo that losses and expenses are not to be considered in the distribution of a
dividend after the dividend amount has been declared, then the Court must use the Idaho
Supreme Court's interpretation of Idaho Code §72-915 to determine the fonnula that is to be
used in the determination of the Plaintiffs' share of the declared dividend. The following is how
Idaho Code §72-915 and the Idaho Supreme Court provide the Plaintiffs' share of the declared
dividends should be determined:

(Total Annual Declared Dividend / All Paid Premiums for the Year) X Individual Policyholder Premium
B.

The Applicable Formula Governing the Pro Rata Dividend.
1.

The Idaho Supreme Court has acknowledged on many occasions that the manager
has the discretion to determine how much of a dividend will be declared each
year.

As outlined in Idaho Code Section 72-915, the SIP Manager is afforded discretion in the
detennination of the dividend when there is an "aggregate balance" which may be safely and
properly divided:
At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in his discretion
.may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the several
classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate
balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry which
the manager deems may be safely and properly divided, he may in his discretion,
credit to each individual member of such class who shall have been a subscriber
to the state insurance fund for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time
of such readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to,
having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates.
Idaho Code §72-915 (emphases added). Dividends, if any, are paid from what the Manager
determined could be safely and properly divided after taking into consideration a multitude of

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RENEW
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
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factors, including present and future SIF operating expenses, the required reserves, investment
income, market forces, industry trends, and other additional factors which are relevant? Indeed,
the Idaho Supreme Court has embraced the discretion of the Manager as it pertains to dividends,
as explained in its recent decision: "the plain language of I.C. §72-915 demonstrates that the
statute grants the Manager discretion to distribute a dividend where 'there is an aggregate
balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry,' and the Manager deems
. that the aggregate balance 'may be safely and properly divided. '" Farber v. The Idaho State

Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289, 294 (2009); accord, Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist.
v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 392, I II P.3d 73, 77 (2005) ("since 1919 the Manager has had the
authority to set surplus and reserves without outside approval and to declare dividends in his

discretion. ")(emphasis added). 4
2.

Once the dividend is declared by the Manager, the Idaho SUPreme Court ruled in
this case that it must be divided pro rata to every policyholder. s

On the appeal of this matter, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated that "[t]he inclusion of
the words 'proportion' of the balance, and 'having regard to' the policyholder's 'prior paid
premiums' can only mean that the distribution of dividends must be done on a pro rata basis."

Farber, 208 P.3d at 293. In further elaborating on this, the Court went on to state that: "[t]he
statute contemplates dividing the aggregate balance proportionately according to the
policyholder's prior paid premiums relative to all paid premiums." ld at 294 (underlined

3 See Alcorn Aft'., 1121; see also Affidavit of Michael Camilleri ("Camilleri Aff."), 11 13, originally filed with this
Court on Febnwy 13, 2007.
4 Although the Legislature amended the SIF statutes most recently in 1998 to, among other things, create a Board of
Directors to appoint a manager oCthe SIF, in general, the Legislature left the Manager's power and discretion intact,
including the authority to set reserve and surplus levels and to declare dividends. Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v.
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 392, III P.3d 73, 77 (2005).
S Again, the SIF still strongly believes losses and expenses should be considered but assuming arguendo that this
court detennines they are not, then the following is a discussion of the formula that must be used.

. SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RENEW
. PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
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emphasis added). In describing the dividend contemplated under Idaho Code §72-915, the Court
acknowledged that "[t]his dividend is different from the dividend issued to stockholders of a
corporation and is instead a refund based upon a rate readjustment." Id at 291.
As such, a policyholder ("PH") dividend is computed as follows:

(Total Annual Declared Dividend / All Paid Premiums for the Year) X Individual
Policyholder Premium
Accordingly, given such formula, the individual policyholder's dividend is
comprised of two components - first, determination of the universally-applicable
Readjustment Rate (Total Annual Declared Dividend/All Paid Premiums for the Year),
which applies to all eligible policyholders (i.e., those that have held policies for more
than 6 months); and second, determination of dividend amounts unique to the individual
policyholder (i.e., application of the Readjustment Rate to paid premiums) that may be
declared by SIF.
Based on this formula, the Court can determine, as a matter oflaw, the Plaintiffs' share of
the declared dividends for the dividend periods at issue in this matter. The following is the
correct application of the above formula to make such determination.
a

The total annual dividend declared by SIF (the Readjustment Rate
numerator)

As established in SIF's responses to discovery requests, SIF declared dividends for each
of the identified dividend periods as follows:

Dividend Period

Total Annual Dividend Declared

.. 7/1/01-6/30/02

$5,037,216

7/1/02-6/30/03

$5,993,228

7/1/03-6/30/04

$8,097,755

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RENEW
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SlJMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
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7/1104-6/30/05

$15,459,013

7/1105-6/30/06

$21,101,317

7/1106-6/30/07

$14,375,339

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew
Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. A, pp.
5:-11, originally filed on August 6, 2009.
b.

All paid premiums to SIP for the year (the Readjustment Rate
denominator)

As established in SIF's responses to discovery requests, SIF received the following total

premium dollars for each of the identified dividend periods as follows:

Dividend Period

All Paid Premiums for the Year

7/1101-6/30/02

$128,529,174

7/1102-6/30/03

$151,142,366

711/03-6/30/04

$181,836,374

7/1104-6/30/05

$211,615,539

711105-6/30/06

$233,670,170

711/06-6/30/07

$221,981,656

Counsel Aff., Exh. A, pp. 5-11.
c.

The Readjustment Rate. per year (Total Declared Annual DividendiAll
Paid Premiums for the Year).

Accordingly, based on the above figures, the Readjustment Rate for each oftbe identified
. dividend periods is as follows:
L

Dividend Period

7/1101-6/30/02

Readjustment Rate

Formula

$5,037,2161 $128,529,174

::;:

3.9191%

. SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RENEW
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
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:

711102-6/30/03

$5,993,2281 $151,142,366

=

3.9653%

711/03·6/30/04

$8,097,7551 $181,836,374

=

4.4533%

711104-6/30/05

$15,459,0131 $211,615,539

=

7.3052%

7/1/05-6/30/06

$21,101,317/$233,670,170

=

9.0304%

7/1106-6/30/07

$14,375,339/$221,981,656

=

6.4759%

Thus, by way of example, utilizing this Readjus1ment Rate for the 7/1/01-6/30/02 dividend
period for a hypothetical policyholder paying $1,000 in premiums, the dividend would be
$39.19.
d.

Based on the formula established by the Idaho Supreme Court. Plaintiffs'
share of the declared dividends for the applicable dividend periods is
$5,392.539.

Based on information provided to Plaintiffs by way of discovery regarding the premium
totals paid by policyholders with policies of less than $2,500,6 Plaintiffs' share of the declared
dividends total for the dividend periods at issue is as follows:
Dividend Period

<$2,500 Premiums

7/1101-6/30/02

$14,991,392

X

3.9191%

=

$587,528

7/1/02-6/30/03

$15,906,348

X

3.9653%

=

$630,734

7/1103-6/30/04

$17,296;019

X

4.4533%

:;::;

$770,244

7/1/04-6/30/05

$17,371,735

X

7.3052%

=

$1,269,040

7/1/05-6/30/06

$17,926,383

X

9.0304%

=

$1,146,9527

Readj. Rate

Total Class Dividend

6 The

figures identified in this section are derived from totals identified in the spreadsheets provided to Plaintiffs and
identified in SIF's recent discovery responses. Counsel Aff., Exh. A (fIled 8/6/09). In total, these spreadsheets are
3,060 pages long; at the Court's request, SIP will provide a copy of such spreadsheets, either in hard copy or as
.pdfs, as the Court may prefer. In addition, attached hereto as Exhibit A to Counsel's Affidavit in Support of
Suwlemental Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Renew Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment, Or In The Alternative, Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is a spreadsheet
summarizing the calculations contained herein.
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7/1106-6/30/07

$18,481,641

X

6.4759%

Total:

=

$988,041 8
$5,392,539

Accordingly, assuming this Court does not permit the application of losses and expenses to the
distribution of dividends, Plaintiffs' share of the declared dividends is $5,392,539.

C.

Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To Prejudgment Interest.
It is anticipated that Plaintiffs will make a request for prejudgment interest. However,

any such argument necessarily fails, as Plaintiffs are not entitled to make a claim for
prejudgment interest on dividend amounts, as such dividends are not within a category for which
prejudgment interest is allowed under Idaho law:
When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest,
interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the hundred by the year on:
1. Money due by express contract.
2. Money after the same becomes due.
3. Money lent.
4. Money received to the use of another and retained beyond a reasonable time
without the owner's consent, express or implied.
5. Money due on the settlement of mutual accounts from the date the balance is
ascertained.
6. Money due upon open accounts after three (3) months from the date of the last
item.
Idaho Code §28-22-104(1). In the present case, the amounts at issue - a readjustment of rates in
the fonn of dividends - do not fall into any of these categories. As stated previously, the

7 Dividends were also paid in this year for policies between $1,500 and $2,500. The dividends paid to those policies
totaled $471,872, which amount bas been deducted from the Total Dividend figure.
8 Dividends were also paid in this year for policies between $1,500 and $2,500. The dividends paid to those policies
t.otaled $208,812, which amount has been deducted from the Total Dividend figure.

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN oPPOSmONTO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RENEW
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 9. .
.

000260

contract of insurance does not provide for the payment of a dividend to the policyholders. 9 The
governing statutes for the SIP do not guarantee payments of dividends to policyholders, nor do
they set forth that the policyholders have a property interest in the surplus or assets of the SIP.

See generally Idaho Code §72-901 et seq. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously
concluded that the SIP's statutory framework does not create any property rights in the SIP's
policyholders. Kelso & Irwin. P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 135,997 P.2d 591,
597 (2000). A SIP policyholder has no vested right in the surplus and assets of the SIP; rather,
the assets and surplus belong to the SIP in order to meet its statutory purpose provided in Idaho
Code §72-90 1(l). ld.

Thus, in light of the discretionary nature of the dividend, the dividend

does not fall into any of the enumerated categories under Idaho Code §28-22-104, and, as such,
no prejudgment interest can be awarded. See, e.g., Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 712,201
P.3d 1282, 1289 (2009)(rejecting claim for prejudgment interest on monies placed in revocable
trust, as the amounts did not '''constitute money due by express contract, or money after the same

becomes due, or money lent, or money due on the settlement of mutual accounts from the date
the balance is ascertained, or money due upon open accounts after three months from the date of
the last item ... Nor did the [Taylors] retain the money without the express or implied consent of
the [Mailes]. "')
Moreover, prejudgment interest is not automatic, and "[i]n the area of prejudgment
interest, equitable principles are emphasized." Chenery v. Am-Lines Com., 115 Idaho 281, 289,
766 P.2d 751, 759 (1988).

Most notably, the decision to award prejudgment interest is a

discretionary determination by the district court. In light of the Idaho Supreme Court's need to

9 See Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek filed on Janual)' 6, 2007, Ex. 1 (State Insurance Fund Workers Compensation
and Employers Liability Insurance Policy). See also Farber, supra and Hayden Lake, supra.
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resolve a question of first impression, and the pending declaration of additional dividends over
and above what the Manager had already determined may be "safely and properli' divided,
prejudgment interest in addition to those additional declared dividends would potentially
adversely impact the Fund. The SIF should not be additionally penalized with prejudgment
interest for distributing dividends inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of
Idaho Code §72-915. This is especially true given that in response to the Supreme Court's ruling
on Idaho Code §72-915, the Idaho Legislature immediately went forward and repealed that
section of law. As such, an award of prejudgment interest is not appropriate and the SIP requests
a ruling from this Court that prejUdgment interest will not be applied in this case.
In any event, "prejudgment interest is allowed only where the damages are liquidated or
readily ascertainable by mathematical process." Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 276, 178 P.3d
639, 641 (Ct. App. 2007). "This limitation is based upon 'equitable considerations,' which
presumably include the notion that a person who could not determine the amount owed should
not be charged interest on the sum that is ultimately found to be due." Id. (internal citation
omitted). As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals:
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it
possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or
Ws4:retion. Examples are claims upon promises to pay a fixed sum, claims for
money had and received, claims for money paid out, and claims for goods or
services to be paid for at an agreed rate.

Id at 277 (quoting Seubert Excavators. Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 874 P.2d 561 (Ct.
App. 1993))(emphasis added). In the present matter, the amount of dividends that might be
~·

declared in favor of the policyholder class at issue was not a liquidated sum capable of being

If
,

determined prior to the Supreme Court's opinion, given both that the detennination of the
dividend is discretionary in nature, and that the formula applicable to the policyholder class at
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issue was not established until the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Farber - a point further borne
out by the fact that the parties continue to provide argument to this Court regarding the precise
formula to use in determining what dividends might. be due to the policyholders in the class at
issue. As such, Plaintiffs cannot characterize any declared dividend for policyholders with
policies of less than $2,500 in premiums as "liquidated" sums, as the applicable dividend
amounts have not been ''readily ascertainable by mathematical process."
For these reasons, this Court should deny any request by Plaintiffs for prejudgment
interest.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, and for the reasons stated in SIF's previously filed Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial

summary Judgment and oral argument thereon, Plaintiffs'· Motion should be denied.

Plaintiffs'

requested formula for the declaration of dividends in favor of the Plaintiffs fails to properly
consider the actual process by which the Manager determines the appropriate dividend, which
includes consideration of losses and expenses.
However, even if this Court is not inclined to permit consideration oflosses and expenses
in SIF's determination of the dividends at issue in this matter, then the formula defined by the
Idaho Supreme Court when it applied Idaho Code Section 72"915 must be used:

(Total Annual Declared Dividend I All Paid Premiums for the Year) X Individual Policyholder Premium
Based upon that formula, Plaintiff s' share of the declared dividends for the dividend periods at
issue is $5,392,539. In conjunction therewith, the Court should reject any request by Plaintiffs
for prejudgment interest.
Oral argument is requested.
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)

RESPECTUFLLY SUBMITTED this

l i day of September, 2009.

HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

By

~~~~~~
the
'l~

Richard E:11:a1I- Of
11ln
.Keely E. Duke - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, CHID
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Keely E. Duke
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
RECEIVED F1V MI.I!l

JUN r : /',,~.....".J
RANDOLPH E. FARBER SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho
professional association,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

REMITTITUR
Supreme Court Docket No. 35144-2008
Canyon County District Court #06-7877

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
)
lAMES M. ALCORN, its manager, and
)
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER
)
MARGUERITE MC LAUGHLIN, GERALD )
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
)
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
)
MARTIN, and MARK. SNODGRASS in their )
)
capacity as members of the Board of
Directors of the STATE INSURANCE FUND, )
)
)

Defendants-Respondents.
TO:

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CANYON.

The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause March 5, 2009, which was
withdrawn May S, 2009,

~d having

announced its Substitute Opinion May 5, 2009, and having

denied Respondent's P~tion for Rehearing on May 12.2009; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with the
directive of the Substitute Opinion, if any action is required; and,
IT FURTIIER IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants' memorandum of costs on

appeal filed March 16,2009 in the amount of $651.00 be and hereby is allowed.
DATED this 27th day of May, 2009.

Cl~k~!!ec~
STATE OF IDAHO.

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge

REMITTITUR - Docket No. 35144-2008
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"\

fto6 A.k

Donald W. Lojek ISBN 1395
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD
623 West Hays Street
PO Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
208-343-7733
Facsimile:
208-345-0050

E DP.M,

NOV 3 0 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN. DEPUTY

Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208/345-7100
Facsimile: 208/345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and DISCOVER
CARE CENTRE LLC OF SALMON,
Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. CV 09-13607-C

vs.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official capacity as
its Manager, and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE
MEYER, GERALD GEDDES, JOHN
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, MARK
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS,
TERRY GESTRIN AND MAX BLACK AND
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as
member's ofthe Board of Directors of the State
Insurance Fund,

AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP GORDON RE:
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP GORDON RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1
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ORIGINAL

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss.
County of ADA
)

PHILIP GORDON, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs in this matter and I make this Affidavit on my own
personal and direct knowledge, except where otherwise stated. The other counsel for the
Plaintiffs are Donald W. Lojek and Bruce S. Bistline, a member of my firm. We are the same
three attorneys who represented the Plaintiffs and the members of the class in the case of
Farber v. State Insurance Fund (which was assigned Case Number 2006-CV-7877 in the

above Court), and I am accordingly familiar with what occurred in that litigation.
2.

I am making this Affidavit in Regards to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

3.

Please see hereto attached Affidavit ofJames Alcorn in Case Number 2006-CV-7899, Bates
Stamped Number 000120-000131.

Dated this 22nd day of November, 2010.
I

/

Notary P
c or I
0
Residing at Boise, Idaho
Commission expires: .:J /Zl'/2"/..3
~

7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22 nd day of November, 2010, I caused the foregoing document to
be delivered by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton
702 W. State St. Ste. 700
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: 208-395-8500

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL

>0 ;.;.FA~C:?S~~~

AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP GORDON RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

3

000270

v

Richard E. Hall
1813 #1253; reh@haIlfarJey.com

Keely E. Duke
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECm & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W:\3\3-461.2\AJcorn Aff.. doc

Attorneys for Defendants

ill THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLillIC, an Idaho
Professional Association,

Case No. CV06-7877

AFFIDA VIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN
Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager,
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE :MEYER,
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN,
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON, JOHN
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTill, and MARK
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member
of the Board of Directors of the State
Insurance Fund,
Defendants.

~ ~E~~U2:7~W
GORDON LAW OFFICES
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)

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

I, James M. Alcorn, being first duly sworn, depose and state:
1.

I am the Manager of the SIP and have been since April 1998.

2.

I have had extensive experience with the insurance industry since 1970 as

a licensed insurance agent and owner of independent property and casualty
insurance agencies and currently hold the professional designation of Certified
Insurance Counselor.
3.

I served as the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance from May

1994 to January 1995, and as its Deputy Director from January 1995 to December
1995, and then again served as Director of the Department from December 1995
until April of 1998.
4.

My past experience as a licensed insurance agent and as Director of the

Idaho Department of Insurance has caused me to be familiar with the laws
regulating the insurance industry and insurance industry practices.
I

5.

As the Manager of the State Insurance Fund (SIP), I am familiar with its

history and its day to day operations and am required by law to conduct the
business of the SIP and do all things convenient and necessary to manage the SIP
so that it is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and
maintains the public purposes for which it was created.
6.

The SIP was' created by the Idaho Legislature in 1917 for the purpose of

providing a stable source of worker's compensation insurance for Idaho
employers and their employees.
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7.

Idaho Law provides that all Idaho employers must maintain worker's

compensation insurance coverage for their employees.
8.

Since the enactment of 41-1601 et seq. in 1961, Idaho's worker's

compensation insurance rates have been regulated by the Department of Insurance
which approves worker's compensation rates based upon the rate filings of an
authorized rating organization (National Council on Compensation Insurance aka
NCC!).

Idaho is an administered pricing state which means that the rating

organization files the entire rate. Companies may file with the Department of
Insurance for approval to deviate from the filed rate by individual rate or for all
rates. Companies may also use schedule credits on specific policies. Companies
may not use both a deviation and scheduled credits.
9.

SIP has chosen to deviate 7% from all filed rates.

Therefore, the

premiums for all SIP policyholders are calculated beginning with a rate 7% below
the rates approved by the Department of Insurance. This deviation is applied
across the board for all policyholders regardless of premium size or losses
occurring on an insurance policy.
10.

Idaho is a competitive state which means that the SIP is not a monopoly

and must compete for business against the private worker's compensation
insurance carriers.

11.

Idaho also has a worker's compensation assigned risk pool which insures

employers who cannot otherwise secure workers compensation coverage, but
employers insuring through the assigned risk pool are subject to rates 30% above
the standard rate.
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12.

Idaho employers are not required to insure through the SIF, they may

msure with a private carrier or if they are declined coverage by two private
carriers and the SIF then coverage can be obtained through the assigned risk pool
which is the carrier of last resort ..
13.

The SIF has a public purpose to provide worker's compensation insurance

to Idaho employers and while it is not the insurer of last resort, the SIF maintains
a liberal underwriting policy that seeks to insure all employers regardless of size
so that most Idaho employers who could not otherwise obtain coverage through a
private carrier could obtain coverage with the SIF and avoid the extra costs
associated with acquiring an insurance policy through the assigned risk pool.
14.

As SJF Manager, I am required to maintain the solvency of the SJF and

make decisions regarding the level of surplus and reserves needed by the Fund to
remain actuarially sound so there continues to be a stable and available source of
worker's compensation insurance coverage.
15.

The maintenance of adequate surplus and reserves is an important aspect

of managing the SJF because unlike all other worker's compensation carriers
operating in Idaho the Fund is precluded by statute (I.e. §72-901(4)) from being a
member of the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association.
16.

The Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association guaranties payment of

insurance benefits in the event that an insurance carrier cannot pay its insurance
claims or becomes insolvent.
17.

All insurers in the state belong to the Idaho Insurance Guaranty

Association except the SIF which is barred by law.
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18.

Since the SIP cannot like other carriers rely on Idaho Insurance Guaranty

Association to pay benefits in the event of insolvency, the SIP must be managed
such that it maintains sufficient surplus and reserves to provide a stable ongoing
source of worker's compensation insurance to protect Idaho workers.
19.

The duty of the Manager and the Board of Directors to maintain the

financial integrity of the SIP is paramount because if the SIP were to become
insolvent, the availability of worker's compensation insurance in Idaho would be
critically jeopardized, since the SIP insures over 39,000 employers which
comprise approximately 70% of the market. Many of these employers, especially
the smaller employers, could not obtain coverage from other insurers whose
underwriting policies are not as liberal as the SIP.
20.

Since its inception the duty to operate and manage the SlF and to decide

the appropriate level of surplus, reserves and dividends has been the duty of its
Manager and subject to his or her discretionary authority.
21.

The SIF surplus is an asset of the SIF and dividends, if any, are paid from

what the Manager determines to be surplus that is safely available after taking
into consideration various factors including, but not limited to, present and future
SlF operating expenses, the

required reserves, projected investment income,

market forces, and industry trends.
22.

Dividends paid by the SlF are not the same as dividends paid by to

stockholders of a company. SlF dividends are not related to ownership or the
sharing of profits. SlF dividends are the return of unused premium.
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23.

The detennination as to whether to declare a dividend, how much, and

who will receive one is not a science, but is a decision-making process that is
based upon experience and knowledge of the insurance business, industry trends,
and market forces.
24.

The declaration of a dividend is a multi-step process that starts with

deciding how much surplus is safely available to be declared as a dividend, then
there is a determination as to how it is to be divided up taking into account the
cost of writing an insurance policy and considering the losses that may have been
incurred on the policy.
25.

One other consideration is the marketing effect that a dividend

wi]]

have

on retaining good profitable accounts, because it is those large profitable accounts
that allow the SIF to fulfill its public policy objectives of providing a source of
insurance for Idaho employers which includes many of the smaller less profitable
accounts.
26.

Policyholders of the Fund are provided with a contract of insurance that

sets forth the parameters of their coverage and neither it nor the governing statutes
of the SIF provide that policyholders are entitled to, or guarantied that they will
receive a dividend.
27.

The SIF, through three previous managers and the current Manager, has

issued dividends continuously since at least 1982 using essentially the same
dividend formula as is used presently, in that the dividends returned as a
percentage of paid premium have always differentiated by the size of the premium
taking into account the losses incurred on the insurance policy such that the SIF
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has always returned back a larger percentage of paid premium to the large policy
holders, as opposed to the smaller sized policyholders. This is consistent with
workers compensation insurance industry practices.
28.

One of the reasons for using policy size as a basis for determining the rate

of return is because dividend is a return of unused premium and a larger policy
will have proportionately more unused premium than a smaller premium policy
because certain costs associated with writing a policy are essentially the same
whether it be for $2,000 or $200,000 policy.
29.

Other considerations for issuing larger dividends as a percentage of

premium size has to do with the fact that workers compensation rates are
regulated and as such are the same for all carriers, and because the SIF has a
public purpose to provide a source of insurance for the Idaho employers including
the small employers, and because private carriers seek to insure only the large
profitable policyholders, and because the SIF needs the large policyholders to
help support the ability to continue to insure the small businesses in the state. The
SIF has made a business decision to give the larger premium policies a larger
dividend percentage in order to help retain the business of the larger profitable
policyholders. Moreover, the SIF looks at the losses incurred on a policy and
factors that in when determining whether a dividend will be paid; if a
policyholder has losses that exceed a certain percentage of premium in a policy
year then a dividend would be reduced or not paid depending on the level of
losses.
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30.

It is the retention of the large profitable insurance policies that helps the

SIP maintain its public purpose of providing insurance to Idaho employers. It is
the large profitable accounts that are subject to being lured away by the private
insurance carriers with whom the SIP is in competition.
31.

Since workers compensation rates are regulated by the state, the primary

method used to cause large profitable policyholders to switch workers
compensation insurance companies is to offer them high scheduled credits.
32.

Since the SIP has chosen to deviate from the regulated rates it cannot use

scheduled credits so it relies on the return of dividend to retain large profitable
accounts. (See Paragraph 8 above) This is a good business decision that helps the
SIP retain the large profitable policyholder and is consistent with workers
compensation insurance industry practices and the statutory mandates of Idaho
Code Section 72-901 to run the SIP as an efficient insurance company.
33.

Additionally, a policyholder with a premium of $2,500 could have equal

or greater losses than a policyholder with a premium of $100,000, and therefore
the larger policyholders more readily absorb the losses generated by lower
premium contributors.
34.

Worker's compensation coverage is a unique form of insurance in that it

provides unlimited coverage to its policyholder regardless of the premium size.
The SIP provides a $300 policyholder with the same amount of upper coverage as
a $500,000 policyholder, but either policy can have extensive losses well above
their premium amount. Losses in excess of a million dollars on a claim are not
unheard of and have been paid by the SIP.
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35.

The decision to give dividends pursuant to a fonnula that excluded smaller

policyholders during the policy years in question was made by considering and
weighing all the factors set forth above and was consistent with the law, and
industry practice, and was done with the knowledge of the Board of Directors.
36.

The decision to give dividends pursuant to a fonnula that excluded smaller

policyholders was also infonnally reviewed by the Chief of the Civil Litigation
Unit of the Idaho Attorney General's Office in a letter dated January 22, 2003, to
Robert Egusquiza, wherein Deputy Attorney General David IEgh stated that the
dividend distribution practice was within the discretionary authority of the SIP
Manager.
37.

Each of the named plaintiffs purchased worker's compensation coverage

from the SIP with inception dates between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2004.
38.

None of the plaintiffs have paid premiums over $2,500 on their contracts

for insurance for the contract years of July 1,2001 to June 30, 2002; July 1,2002
to June 30, 2003; or July 1, 2003, to June 30,2004 except the Critter Clinic which
paid premiums in excess of $2,500 for the policy year with an inception date
between July 1,2003, to June 30, 2004.
39.

Plaintiffs were not offered a dividend for years they did not pay premiums

over $2,500.
40.

Dividends are declared by the SIP in December and the plaintiffs were

each sent a letter the January following the declaration of the dividend stating
they would not be receiving a dividend based on the amount of premium they paid
for the particular policy year. Plaintiffs have renewed their existing contracts for
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insurance and paid their respective premiums even though they may not have
been offered a dividend the prior year.
41.

If the Court were to accept the Plaintiff's interpretation that Idaho Code

Section 72-915 does not give the SIP Manager the discretion to declare a dividend
that can be safely and properly divided with regard to prior paid premiums then it
severely impacts the ability of the Manager to run the SIP as an efficient
insurance company, remain actuarially sound, and maintain the public purposes
for which the insurance Fund was created.
42.

Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of

Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from November 21,
2002' s Special Meeting.
43.

Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of

Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from December 10, 2003.
44.

Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit

"c"

is a true and cOrrect copy of

Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from October 20, 2004.
45.

Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "D" is a true and COrrect copy of

Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from December 21, 2005.
46.

Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "E" is a true and, correct copy of the

letter sent by David G. High, Chief, Civil Litigation Division of the Idaho
Attorney General's Office, to Robert Egusquiza on January 22, 2003.
47.

Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of

Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from January 22, 2004.
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, Idaho
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served a true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN, by the
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Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, CHTD
1199 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701-1712
Fax No.: (208) 343-5200
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
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Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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DEC 06 2010

ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com

Keely E. Duke
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF
SALMON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV 09-13607-C

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his
official capacity as its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS,
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the
State Insurance Fund,
Defendants.

COME NOW the defendants, The Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn in his
official capacity as its Manager, and William Deal, Wayne Meyer, Gerald Geddes, John Goedde,
Elaine Martin, Mark Snodgrass, Rodney A. Higgins, Terry Gestrin, Max Black, and Steve
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-

Landon in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund
(collectively, "SIF"), by and through their counsel of record Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton,
P.A., and hereby submit their reply to plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Opposition") and in support of Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, filed October 26, 2010 ("SIF Motion"). For the reasons stated herein,
the SIF Motion should be granted.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' Opposition fails to demonstrate that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915

IS

unconstitutional.
As an initial matter, plaintiffs' attempts to burden-shift two steps in the Contract Clause
analysis - whether the State has a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation
such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem, and whether the
adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable
conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation's
adoption - should be rejected by the Court, as burden-shifting only occurs where the State is
attempting to impair its own contractual obligations. As the SIF is not the State of Idaho, no
such burden-shifting is appropriate.
Further, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how - or even if - the Idaho Constitution's Contract
Clause is evaluated under any test different from the modem Contract Clause analysis that courts
now employ. Absent such a showing, and in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that
"we seriously consider federal law in determining the parameters of our own constitutional
provisions, and we may adopt federal precedent under the state constitution but only to the extent
that we believe the federal law is not inconsistent with the protections afforded by our state
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constitution" this Court may appropriately apply modem Contract Clause analysis in the
determination of this matter. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988, 842 P.2d 660,667 (1992).
Additionally, plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Idaho Legislature has operated a
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship, given there is neither a contractual right to a
dividend under the SIF policies of insurance, nor a history of distribution of dividends in pro rata
fashion that would give rise to an expectation of receiving such dividends. Further, the repeal did
not impair the policies, which expressly incorporate Idaho law.

Moreover, even were an

impairment to have occurred, it was not a "substantial" impairment simply because it may have
impacted a claimed financial term, given the size of the dividends at issue and the heavilyregulated nature of the workers' compensation field.
Even were plaintiffs to establish a substantial impairment, however, plaintiffs still fail to
demonstrate that the repeal lacks a significant and legitimate public purpose. Plaintiffs also
cannot disregard the public purpose of the fund, and cannot ignore the broad purpose of the
repeal: to avoid the harm effectuated on current and future public and private policyholders by
way of loss of dividends and deviations if I.C. § 72-915 were not repealed. Plaintiffs also fail to
recognize that the Legislature is empowered to change laws to avoid windfalls to private parties.
Finally, plaintiffs cannot show that the repeal is anything other than based upon
reasonable conditions and is a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the repeal.
The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 was intended to address the uncertainty arising from the Farber
decision, and to avoid harm to current and future policyholders as a result thereof.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the SIF Motion should be granted.
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UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
As the Court is aware, plaintiffs currently have their own Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment pending, which will be heard at that same time as the SIF Motion.

In the SIF's

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed November 22,2010, at pp.
4-7 ("SIF MSJ Opposition"), the SIF identified the limited number of undisputed material facts
this Court must consider in light of the question posed (to wit, the constitutionality of the repeal
of I.C. § 72-915), which were not - and cannot - be disputed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' Opposition
provides no additional challenges to these undisputed material facts as outlined by the SIF. As
such, in an effort to reduce duplication, the SIF references and incorporates the "Undisputed
Material Facts" section of the SIF MSJ Opposition (pp. 4-7) as if fully set forth herein, and
instead only identifies those facts in cursory fashion:
1)

Plaintiffs' claim is predicated on Idaho Code § 72-915.

2)

Idaho Code § 72-915 was repealed on May 6, 2009.

3)

Idaho Code § 72-915 was repealed to a retroactive date of January 1,2003.

4)

Plaintiffs' claims all relate to dividend distributions after January 1,2003.

5)

Plaintiffs' action was not filed until December 24,2010.

6)

Plaintiffs' claim is foreclosed if the repeal is upheld.

7)

The purpose of the SIF is to provide Worker's Compensation coverage to Idaho
employees.

Additionally, plaintiffs have not - and cannot - dispute the following facts established in the SIF
Motion:
1)

The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 was made effective prior to the Idaho Supreme Court
issuing remittitur in the Farber case.

2)

The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 was expressly made retroactive as expressed in the
language of the repeal.
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3)

Dividends prior to the Farber decision were paid on a non-pro rata basis.

4)

Dividends after the Farber decision and the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 were also paid
on a non-pro rata basis.
ARGUMENT

1.

The SIF does not bear the burden of proving that the repeal was constitutional, and
such repeal is generally presumed to be constitutional.
Plaintiffs concede, as they should, that "they shoulder the initial burden of convincing

this Court that the challenged enactment is unconstitutional." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p.8;
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, _,232 P.3d 813,818 (2010)("There is a presumption in favor of
the constitutionality of the challenged statute or regulation, and the burden of establishing that
the statute or regulation is unconstitutional rests upon the challengers.")(quoting Am. Falls
Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 154 P.3d 443
(2007»(emphasis added).
However, plaintiffs then assert that the burden shifts to the defending party "to
demonstrate the existence of a legitimate and significant public purpose and an impairment
which is a reasonable means for and of a character appropriate to the furtherance of that public
interest." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 9. Plaintiffs contend this burden shifts simply where "State
action retroactively terminates the contract rights of a citizen who is a party to a contract with a
public entity." Id. Plaintiffs cite to S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885 (9 th Cir.
2003) for this proposition. This argument, however, ignores two critical distinctions.
First, and most importantly, this burden only applies where the State is a party to the
contract that is impaired. See University of Hawai'i Professional Assembly v. Cayetano, 183
F.3d 1096, 1106 (9 th Cir. 1999)("Defendants bear the burden of proving that the impairment was
reasonable and necessary because '[t]he burden is placed on the party asserting the benefit of the
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statute only when that party is the state. ''')(emphasis added). As the Ninth Circuit previously
explained:
When a state statute substantially impairs a private contract, we must next
determine whether the impairment is both reasonable and necessary to fulfill an
important public purpose. See Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411-12, 103 S.Ct. at
704-05. The parties dispute who bears the burden on this issue. We conclude that
the bankruptcy and district courts properly required the trustee, as the
objecting party, to carry the burden. See Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 632 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir.1980) ("the
challenger must demonstrate that legitimate governmental interests do not justify
the impairment"). The burden is placed on the party asserting the benefit of
the statute only when that party is the state. See Keating, 903 F.2d at 1228
(requiring state to prove that legislation impairing public contract is necessary to
achieve a valid public purpose); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795
F.Supp. 1476, 1487 (D.Nev.l992) (same), affd on other grounds, 10 F.3d 633
(9th Cir.l993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1033, 114 S.Ct.1543, 128 L.Ed.2d 195
(1994).
In re Seltzer, 104 F.3d 234,236 (9 th Cir. 1996)(emphases added). That is, the burden only shifts
where the State itself bears the contractual obligations impacted by the change in the law. See,

e.g., State of Nev. Employees Ass'n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223 (9 th Cir. 1990)(challenge to
Nevada's change to Nevada's state employees' pension plan which change precluded employees
from withdrawing pension funds without penalty prior to vesting).
In the present case, the SIF is not "the State," nor did the State have any contractual
obligations with the plaintiffs-policyholders. By statutory definition, the SIF is "created as an
independent body corporate politic" and derives its financial well-being from "premiums and
penalties received," "property and securities acquired," and "of interest earned" thereon.
I.C. § 72-901(1). The SIF is to "be administered without liability on the part of the state." Id.
The money generated by the SIF is deposited with the state treasurer, who acts as custodian for
the SIF; however, "[t]he money in the fund does not belong to the state ... [the money is held by
the treasurer] ... for the contributing employers and the beneficiaries of the compensation law,

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6

000288

and for the payment of the costs of the operation of the fund."

State ex reI. Williams v.

Musgrave, 84 Idaho 77, 84, 370 P.2d 778, 782 (1962). Notably, the State itself is a policyholder,
and not the insurer. See Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed October 26, 2010 ("Counsel Aff."), at Exh. C, Fiscal Note ("The State ofIdaho
and public entities, which are insured by the State Insurance Fund, .... ")(emphasis added).
As the State has no contractual relationship with the plaintiffs-policyholders, this burden-shifting
is inapplicable to this matter.
Second, the question of burden-shifting is not even reached until plaintiffs have first
demonstrated a substantial impairment of a contract - not simply that the state "retroactively
terminates the contract rights of a citizen". See Cayetano, 183 F.3d at 1106 ("Defendants bear
the burden of proving that the impairment was reasonable and necessary because '[t]he burden
is placed on the party asserting the benefit of the statute only when that party is the
state."')(emphasis added); accord S. Cal., 336 F.3d at 894 ("Because Santa Ana has

substantially impaired its own contract, it has the burden of establishing that the trench cut
ordinance is both reasonable and necessary to an important public purpose.")(emphasis
added)(citing Cayetano). As discussed in the SIF's Motion, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that
any contract right has been impaired by the repeal of I. C. § 72-915, nor can plaintiffs
demonstrate that the impairment is substantial. Even then, however, the precise burden the State
faces depends upon the degree of the impairment: "[I]f a State undertakes to alter substantially
the terms of a contract, it must justify the alteration, and the burden that is on the State varies

directly with the substantiality of the alteration." Equipment Mfrs. Institute v. Janklow, 300
F.3d 842, 860 (8 th Cir. 2002)(quoting White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 599 F.2d 283,287 (8 th Cir.
1979»(emphasis added).
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In any event, plaintiffs do not dispute that the repeal of I.e. § 72-915 -like all legislative
acts - is presumed to be constitutional: "[ a] legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and
all reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be resolved in favor of its validity." Oneida
County Fair Bd. v. Smylie, 86 Idaho 341, 346, 386 P.2d 374,376 (1963).
Thus, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the SIF bears any burden

In

proving the

constitutionality of the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 - to the contrary, the repeal is presumed to be
constitutional, and plaintiffs themselves bear the burden of establishing that the repeal is
unconstitutional.

2.

Federal law is applicable in interpreting Idaho's Constitution both generally and in
this case.
Plaintiffs next assert that federal law regarding the U.S. Constitution's Contract Clause is

inapplicable to the evaluation of the Idaho Constitution's Contract Clause. Plaintiffs' attempts to
downplay the State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P.3d 480 (2009) decision, and to rely upon
Idaho caselaw without specifying how the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected federal analysis in
favor of an analysis unique to the Idaho Contract Clause, should be rejected by this Court.
a.

State v. Korn demonstrates that Idaho does not employ a separate analysis.

As explained by the SIF in its brief-in-chief, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a federal
and state constitutional argument in Korn with a single, dispositive analysis.

In Korn, the

defendant argued that a city violated his rights under "the contract clauses found in the Idaho and
U.S. constitutions."

The Korn Court, without making a distinction between the two

constitutions, engaged in a single analysis, relying on federal law (Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978)) to hold that the city's ordinance did not violate his rights
under either constitution. Id. at 483.
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Plaintiffs attempt to downplay Korn by asserting that "[n]owhere in its opinion does our
Supreme court engage in any substantive analysis of whether or not the ordinance Korn
challenged violated either the State or Federal Contracts Clause." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 11.
While the Court resolved the issue short of the full test as outlined in, e.g., RUT One Corp. v.
City of Berkeley, 371 FJd 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004), telling is the absence of any discussion of
how a Contract Clause claim would be treated differently under the Idaho Constitution than
under the U.S. Constitution. This is consistent with the rule that "we seriously consider federal
law in determining the parameters of our own constitutional provisions, and we may adopt
federal precedent under the state constitution but only to the extent that we believe the federal
law is not inconsistent with the protections afforded by our state constitution." State v. Guzman,
122 Idaho at 988.
Further, the Korn Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, supra, in stating that "[t]he ... contracts clause protects only those
contractual obligations already in existence at the time the disputed law is enacted." Thus, the
Idaho Supreme Court expressly relied upon a U.S. Supreme Court case, which evaluated a
Contract Clause claim under the U.S. Constitution. A review of Allied Structural reflects the
modern test of the Contract Clause. For example, the Allied Structural Court rejects the literal
reading of the Contract Clause that plaintiffs seek to employ in this case: "The Clause is not,
however, the Draconian provision that its words might seem to imply.

As the Court has

recognized, 'literalism in the construction of the contract clause ... would make it destructive of
the public interest by depriving the State of its prerogative of self-protection." 438 U.S. at 240.
Further, the Allied Structural Court also, for example, discussed the requirement of
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substantiality, and evaluation of the nature and purpose of the legislation where a severe
impairment occurs:
In applying these principles to the present case, the first inquiry must be whether
the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship. The severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the
state legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end
the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push the
inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state legislation.
438 U.S. at 244-45. Thus, the implicit argument by plaintiffs - that Idaho has rejected the
modem Contract Clause analysis with respect to the Idaho Constitution's own Contract Clause,
or somehow employs some other test - is unavailing.
b.

Idaho Contract Clause decisions reflect application of the modem Contract Clause
analysis.

Plaintiffs cite two Idaho decisions for their contention that Idaho does not utilize modem
federal Contract Clause analysis: the 1954 decision of Penrose v. Commercial Travelers
Insurance Company, 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d 969 (1954), and the 1933 decision in Straus v.
Ketchen, 54 Idaho 56, 28 P.2d 824 (1933).
With respect to Penrose, plaintiffs acknowledge that the lead opinion authored by Justice
Thomas "demonstrated a strong inclination to apply what is current Federal methodology," but
that the dissenting opinions of three concurring Justices demonstrates that the Idaho Supreme
Court has refused to use the modem federal Contract Clause analysis. Plaintiffs' Opposition at
15.

However, the Penrose decision has been reeled in by later decisions, clarifying that

retroactive legislation, even as applied to existing contracts, is not per se unconstitutional. In
Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Services, Inc., the Idaho Court of Appeals clarified that
"[b]ecause the statute shifted the balance of power between contracting parties, by identifying a
favored party in the event of litigation, the Supreme Court barred its application to pre-existing
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contracts." 116 Idaho 693, 696, 778 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct. App. 1989). Thus, the Eriksen Court
narrowed Penrose to scenarios where a statutory change would have "affected bargaining
relationships by designating favored parties," characterizing the Penrose decision as resting upon
a "policy rationale." Id This explanation by the Idaho Court of Appeals was later confirmed by
the Idaho Supreme Court in Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 835 P.2d 1282
(1992).

As discussed above, however, the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 did not impact the "bargaining
relationships" between the parties, but rather maintained the status quo of dividend practices in
accord with the Idaho Legislature's intent. Further, the policy needs of the repeal of I.e. § 72915, outlined in the SIF's brief-in-chief, were not at issue in Penrose, and, applied here,
demonstrate that the repeal complies with the Contract Clause. Tellingly, this later discussion of
Penrose by the Idaho appellate courts is not cited by plaintiffs.
Nor is the 1933 Straus v. Ketchen decision guiding authority on application of the
modem Contract Clause analysis in Idaho. Not surprisingly, omitted from plaintiffs' discussion
of Straus is that the Idaho Supreme Court was simultaneously ruling on both the U.S. and Idaho
Contract Clause provisions:

Under the federal and state constitutional provisions above quoted, no law
can ever be passed impairing the obligations of a contract, and no exception
is made, consequently the contracts of a drainage district stand upon the
same footing as those of individuals or any other agency. The Legislature
cannot, under such constitutional prohibitions, authorize, under the police power
of the state, the creation of a contracting agency and permit the contracting of
obligations, and by the same power destroy its contracts and abolish its
obligations. To permit the Legislature to do so would destroy the very essence of
the constitutional prohibitions. Clearly such was never the intention of the framers
of the Constitution. Were it otherwise, no person would ever be safe to enter into
a contract with public or quasi public corporations, creatures of the law.
For the reasons herein announced, we hold that chapter 183, Session Laws 1933,
impairs the obligations of the contract, as to the bonds in question, in violation of
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article 1, § 10, Constitution of the United States, and article 1, § 16,
Constitution of Idaho.
28 P.2d at 834 & 835-36. (emphases added). As an initial point, Straus actually supports the
SIF's position that the Idaho Supreme Court has not enunciated a test different than the federal
analysis, in that Straus treated the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Constitution Contract Clause
provisions in the same breath. Further, Straus's contention that under the U.S. Contract Clause
"no law can ever be passed impairing the obligations of a contract" is, now almost 80 years later,
no longer even remotely an accurate statement regarding federal Contract Clause law. See, e.g.,
Allied Structural. supra (cited in State v. Korn, supra); RUI, supra.
In addition, the Straus decision includes reference to Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 535, 18 L.Ed. 403 (1866). In evaluating a Contract Clause under the New Mexico state
constitution, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained: "much water has flowed over the dam
since Von Hoffman, and so we prefer to apply more modem Contract Clause analysis in deciding
whether or not to invalidate this statute in this case." Los Quatros, Inc. v. State Farm Life Ins.
Co., 800 P.2d 184, 192 (N.M. 1990). Further, Straus' language as to "public or quasi public
corporations" is also untenable under more recent Idaho law, given that Idaho appellate courts
have made clear that laws impacting existing public and quasi-public contracts are not per se
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Agricultural Products Corp. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 98 Idaho 23,
29, 557 P.2d 617, 622-23 (l976)(public utilities - "On the other hand, the state has a well
established right to regulate public utilities .... Pursuant to that power, it has been settled that the
state may fix rates for a public utility service which will supersede rates previously fixed by
private contract. ... Private contracts with utilities are regarded as entered into subject to
reserved authority of the state to modify the contract in the public interest."); City of Hayden v.
Washington Water Power Co., 108 Idaho 467, 469, 700 P.2d 89, 91

(Ct. App.
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1985)(municipalities - "We do not suggest, of course, that a municipality never may impose new
burdens upon an existing franchise grantee. A city has the inherent right to enact valid police
power regulations, even if contracts are thereby affected."). In short, plaintiffs fail to cite any
Idaho authority that demonstrates that Idaho employs anything but the modem Contract Clause
analysis employed by federal courts.
Accordingly, this Court can correctly utilize the modem Contract Clause test - such as
that employed in the RUI and Quatros decisions - in evaluating the constitutionality of the repeal
ofLC. §72-915.

3.

The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is constitutional, per modern Contract Clause analysis.
Its prior arguments notwithstanding, plaintiffs next argue that application of the modem

Contract Clause analysis (as reflected in the RUI decision) demonstrates that the repeal of I.e.
§72-915 is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs' arguments as to each of the elements outlined in RUI l are
in error, and plaintiffs' arguments fail.
a.

The Idaho Legislature has not operated a substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship.

i.

There is no contractual right to dividends in the SIF workers'
compensation policies.

Plaintiffs baldly contend that the decisions in Kelso & Irwin v. State Insurance Fund, 134
Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000) and Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho
388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005) demonstrate there is a "contractual agreement between the Fund and its

I As previously explained in the SIF's brief-in-chief, the RUI Court summarized the modem Contract Clause threestep analysis as follows: (I) "whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship[;]" (2) "whether the State ... [has] a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation,
such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem[;]" and (3) "whether the adjustment of the
rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate
to the public purpose justifying the legislation'S adoption." RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1147
(internal quotations omitted). Additionally, the first step "itself has three components: 'whether there is a
contractual relationship, whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, and whether the impairment
is substantial. '" Id.
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policyholders regarding the specific term before this Court." Plaintiffs' Opposition at 18-19. In
doing so, however, plaintiffs fail to address two points on this issue raised in the SIF's brief-inchief, and, as such, do not appear to contest them.
First, plaintiffs do not dispute that the SIF policy of insurance is silent as to dividends.
See Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment ("Lojek Aff."), filed September 22,2010, at Exh. A.
Second, plaintiffs also do not dispute the SIF's governing statutes do not guarantee
payments of dividends to policyholders, nor do they set forth that the policyholders have a
property interest in the surplus or assets of the SIF. See generally I.C. § 72-901 et seq. The
Idaho Supreme Court previously concluded the SIF's statutory framework does not create any
property rights in the SIF's policyholders. Kelso, 134 Idaho at 135. Plaintiffs acknowledge this,
but argue that the policyholders' claimed contract right is simply "a right to share in [a]
dividend" once declared. Plaintiffs' Opposition at n.4.

In doing so, however, plaintiffs also fail

to address the SIF's argument that plaintiffs cannot characterize a strict pro rata dividend
distribution as some variety of expected or vested contractual right that has been disrupted by
retroactive application, because SIF dividends have not previously been paid that way, and,
indeed, any change in the law created by Farber was promptly remedied by the Idaho legislature
(via repeal) even before remittitur issued by the Idaho Supreme Court in the Farber matter. See,
e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 Idaho 400, 411, 103 S.Ct.

697, 704 (1983)("[S]tate regulation that restricts a party to gains it reasonably expected from the
contract does not necessarily constitute a substantial impairment."); Boykin v. Boeing Co., 128
F.3d 1279, 1283 (9 th Cir. 1997)("The proper inquiry in determining the constitutionality of
retroactive legislation is 'whether a party has changed position in reliance upon the previous law
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or whether the retroactive law defeats the reasonable expectations of the parties. "'); accord, In
Re Marriage of Giroux, 704 P.2d 160 (Wash. App. 1985).
Accordingly, there is no contractual right to dividends, and a legislative change to the
statute governing the methodology for distribution of dividends does not implicate a term of the
SIF insurance policy.

ii.

The repeal of LC. § 72-915 was not a change in law that impaired the
contractual relationship between the SIF and its policyholders.

Plaintiffs next contend, in conclusory fashion, that the workers' compensation policies
must be impaired, simply by the fact of the existence of the SIF's summary judgment motion,
and because plaintiffs' rights "will be rendered nugatory by their inability to enforce them."
Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 19.
The SIF's summary judgment motion is not, and cannot, be construed as some variety of
admission that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 constituted an impairment of the SIF-issued workers'
compensation policies. To the contrary, it was plaintiffs that brought this action, alleging that
such repeal was unconstitutional under the Contract Clause of the U.S. and Idaho constitutions.
The SIF's summary judgment motion merely seeks to resolve those claims.

The fact that

plaintiffs cannot sue for a claimed pro rata share of declared dividends because of the repeal of
I.C. § 72-915 does not mean there has been an impairment.
To the contrary, as explained in the SIF's brief-in-chief (and unaddressed in plaintiffs'
Opposition), the policy expressly provides:
Terms of this insurance that conflict with the workers compensation law are
changed by this statement to conform to this law.
(Lojek Aff., Exh. A, at p. 2.) Thus, even to the extent a dividend methodology may be a term of
the contract by virtue of statute (here, the now-repealed I. C. § 72-915), that term is subject to
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change at any time by the Legislature, which is expressly outlined in the policy. Changes in the
law are automatically incorporated into the policy, and no "impairment" would exist because the
terms of the policy are changed when the law is changed, a fact that all policyholders are
apprised of in the express language of their policy.

iii.

The SIF policies were not "substantially impaired."

Plaintiffs' Opposition then asserts that the workers' compensation policies were, in fact,
substantially impaired, given that a financial term was altered. Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 20
(citing S. Cal, supra, and its underlying District Court decision at 202 F. Supp. 1129 (2002)).
Plaintiffs' argument on this point fails for two key reasons.
First, plaintiffs are dismissive of the value of the dividends at issue, effectively
contending that any financial term that is altered constitutes a substantial impairment. In doing
so, however, they disregard S. Cal.'s explanation that "[w]hen assessing substantial impairment,
we need not resolve the 'question of valuation' in terms of dollars if an important financial
provision is impaired." 336 F.3d at 891 (emphasis added). In discussing this, the S. Cal. court
cited two decisions, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 1505 (1977)
and Cayetano, supra. The S.Cal. court pointed out that in U.S. Trust, the change in the law
effected "an 'outright repeal' of 'an important security provision'" - to wit, diversion of
"revenues and reserves earmarked as security for privately held bonds." 336 F.3d at 889. The S.
Cal. court also noted that in Cayetano, the statute at issue allowed the state "to delay employees'
pay by one to three days on no more than six occasions over one year." Id. Plaintiffs fail to
explain how the pro rata share of a discretionary declared dividend is an "important financial
provision" comparable to a bond security or a paycheck.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -16

000298

Perhaps even more incredibly, plaintiffs appear to suggest a right to a dividend
declaration itself: "[i]t bears directly upon the cost of that contract or the consideration for the
issuance of the policy." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 20. However, as explained above, and
uncontested by plaintiffs,2 the SIF's policyholders have no contractual right to a dividend or even
a property interest in the assets of the SIF, per the terms of the policy, the SIF's governing
statutes, and the Kelso decision. Thus, the SIF Manager is entitled, in his discretion, to forgo the
declaration of dividends for particular dividend periods or even declare a nominal amount, and,
absent an abuse of such discretion, the SIF's policyholders cannot challenge such
determinations; thus, the SIF's policyholders have no inherent right to rely upon dividends as
"consideration" for a workers' compensation policy or that a particular amount be declared as
dividends. Thus, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the potential for a dividend - the existence
and amount thereof purely in the discretion of the SIF Manager - constitutes an "important
financial provision" of a workers' compensation policy.
Second, plaintiffs then argue that "[t]his is a class action and the damages are an
aggregate of the individual damages, which in this case are expected to be in excess of one
million dollars." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 21. 3 Plaintiffs cite no authority for this proposition,
nor otherwise highlight any differential analysis employed by courts depending on whether the
challenged legislative action impacts one contract (e.g., the municipal franchise agreement in
City of Hayden, supra) or potentially hundreds of contracts (e.g., attorney fee agreements in Curr

"Plaintiffs are not claiming in the case at bar, just as they never claimed in Farber, that they have an absolute
'contractual right to a dividend.'" Plaintiffs' Opposition at nA.
3 It is worth noting, of course, that this action is not yet actually certified as a class action. As noted in the SIF's
brief-in-chief, as well, not all policyholders with more than $2,500 in paid premiums for the years at issue would be
class members as some policyholders benefit from the SIF's dividend practices, a point that plaintiffs do not dispute.
2
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CUIT, 124 Idaho 686, 691, 864 P.2d 132, 137 (1993))4 or even potentially thousands of

contracts (e.g., utility customers' private contracts in Agricultural Products COrp.).5
Finally, plaintiffs do not challenge the SIF's argument that the workers' compensation
policies exist in a "heavily regulated industry," such that "expectations of further regulation that
industry may lessen the severity of a subsequent impairment of that party's contractual rights and
obligations." State v. All Property and Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized and Licensed To Do
Business In State, 937 So.2d 313, 324 (La. 2006).

Indeed, in the context of insurance

agreements, "public interest is so affected by the insurance business carried on in the state that
private right of contract must be subjected to the police power." U.S. for Use and Benefit of
Midwest Steel & Iron Words Co. v. Henly, 117 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (D. Idaho 1954)(quoting
Intermountain Lloyds v. Diefendorf, 51 Idaho 304, 5 P.2d 730 (1931)). Given that Idaho's
workers' compensation law exists as an express exercise of the police power (I.C. §72-201), and
also given that the Idaho Supreme Court has expressly recognized that an exercise of the police
power is an exception to the application of the Contract Clause prohibition,6 there should be no
doubt that the Legislature's repeal of a statute relating to an insurer in a heavily-regulated
industry created as a result of an exercise of the Legislature's police power would not constitute
a 'substantial' impairment of contracts (that is, workers' compensation insurance policies).

Although addressing only four fee agreements in particular, the Idaho Supreme Court spoke generally as to the
right of the Idaho Industrial Commission to modify attorney fee agreements: "In order to justifiably modify
attorney fee agreements in the interest of public welfare, the Commission must afford due process to the
contracting parties, i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time." 124 Idaho at 696 (emphasis
added).
5 Although addressing only one customer's rate increase, the Idaho Supreme Court spoke generally as to the right of
the Public Utility Commission's right to allow rate changes: "On the other hand, the state has a well established
right to regulate public utilities ... , Pursuant to that power, it has been settled that the state may fix rates for a public
utility service which will supersede rates previously fixed by private contract. ... Private contracts with utilities are
regarded as entered into subject to reserved authority of the state to modifY the contract in the public interest." 98
Idaho at 29.
6 City of Hayden, 108 Idaho at 469 (stating that "[a] city has the inherent right to enact valid police power
regulations, even if contracts are thereby affected," but holding, as to specific facts in case, "the police power
exception to the constitutional proscription against impairing contracts does not apply.").
4
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b.

The State has a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the repeal of I.C.
§ 72-915.

Plaintiffs next address the requirement that, in demonstrating a violation of the Contract
Clause, the regulation lacked a significant and legitimate public purpose. In doing so, however,
they attempt to equate the SIF with the State of Idaho, and further fail to demonstrate that the
repeal lacked a legitimate and significant public purpose.

i.

The SIF does not have the burden ofproof, as it is not "the state. "

Plaintiffs first reiterate their argument that the SIF, as a "public entity," carries the burden
of proof in demonstrating whether there is a sIgnificant and legitimate public purpose behind the
regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem. Plaintiffs'
Opposition at 22. As addressed earlier on pages 5-8 above, this is incorrect, as the SIF is not
"the state."
Plaintiffs' error lies in the application of caselaw which looks to whether a State or state
entity interferes "with their own obligations." S. Cal., 336 F.3d at 894 ("Because Santa Ana has
substantially impaired its own contract, .... ")(emphasis added); accord Allied Structural, 438
U.S. at 244, n.15 ("The Court indicated that impairments of a State's own contracts would face
more stringent examination under the Contract Clause than would laws regulating contractual
relationships between private parties.")(emphasis added); Cayetano, 183 FJd at 1106 (9 th Cir.
1999)("Defendants bear the burden of proving that the impairment was reasonable and necessary
because '[t]he burden is placed on the party asserting the benefit of the statute only when that
party is the state."')(emphasis added). Plaintiffs' flaw lies in the inherent conclusion that the
SIF is the State.
The SIF does not dispute that, by law, it is "created as an independent body corporate
politic." I.C. § 72-901(1). However, it is not "state managed," as plaintiffs contend. Plaintiffs'
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Opposition at p. 22. Rather, the SIF is managed by the SIF Manager. I.C. § 72-902. 7 The SIF
is, by express statute, to "be administered without liability on the part of the state." I.C. § 72901(1). The money generated by the SIF is deposited with the state treasurer, who acts as
custodian for the SIF; however, "[t]he money in the fund does not belong to the state ... [the
money is held by the treasurer] ... for the contributing employers and the beneficiaries of the
compensation law, and for the payment of the costs of the operation of the fund." State ex reI.
Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho 77, 84, 370 P.2d 778, 782 (1962). Thus, when the SIF issues a
workers' compensation policy to a policyholder, no relationship between the State and the
policyholder is created, 8 and the State bears no liability whatsoever for that policy of insurance.
Thus, a legislative act by the Idaho State Legislature applicable to the SIF - such as the repeal of
I.C. § 72-915 - does not constitute an impairment of the State's own contractual obligations.
Accordingly, the burden remains on plaintiffs to demonstrate that there is no significant
and legitimate public purpose behind the repeal ofl.C. § 72-915.

ii.

The applicable standard is not "strict scrutiny. "

Even were the Court to find that the SIF was equivalent to the State, which it should not,
the Court should reject plaintiffs' demanded "strict scrutiny" standard. Plaintiffs' Opposition at
pp. 22 & 24.

7 "72-902

.STATE INSURANCE MANAGER -- POWERS AND DUTIES OF STATE INSURANCE
MANAGER. The board of directors of the state insurance fund shall appoint a manager of the state insurance fund,
whose duties, subject to the direction and supervision of the board, shall be to conduct the business of the state
insurance fund, and do any and all things which are necessary and convenient in the administration thereof, or in
connection with the insurance business to be carried on under the provisions of this chapter. The manager shall have
skill and expertise in managing and administering within the insurance industry, shall be of good moral character
and shall be bonded in the time, form and manner as prescribed by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code."
8 Again, the State itself is a policyholder. See Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Fiscal Note ("The State of Idaho and public
entities, which are insured by the State Insurance Fund, .... ")(emphasis added).

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 20

000302

"Strict scrutiny" is, of course, a different constitutional standard employed in other
constitutional law matters. For example, in the context of alleged First Amendment violations,
"any restriction based on the content of speech [in traditionally public forums] must satisfy strict
scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest." Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, l30 S. Ct. 2971, 2984, n.l1 (U.S. 2010). This is
inapplicable in the Contract Clause analysis.
The requirement is simply that there be "a significant and legitimate public purpose
behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic
problem." RUI, 371 F.3d at 1147. Caselaw discussing the scenario of a State's impairment of
its own contractual obligations does not impose a new "strict scrutiny" standard, but rather
simply directs courts to more closely scrutinize legislative assessments of reasonableness and
necessity where the State is attempting to alter its own contractual obligations. Energy Reserves
Group v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. at n.14. Even in that scenario, however, the
burden is not a static test, but depends on the degree of impairment: "[I]f a State undertakes to
alter substantially the terms of a contract, it must justify the alteration, and the burden that is on
the State varies directly with the substantiality of the alteration." Equipment Mfrs. Institute
v. Janklow, 300 F.3d at 860 (quoting White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 599 F.2d 283, 287 (8 th Cir.
1979))(emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Court should reject any contention by plaintiffs that a "strict scrutiny"
standard applies to this action.
iii.

Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the repeal of I.e. § 72-915 lacks a
significant and legitimate public purpose.

Plaintiffs contend that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is "nothing more than an amnesty
provision for the illegal conduct of the fund." Plaintiffs' Opposition at 27. Plaintiffs further
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contend that the repeal is "very narrow and specific and only designed to benefit a single entity."

Id at 24. Thereby, plaintiffs argue, there lacks a significant and legitimate public purpose
behind the repeal ofLe. § 72-915.
Plaintiffs' first error in arguing such a position is that plaintiffs attempt to argue what
they contend is the motivation ("reward the Fund for having ignored the clear and unambiguous
language of a law" and "amnesty ... for the illegal conduct") behind the repeal, rather than
looking to the text of the repeal.
inappropriate.

Plaintiffs' Opposition at 25 & 27.

This is, of course,

As the RUI court explained, in rejecting a dissenting opinion's efforts to

characterize the motives for an amendment:
Although the dissent cites additional facts that it states "reveal why the Marina
Amendment is an improper exercise of municipal authority," post, at 1158, these
facts are introduced solely to establish a supposed nefarious motive on behalf of
the City Council. Such facts are wholly irrelevant, however, as our analysis of the
constitutionality of an ordinance must proceed from the text of the ordinance, not
the alleged motives behind it. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 686 F.2d 758, 761 (9th Cir.l982) ("It is well settled that a reviewing
court 'will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of
an allegedly illicit legislative motive.' " (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367,383,88 S.Ct. 1673,20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968))).
371 F.3d at 1146, n.7 (emphasis added).9
Plaintiffs' next error lies in characterizing the Legislature's act as one of "very narrow
focus ... aimed at specific" parties. Plaintiffs' Opposition at 24. Plaintiffs' citation to Allied
Structural is of little benefit to this Court, given its lack of factual similarity to this matter. In

9 Plaintiffs also err in attempting to attribute some deficiency in the constitutionality of the repeal by noting that it
was passed in response to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Farber. Not only did the Idaho Supreme Court
expressly contemplate that the law would be changed, but even the U.S. Congress' efforts to pass legislation in
direct response to a U.S. Supreme Court holding has been upheld. See Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147
Idaho 307, 313, 208 P.3d 289,295 (2009)("The arguments, evidence, and testimony provided to this Court would be
better targeted at the Legislature, which is empowered to change existing law .... If, in the intervening time, it has
become prudent to alter the statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the proper
remedy is to approach the Legislature to change the law."); In Re Marriage of Giroux, 704 P.2d 160 (Wash. App.
1984)(approving retroactivity of military pay-related community property statute passed in response to U.S.
Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981)).
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that matter, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the effort of the Minnesota Legislature to "grossly
distort[] the company's existing contractual relationships with its employees" by imposing new,
onerous requirements for pension funding in the event an employer attempted to close up shop in
Minnesota or terminate a pension:
Moreover, the retroactive state-imposed vesting requirement was applied only to
those employers who terminated their pension plans or who, like the company,
closed their Minnesota offices. The company was thus forced to make all the
retroactive changes in its contractual obligations at one time. By simply
proceeding to close its office in Minnesota, a move that had been planned before
the passage of the Act, the company was assessed an immediate pension funding
charge of approximately $185,000.
Thus, the statute in question here nullifies express terms of the company's
contractual obligations and imposes a completely unexpected liability in
potentially disabling amounts. There is not even any provision for gradual
applicability or grace periods. Cf. the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1061(b)(2), 1086(b), and 1144 (1976 ed.). See n.
23, infra. Yet there is no showing in the record before us that this severe
disruption of contractual expectations was necessary to meet an important general
social problem. The presumption favoring "legislative judgment as to the
necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure," United States Trust Co.,
431 U.S., at 23,97 S.Ct., at 1518, simply cannot stand in this case.
The only indication of legislative intent in the record before us is to be found in a
statement in the District Court's opinion:
"It seems clear that the problem of plant closure and pension plan termination was
brought to the attention of the Minnesota legislature when the MinneapolisMoline Division of White Motor Corporation closed one of its Minnesota plants
and attempted to terminate its pension plan." 449 F.Supp., at 651.
But whether or not the legislation was aimed largely at a single employer, it
clearly has an extremely narrow focus. It applies only to private employers who
have at least 100 employees, at least one of whom works in Minnesota, and who
have established voluntary private pension plans, qualified under § 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code. And it applies only when such an employer closes his
Minnesota office or terminates his pension plan. Thus, this law can hardly be
characterized, like the law at issue in the Blaisdell case, as one enacted to protect
a broad societal interest rather than a narrow class.
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438 U.S. at 247-49. The repeal of I.C. §72-915 was not an effort by the Idaho Legislature to
disrupt the business decision of a company by suddenly imposing new, onerous financial
conditions and "grossly distorting" extant contracts.

Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has

explained, the reach of Allied Structural has been pulled back: "The Court retreated from its
holding in Spannaus [in later cases]. In these cases, the Court indicated a renewed willingness to
defer to the decisions of state legislatures regarding the impairment of private contracts."
Keating, 903 F.2d at 1226.
In the present case, the Legislature appropriately explained the 'significant and legitimate
public purpose' of the repeal by the Legislature'S Statement of Purpose and Fiscal Note to S.B.
1166, as amended. Counsel Aff., Exh. C. There, the Legislature stated:
Repeal of Idaho Code Section 72-915 will serve to offset an adverse decision of
the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code Section 72915 which could subject the State Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies
that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the Fund's ability to reduce
premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. The proposed repeal of
Idaho Code 72-915 will clarify the law regarding the payment of dividends by the
State Insurance Fund by making it clear that in passing House Bill 774aa in 1998,
it was the intent of the legislature to have the State Insurance Fund operate like an
efficient insurance company subject to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code,
including the dividend provision set forth in Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho Code.
Repeal of the law effective April 3, 1998 is necessary because on that date laws
were enacted which subjected the State Insurance Fund to regulation under the
Insurance Code, Title 41 of the Idaho Code. This legislation will allow the State
Insurance Fund to issue dividends in the same manner as other insurance
companies operating within the State of Idaho.
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Id 10 In turn, the repeal's Fiscal Note emphasized the financial uncertainly faced by the SIF in
light of the Court's ruling:
The State of Idaho and public entities, which are insured by the State Insurance
Fund, face losing all or part of their future dividends and deviations as a result of
uncertainties as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision. Based on
dividends and rate reduction deviations provided by the State Insurance Fund over
the past two years, that number could exceed $5,000,000 annually. Private
businesses may also, due to the same uncertainties, experience the loss of future
dividends and deviations since, according to the Court's decision, the Fund has no
option when distributing dividends, other than to use a pro rata formula.

Id Plaintiffs attempt to assert that the stated intent is only prospective in nature, but the repeal
itself squarely addresses the Legislature's concern that the Farber decision "require[s] the State
Insurance Fund pay dividend on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the
fund's ability to reduce premiums and pay dividend to profitable policyholders." Counsel Aff.,
Exh. C. The Legislature, in so doing and with the rule that "the Legislature was aware of the
prevailing judicial interpretation of that statute and specifically chose to change that
interpretation," clearly recognized that the Farber court's interpretation of I.C. § 72-915 would
apply not only to future policies, but also to existing policies and policies no longer in force Farber itself was addressing a class of "Idaho employers who paid annual premiums of $2,500.00
or less to the Fund for worker's compensation insurance from the policy year beginning in 2001
onward." 147 Idaho at 310. Thus, the Legislature was acutely cognizant that additional claims
might be brought pursuant to I.C. § 72-915 if not retroactively appealed, which would have
precisely the harmful impact the Legislature sought to avoid: the loss of future dividends and

10 Of course, even in the absence of such a legislative statement as to a particular decision by the Idaho Supreme
Court: "[s]tatutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal
preceden[t] at the time the statute was passed." State, ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, __ , 224 PJd
1109, 1118 (Idaho 201O)(quoting Druffel v. State, Dep't of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002)); accord
Smith v. Washington County, _ Idaho _ , _ PJd __,2010 WL 3895341 (Idaho, October 6,2010) ("We
presume that when it amended § 12-117(1), the Legislature was aware of the prevailing judicial interpretation of that
statute and specifically chose to change that interpretation.").
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deviations.

Given the SIF's public purpose 11 and the potential impact upon thousands of

policyholders (present and future) of such a result, the' significant and legitimate public purpose'
is amply demonstrated.
Finally, plaintiffs fail to recognize, again, the history of dividend payments by the SIF.
Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, demonstrate that SIF dividends were previously paid pro rata,
either before 12 or after the Farber decision. Indeed, any change in the law created by Farber was
promptly remedied by the Idaho legislature even before any remittitur in Farber issued. The end
result of the Farber decision, then, was to suddenly mandate a particular dividend distribution
methodology which had not previously been employed, and could not have been expected or
relied upon by policyholders, resulting in a windfall to policyholders still within the applicable
statute of limitations. However, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, avoidance of windfall is a
perfectly appropriate basis for a Legislature to act: "if a statute causes unforeseen and unintended
consequences such that private parties would obtain windfalls they never expected, later
amendment to realign a statute with the parties' expected bargain may be reasonable." S. Cal.,
336 F.3d at 895. Here, the Idaho Legislature has made clear its belief that the Farber court
wrongly interpreted its intent (Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Section 1(4)), and the plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate any existing "expected bargain" given that dividends were never paid in a strict pro
rata fashion.
Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, "unless the State is itself a contracting
party, courts should 'properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and

I I Plaintiffs do not appear to contend that the SIF itself lacks a public purpose, as was previously outlined by the SIF
in its brief-in-chief. See generally Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp.3336.
12 Affidavit of Jim Alcorn in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 26, 2010 at , ~
25.
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.
reasonableness of a particular measure." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 505, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1252 (1982)(emphasis added). In the present case, the Idaho
State Legislature appropriately stated the reasons for the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 and the
retroactive nature therefor, and plaintiffs are thus unable to demonstrate that the repeal lacked a
significant and legitimate public purpose.
c.

The adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of the SIF and its policyholders,
if any, is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the
public purpose justifying the repeal of I.C. § 72-915.

Finally, plaintiffs assert, with little specific explanation, that the retroactive repeal of I.C.

§72-915 is not of an appropriate character to the public purpose justifying the repeal.
Plaintiffs first misstate the test, asserting that "the Court is to to [sic] examine the
availability of alternative measures which the legislature could have taken which would have
addressed its legitimate concerns without producing a concomitant impairment of the Fund's
contractual obligations to the Plaintiffs and the members of the class." Plaintiffs' Opposition at
p. 28. More correctly, the burden falls upon plaintiffs to disprove that "the adjustment of the
rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation'S adoption." RUI One Corp.
v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1147 (9 th Cir. 2004).). This is the final step of the RUI analysis,
where a court has already identified a contractual impairment of some kind, but also found that
the legislation addressing that impairment serves a significant and legitimate public purpose:
"[o]nce a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the next inquiry is whether the
adjustment of 'the rights and responsibilities of the contracting party [is based] upon reasonable
conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation'S]
adoption." Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 413. Thus, the Court need not find that
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legislation should avoid "concomitant impairment," as at this stage in the analysis, impairment
will have already been found but also justified by a public purpose.
Even were the Court to reach this stage of the analysis, plaintiffs have failed to expressly
indicate what is inappropriate as to the character of the repeal of I.C. § 72-915, or to otherwise
overcome the deference afforded the Legislature in making such repeal.

See, e.g., Energy

Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412-13 ("Unless the State itself is a contracting party, ... '[a]s is customary
in reviewing economic and social regulation, ... courts properly defer to legislative judgment as
to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.'''). The Legislature has identified
the potential harm caused by the Farber ruling: the loss of future dividends and deviations both to
public and private entities insured by the SIF. The Legislature, in seeking to avoid such harm,
repealed I.C. § 72-915 (the only source from which the SIF could be required to distribute under
a particular methodology) and made it retroactive. The retroactive nature of the statute both
ensured that no such harm could be brought on present and future policyholders by claims
related to past dividend periods, and prevented policyholders from gaining a windfall that was
neither reflective of any past dividend practice of the SIF nor which policyholders could have
claimed an expectation in.

S. Cal., 336 F.3d at 895 ("if a statute causes unforeseen and

unintended consequences such that private parties would obtain windfalls they never expected,
later amendment to realign a statute with the parties' expected bargain may be reasonable.").
In doing so, the Legislature cut off the risk of unknown claims adversely harming present
and future policyholders. Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Fiscal Note ("The State of Idaho and public
entities, which are insured by the State Insurance fund, face losing all or part of their future
dividends and deviations as a result of uncertainties as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court
Decision .... Private businesses may also, due to the same uncertainties, experience the loss of
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.. .
future dividends and deviations[.]". However, the Legislature, in its judgment, also saw fit to
actually preserve claims by policyholders who had already initiated litigation as of December 31,
2008, including the Farber plaintiffs. Thus, the retroactive repeal of the newly-interpreted I.C. §
72-915 to eliminate the risk of unknown additional claims impacting present and future
policyholders, while preserving existing litigated claims, was legislation of a wholly appropriate
character to address the Legislature's concerns at hand.
Finally, plaintiffs again raise the SIF's purported 'surplus,' but fail to explain the
relevance to this particular question.

While certainly a consideration in explaining how

dividends are determined, the Legislative repeal is not predicated on the assertion that a lack of
repeal will result in the insolvency of the Fund - rather, the Legislature expressly states that
"[t]he result of the [Farber] decision is to require that the State Insurance Fund pay premiums on
policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's ability to reduce
premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders." Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Section 1(2).
Further, even were the repeal based, in whole or in part, on concerns about the solvency of the
SIF, this would still not render the repeal unconstitutional for being of an inappropriate character,
especially given the public purpose of the SIF, its lack of State monetary support, and its lack of
a safety net in the form of the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association.
Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is not based
upon reasonable conditions and is of not a character appropriate to its public purpose.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 is
constitutional and forecloses Plaintiffs' claims, and the Court should grant summary judgment in
favor of the SIF on all of plaintiffs' claims in this case.
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COME NOW THE PLAINTIFFS, and the members of the class, by and through
undersigned counsel, and hereby provide the Court with the following Reply Memorandum in
Support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

I.

CURRENT PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Currently pending before this Court are four Motions,
A.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Filed September 23,2010. This Motion asks the Court to find and declare that making
the 2009 repeal ofldaho Code §72-915 retroactive to January 15" 2003, is clearly
unconstitutional, in that it violates Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of Idaho. In Support
of this Motion, the Plaintiffs filed the Affidavit of Philip Gordon to which was attached a number
of documents, which were either culled from the public record (including the complete
legislative history of 2009 Session Law, Ch. 294 (hereinafter "SB 1166aa") which is at issue in
this matter) or supplied by the Defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Fund") in

Randolph Farber, et. al. v. The Idaho State Insurance Fund, CV06-7877, Canyon County (herein
after "Farber v. Fund" to differentiate from citations to the Supreme Court decision in the
matter), and the Affidavit of Donald Lojek to which was attached a copy of the policy form used
by the State Insurance Fund. Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Support of that Motion on the
same day (hereinafter "PlfMemo."), and the Fund filed its Opposition on November 22nd, 2010
(hereafter "Def. Opp").

B.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Filed October 26th, 2010. This Motion asks the Court to find and declare that the
retroactivity aspect of the repeal of Idaho Code §72-915 offends neither Article 1, Section 16 of
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [I.R.C.P.
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the Idaho Constitution, nor Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution.
(Each of these provisions is generally known as the "Contracts Clause" of its respective
Constitution.) In Support of this Motion, the Fund filed the Affidavit of James Alcorn, the
Fund's Manager, which consists largely of self-serving conclusory claims regarding "facts" and
seeks to introduce a purported internal document of the Fund. The Fund also filed the Affidavit
of Bryan A. Nickels, to which is attached several pleadings and decisions from Farber v. Fund,
and a portion of the legislative history of SB 1166aa. The Fund filed a Memorandum in Support
of that Motion on the same day (hereinafter "DefMemo"), and Plaintiffs filed their Opposition
on November 22nd, 2010 (hereinafter PIPs Opp.).
C.

Plaintiffs' Motion pursuant to Rule 56 (t).

Filed on November 22,2010, this Motion asks the Court to proceed on the Plaintiffs'
independently determinable Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, if granted, which would
moot the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and, to the extent that the Court finds it
necessary to consider and rely upon any of the claims made in the Affidavit of James Alcorn or
many of the documents attached to the Affidavit of Bryan Nickels, asks the Court to stay
proceedings on the Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment until relevant discovery can be
conducted by Plaintiffs. In support of this Motion, the Plaintiffs filed the Affidavit of Philip
Gordon which, among other things, identifies some of the discovery which would need to be
conducted if the Court considers the Alcorn Affidavit relevant and admissible. The Plaintiffs
filed a Memorandum in support of that Motion on the same day, and Fund filed their Opposition
on or about December 3, 2010.
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D.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike.

Filed on November 22,2010, this Motion asks the Court to Strike many of the documents
attached to the Affidavit of Bryan Nickels and to Strike the entire Affidavit of James Alcorn on
the basis that they are wholly irrelevant to these proceedings and therefor not properly filed
affidavits. Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in support of that Motion on the same day, and the
Fund filed its Opposition on or about December 3, 2010.

TI.

INTRODUCTION
The Fund's 36 page memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment consists almost entirely of arguments and analyses which were set forth
verbatim (or virtually verbatim) in their memorandum in support of their own Motion for
Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs have already replied to most of these arguments in their

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motionfor Summary Judgment and do not wish to
burden the Court with reading those arguments again. For this reason, Plaintiffs are intending to
generally use summaries of arguments and provide references as appropriate to earlier
memoranda.

TIL

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
The indisputable and material facts are that Plaintiffs and the putative class members all

entered into contracts with the Fund, an entity created and regulated by the State of Idaho. All of
those contracts included a clear and unambiguous provision mandated by the Idaho Legislature
which required any dividends to be allocated pro rata among all time-qualified policyholders.
This term had been part of every policy issued by the Fund since 1917. The Manager of the Fund
considered that dividend allocation requirement to be inconvenient to his vison of how the Fund
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
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should be operated. Rather than going to the Legislature to secure a change in the legislatively
mandated contract provision, LC. § 72-915, he simply breached the contracts between the Fund
and its policyholders by ignoring that contract provision. In every year relevant to this action, he
exercised his discretion to declare a dividend (ranging between 5 million and 24 million dollars)
and then proceeded to arbitrarily allocate the dividend without the benefit of any rule, regulation,
or statute to suppoI1 his conduct. The approach he took caused Plaintiffs and the other putative
class members to receive either no dividend or less than they should have received. l After the
Manager was shown the error of his ways by the Supreme Court in Farber, et al. v. Idaho State
Insurance Fund,et ai., 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289 (2009) rather than taking action to remedy

the multiple breaches and to appropriately compensate all of the policyholders who had been
denied the full benefit of their contract with the Fund, representatives of the Fund went to the
Idaho Legislature and advocated for the passage ofa bill which removed LC. § 72-915 from the
contracts between the Fund and its policyholders, retroactive to a date prior to the earliest claim
that Plaintiffs can assert, consistent with existing statutes of limitation.
The Fund attempts to obscure these facts with several erroneous, inapposite or distorted
claims about these undisputed facts. First, it asserts that Plaintiffs' claims are predicated on
Idaho Code § 72-915 and not upon the contract. De/Opp., pp 4-5. This assertion is premised
upon the fact that the language ofLC. § 72-915 is not part of the printed specimen policy which

1 It should be noted that this conduct, as carried out, is contrary to the law in another respect. The fonnula
implemented by the Manager works to reduce(in many cases to $0.00) the dividend allocable to policyholders who have
suffered insured losses. This action works as an assessment against them which causes them to pay more premiums on
their policy then were paid by insureds who did not sufferer covered losses. Prior to 1951, the Manager had the power
to assess policyholders within a particular industry on an equal basis.I.C. §72-916. In 1951 ,the Legislature repealed I.C.
§72-916. Since that date the Manager has had no power to assess any policyholders. In either event, causing the net
cost of insurance to be higher for policyholders who suffered losses than for those who do not suffer losses is illegal
conduct and itself a breach of the contract. See Affidavit ofDonald W. Lojek dated December December 6, 2010.
REPLyMEMORANDUMlN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [I.R.C.P.
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is issued by the Fund. This claim ignores undisputed facts. First, without a contract between the
Plaintiffs and the Fund there would be no right to seek the required dividend allocation. LC.§72915, by itself, confers no generalized rights on any person or entity- only those in contract with
the Fund. Second, the Idaho Supreme Court has already expressly ruled that I.C. § 72-915 is a
provision of the contract between the Fund and its policyholders. Hayden Lake Fire Protection
Dist v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 399 (2005).
Second, the Fund claims that it is undisputed and material that I.C. §72-915 was repealed
on May 6,2009. De! Opp. pp. 5-6. The Fund is apparently not reading SB 1166aa very
carefully. SB 1166aa provides that there was an emergency such that Section 1 of the act (the
statement of purpose section) was effective immediately upon the Governor's signature or May
6,2009. SB 1166aa provides that Section 2 (the language repealing I.C. §72-915) is
retroactively effective as of January 1,2003. Based solely upon the language ofSB 1166aa it is
not possible to conclude that the actual repeal ofLC. § 72-915 was itself an emergency
enactment and, therefore, if it is not effective retroactively (because it is constitutionally
defective) then it is not effective until other general laws become effective, i.e., on July 1,2009.
Third, the Fund claims that it is an undisputed fact that Idaho Code § 72-915 was
repealed retroactive to January 1,2003 (Opp. pp.6). The Plaintiffs do not dispute that SB
1166aa states that the repeal ofLC. § 72-915 is retroactive to January 1, 2003. However, by
claiming that the statute is retroactively repealed the Fund is jumping the gun. Until it is
determined if this action is constitutional it is not correct to say that it is an undisputed fact that
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I.C. § 72-915 was repealed retroactive to January 1,2003.2
Fourth, the Fund claims that Plaintiff s claim is foreclosed if the repeal is upheld. De!
Opp. p.6 This assertion confounds the effect of a retroactive repeal and a prospective repeal.
Plaintiffs' claim is foreclosed if the retroactive repeal is deemed to be constitutional. If the
retroactive repeal is unconstitutional then the repeal ofLC. § 72-915 will only apply
prospectively as of the actual effective date ofthe bill and will not foreclose Plaintiffs' claims.
Fifth, the Fund engages in a lengthy discussion of the purposes for which it was created.
Whether this discussion is accurate or not, it is wholly immaterial to the decision to be made by
the Court. It appears to be offered to give the Fund some justification for filing the Mfidavit of
James Alcorn. The same can be said for the Fund's continued efforts, under the guise of
providing "Background" to continue to try to induce the Court to concern itself with a plethora
of irrelevant information which does little other than to attempt to justify the Manager's repeated
breaches of the contract. This case does not turn upon whether there is a justifiable breach of
contract, and consequently the Fund's recitation of the "facts" underlying the Manager's conduct
are no more relevant here, and should be no more persuasive to this Court than they were to the
Idaho Supreme Court.

2 At this point the numbering of the points set out in the memorandum will diverge from the numbering set out
in the Fund's opposition memorandum. This is because Plaintiff agrees that their claims all relate to dividend
distributions which occurred after 1, 2003 (Fund's point #4) and that this action was not filed until 24, 2009 (Fund's
point 5), assuming there is a typographical error in the caption of that point.
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [I.R.C.P.
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N.

ARGUMENT
A.

Summary of Argument

Plaintiffs maintain that a retroactive application of the repeal of I.C. §72-915 is a
violation of the Idaho Contract Clause and as such SB 1166aa cannot work as a bar to Plaintiffs'
breach of contract claims. In 1917, the legislature imposed a term into the Funds' contracts. 3
The Plaintiffs and every member of the putative class accepted those contracts and proceeded to
pay premiums pursuant to those contracts. Idaho decisional law makes clear that the Idaho
Contracts clause works to prohibit the Legislature from retroactively favoring an entity which it
created by removing terms from contracts which it mandated in the first place. Straus v.

Ketchen, 54 Idaho 56 (1933).
The Fund's response to this argument seeks to dodge controlling Idaho case law and
proceeds instead on the demonstrably false premise that "Federal law is applicable in interpreting
Idaho's Constitution both generally and in this case." Del Opp. p.10. Launching from this
unsupported notion, the Fund's argument proceeds by placing excessive reliance upon a single
Ninth Circuit case, which discusses but does not employ (because the matter is resolved on a
threshold issue) a number of factors employed in Federal decisional law analysis relative to the
Federal Contracts Clause. To support its claim that Federal Contracts Clause analysis applies,
the Fund also exalts a smattering of cases from other states. Apparently the Fund is suggesting
that this Court should rely on these decisions in order to overrule the long line of decisions of the

3 It should be noted that this term remained in place for 92 years and that during that time there was at least
one overhaul of the law controlling the operations of the Fund. In 1998 the Legislature considered and enacted a
substantial reorganization of the Fund. During that process, despite the benefit of testimony by the Fund manager and
several other knowledgeable persons, there is no record that the Fund manager or his supporters made any attempt to
have the Legislature consider or change I.C. § 72-915 specifically or the dividend allocation process generally.
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Idaho Supreme Court. However, the Fund fails to cite to a single authority which would support
this Court in proceeding to disregard the long-standing and controlling Idaho precedent on the
basis that it is not "modern" or "refmed". De! Opp. pp. 3-4.

B.

Reliance upon Federal Contracts Clause analysis for the purpose of determining
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is unwarranted.

Plaintiffs contend that this matter can be resolved by looking only to the Idaho Contracts
Clause. IfSB 1166aa impairs the Plaintiffs' contracts then it is unconstitutional under Idaho law
and it does not matter if the Fund can demonstrate (which it cannot) that SB 1166aa is not
unconstitutional under the Federal Contracts Clause. The Federal Contracts Clause imposes a
floor below which state conduct cannot dip, but, as a provision of the Federal Constitution which
infringes upon the power of the States who joined the Union, it is understandable that the Courts
have read into that infringement a limited willingness to defer to an exercise of police power by a
state legislature. The Federal Contracts Clause does not however impose a ceiling upon the
rights that the citizens of a state may impose upon their state government in the Constitution they
adopt. This means of course that the Idaho Supreme Court could, as it has done in other
instances, properly determine that the Idaho Contracts Clause is intolerant of State action which
impairs contracts, especially when the contract right at issue was mandated by the legislature in
the flrst instance. Indeed, considering Idaho Decisional Law, this is exactly what has happened
with respect to the Courts' application of the Idaho Contracts Clause. The Fund seeks to avoid
the clear result of applying Idaho Contracts Clause analysis in this case in several ways which
will be addressed below.
1.

The contents of the pleadings do not control the issues which must be
proven in order for the Plaintiff to prevail.

REPLyMEMORANDUMlNSUPPORTOFPLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [I.R.C.P.
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The Fund suggests, without any supporting authority, that because the Plaintiffs have
alleged in their Amended Complaint that SB 1166aa violates both the Federal and the State
contracts clause, they cannot prevail in this action unless the they prove that the Bill violates both
provisions. De! Opp. p 10. This assertion places undue weight upon the pleadings in this action
which are intended only to give notice of the claims being made but which have never been held
under modem procedural rules to set the standard of what must be proven to prevail upon those
claims. In making this assertion Defendants fail to address the fact that all Idaho precedent
supports a conclusion that if SB 1166aa violates the protection afforded by the Idaho Contracts
Clause, it cannot eliminate the contractual rights at issue in this matter. There is no reason why
Plaintiffs cannot proceed and prevail solely upon the Idaho Contracts Clause claim. Plaintiffs
have the absolute right to determine the basis for their motion.
2.

Federal law is not applicable in interpreting Idaho's Constitution both
generally and in the context of the Contracts Clause.

Placing unfounded reliance upon State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P. 3d 480 (2009), the
Fund asserts that "Federal law is applicable in interpreting Idaho's Constitution both generally
and in this case." De! Opp. pp. 10. While it may be argued that the Korn Court employed a
"single, dispositive analysis," it is specious to conclude or assert that the Court conducted any
analysis whatsoever as to whether the challenged ordinance "impaired the obligations" of any
contract or even got close to deciding that the constitutional analysis would be the same
regardless of whether the Federal Contract Clause claim or the Idaho Contracts Clause claim was
being evaluated. The Court's ruling that no Contract Clause violation occurred resulted entirely
from its threshold evidentiary determination that " ... Korn simply failed to meet his burden of
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establishing the existence of a contract or contracts that were affected by adoption of the
ordinance." 224 P. 3d 480, 483. Having detennined that no contract existed, the Korn Court
never even reached the question of whether or not an impainnent had occurred, and it certainly
did not reach the question of whether Federal decisional law relative to the Federal Contracts
Clause had any bearing at all upon how the Idaho Contracts Clause should be applied.
In a similar vein, while it may be asserted that our Supreme Court "has not indicated it has

(or will) differentiate its analysis ofIdaho's Contract Clause versus that of the federal
constitution" De! Opp. p 11, such an assertion is meaningless in view of the fact that Idaho
Courts have repeatedly employed an analysis which, unlike the analysis applied by Federal Courts
to the Federal Contracts Clause, shows no tolerance for Legislative action which impairs contracts
involving State-created entities or which arise from attempts to retroactively remove tenns
mandated by the Legislature in the first instance. This groundless assertion is being employed
because the Fund is unable to cite a single case in which the Idaho Supreme Court has held that
Idaho Contract Clause claims will be analyzed by recourse to Federal Contract Clause
jurisprudence. Indeed, the Fund's assertion ignores the conclusion compelled by juxtaposing the
decision of District Judge Chase Clark's (United States District Court for the District of Idaho)
decision in United States for Use and Benefit ofMidwest Stell & Iron Works Co. v. Henlyet

al. 117 F. Supp. 928 (D.Idaho,1954) which found an Idaho statute constitutional applying Federal
Contracts Clause analysis against the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Penrose v Commercial

Travelers Insurance Company, 75 Idaho 85, 753 P.3d 969 (1954) which a few months later and
with full awareness of Judge Clark's ruling, found the same statute unconstitutional applying
Idaho Contracts Clause analysis. When these cases are considered together it is certain that the
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Idaho Supreme Court has manifested a clear intention to " differentiate its analysis of Idaho's
Contract Clause versus that of the federal constitution."
Despite being aware that Judge Clark's determination that the Idaho statute was a
reasonable exercise of the State's police power and therefor not a violation of the Federal
Contracts Clause, the Penrose Court refused to reach the same conclusion with reference to the
Idaho Contracts Clause. The juxtaposition of these two cases, so close in time and involving the
exact same Idaho statute, provides a compelling demonstration that our Supreme Court
consciously considers the Idaho Contracts Clause as imposing a greater limit upon the Legislature
than is imposed by the Federal Contracts Clause, and that it will therefore employ a different
analysis when dealing with Idaho Contracts Clause claims than is applied by Federal Courts
construing challenges based on the Federal Contracts Clause.
3.

The Fund erroneously claims that in the context of the facts of this case,
both the Idaho and United States' Contract Clauses are not to be read
literally and that this Court should utilize the three-step analysis employed
by some Federal Courts to determine whether state action is
unconstitutional under the Idaho provision.

The Fund argues that the Idaho Contracts clause should be interpreted using the three step
analysis set out in RUI One Corp. v. City o/Berkeley, 371 F. 3d 1137 (9 th Cir. 2004). Del Opp. p

11.-14.4 This assertion is belied by every Idaho Supreme Court decision interpreting our State
Contracts Clause. In every case which the Plaintiffs have cited, the Idaho Supreme Court has
used a consistent pattern of analysis which is based upon a long line ofIdaho precedent and which
does not utilize the three step approach described in the majority and dissenting opinions in RUI.

4 This argument is raised previously raised by the Fund, See De! Memo, pp. 18-19 and rebutted by the
Plaintiffs. See Plf Opp., pp.9-16.
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Lacking any supportive Idaho cases the Fund is left to rely upon Federal decisions and a
single decision from New Mexico. De! Opp. 11-12. The Fund does not provide this Court with
any authority upon which this Court could rely to jettison long standing Idaho precedent. Instead
the Fund seems inclined to justify ignoring the entire body of Idaho Contracts Clause
jurisprudence on the basis that "the modern law" pertaining to the Federal Contracts Clause is
somehow a better way to apply the State Contracts Clause. De! Opp. p 14. The Fund does not
explain how or why the analysis employed in Idaho Supreme Court decisions involving the Idaho
Contracts Clause should be treated as outmoded when it has been consistently applied in cases
decided as recently as 1993. Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749 (1993) and Curr v.

Curr, 124 Idaho 686. (1993). In addition, almost all of the Idaho case which are relied upon by
Plaintiffs post date the earliest U.S. Supreme Court cases which holds that the Federal Contract
Clause will, in limited circumstances, give way to reasonable exercises of police power. See,

Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Despite the fact that
Federal decisional law has, since as early as 1934, interpreted the Federal Contracts Clause as
allowing, in limited circumstances, for contracts to be impaired by exercises of the state's police
power, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently not adopted this approach. Indeed, it did not do
so even when the choice was clearly before it in Penrose. This Court should clearly reject the
suggestion that it should defer not only to the Federal Courts, but to the highest Court of a sister
state. This is especially true when Idaho precedent is so clear and consistent.
4.

The Idaho Cases cited and discussed by the Fund lend no support to its
argument that Federal Law analysis or something akin to it should be
applied in this case.

Defendants' dismissive characterization of the whole line ofIdaho appellate cases
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interpreting Article 1, Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution as well as their attempts to distinguish
the individual cases can only be understood in the context of their prefatory remarks:
Plaintiffs ultimately fail to make discussion of how these cases interact with the correct
test under the Contract Clause, or that Idaho courts employ a Contract Clause analysis
different from that employed by the federal courts regarding the U.S. Constitution's
Contract Clause. See, e.g., State v. Korn, 148 Idaho at 413 ...
There are numerous problems with this formulation which carry over into and plague Defendants'
discussion of the individual Idaho cases.

Primary among those problems is the Fund's failure to appreciate the high level of
intolerance the Idaho Supreme Court has shown for legislative attempts to retroactively remove
terms which it mandated be included in contracts between Idaho citizens and entities created by
legislative action. In Straus v. Ketchen, 54 Idaho 56, 83 (1933), the Court established the
foundational understanding on which its Contract Clause cases have rested -and wisely so- for the
intervening 77 years. It is against this background of wisdom and restraint, rather than against
Defendant's assertion that our Court has yet to discover the "correct test" that this Court should
review each cited Idaho case.
The relevant facts of Straus can be readily summarized. Drainage Districts had been
formed by legislative action and they were allowed to issue bonds for development purposes. A
particular process for repaying these bonds was established by the laws in place at the time that
the bonds were issued and sold by the Drainage District. Later the legislature changed the law and
allowed for a different manner of repayment, which, under the circumstances, could have lead to
some of the real property securing the extant bonds to be released from the liens before those
bonds were fully paid off. The Defendants contended that this would unduly compromise the
security ofthe bond holders. Id 54 Idaho at 59-63.
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The Court refused to allow the change in the statute to be applied retroactively to bonds
purchased before the passage of the statute at issue. Specifically the Court stated:

It is conceded by the parties that the bonds in question are contracts existing as
between the land owners and the bondholders. Under the federal and state
constitutional provisions above quoted, no law can ever be passed impairing the
obligations ofa contract, and no exception is made, consequently the contracts of a
drainage district stand upon the same footing as those of individuals or any other
agency. The legislature cannot, under such constitutional prohibitions, authorize
under the police power of the state the creation of a contracting agency and permit
the contracting of obligations, and by the same power destroy its contracts and
abolish its obligations. To permit the legislature to do so would destroy the very
essence of the constitutional prohibitions. Clearly such was never the intention of
the framers of the Constitution. Were it otherwise no person would ever be safe to
enter into a contract with public or quasi-public corporations, creatures of the law.
fd 83 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently employed such strong
language when, on the authority of a provision which is included in the Article of the State
Constitution titled "Declaration of Rights", it strikes down legislation which impairs existing
contracts, especially on a retroactive basis.
Plaintiffs decline Defendants' tacit suggestion that they should defend each of the Idaho
cases whose reasoning Defendants attack and whose holdings they seek to narrow or distinguish.
These cases each speak for themselves, and each represents an important milestone in the history
of how Idaho's Contracts Clause has been interpreted by Idaho Courts. Instead, Plaintiffs will
discuss each of the Idaho cases cited by Defendants which are making their first appearance in any
briefmg in this case, along with other Idaho decisions mentioned in Defendants' cases:
a.

Eriksen v. Blue Cross, 116 Idaho 693 (Ct. App. 1989). Eriksen involved an attorney

fee award in a case involving an insurance policy filed after the Legislature amended I.C. § 12120(3) allowing fees to a prevailing party in a contracts case. The policy had been issued before
the effective date of the amendment but the commencement of the litigation was after the effective
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date. The actual language of Eriksen is instructive:

.... Penrose is inapposite here. It involved an insurance statute which authorized
attorney fee awards only to policyholders. Because the statute shifted the balance
of power between contracting parties, by identifying a favored party in the event of
litigation, the Supreme Court barred its application to pre-existing contracts.
Penrose, 75 Idaho at 540, 275 P.2d at 979 (Keeton, J., concurring). Idaho Code §
12-120(3) is different. That statute is party-neutral. It mandates fee awards to
prevailing parties but does not affect bargaining relationships by designating
favored parties. Therefore, the policy rationale of Penrose does not apply to this
case.
We also believe the reasoning of Myers is inapplicable here. In Myers, we drew a
line against application of IC § 12-120(3) to suits filed prior to the 1986
amendment because the parties in such cases had no opportunity to weigh the risk
of exposure to mandatory fee awards before deciding to litigate. That is not so
here. Although the insurance policy was issued prior to the 1986 amendment, the
application of the attorney fee provision was triggered only by the commencement
of litigation after the amendment had become effective. Thus, unlike the parties in
Myers, the parties in this case were aware of the attorney fee risk when they chose
to litigate. 116 Idaho 693, 695. (Emphasis in original)

This court of appeals case neither mentions the Contracts Clause nor characterizes Penrose
as "resting" upon a policy rationale. Although the analysis in Penrose is very brief, it is
unmistakable that the decision rests upon the conclusion that the Idaho Contracts Clause is clear
that it means what its says and that there is no mere "policy rationale" as argued by the
Defendants. De! Opp. p. 32.
What can be drawn from Eriksen is that there are compelling differences between the
circumstances presented in Eriksen and Idaho precedent. First, in Eriksen the change imposed on
the contract was "party neutral" in that it applied to and impacted both parties to the contract
equally. The same cannot be said about the circumstances presented in this case. SB 1166aa
works to impose a burden upon the Plaintiffs by taking away their contractual right to receive
back a part of the consideration which they gave for their insurance policies, while simultaneously
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conferring a benefit on the Fund by releasing it from paying damages caused to Plaintiffs by the
Fund's breach of contract. The Fund is not penalized or burdened one whit. SB 1166aa not only
shifts the balance of power, it removes the Plaintiffs' power to enforce their contractual right
retroactively and completely. This is exactly the type of governmental vice which the Contracts
Clause was intended to prevent.
Second, as they are applied, the attorney fees statutes are not "strictly" retroactive. While
they are sometimes interpreted as applying to contracts which existed before the passage of the
statute they are only triggered when a lawsuit is filed by one of the parties after the passage of the
statute. While it is true that the parties to the contract were having an attorney's fee provision
imposed upon their contracts after the contract was formed, they each had the power to decide
whether to trigger the impact of that statute by failing to resolve their differences before a lawsuit
was filed. As the Court noted in Eriksen, the decision to litigate is a volitional one, one which the
parties make knowing of the state of the law at the time they do so.
The Statute at issue in the case at bar bears no relationship to an attorneys fees statute
which, at most, may shift the balance of power between the parties. This enactment eliminates all
remedies available to one of the parties, which impairs the very core of the contract consideration. Thus, the statute herein challenged, by contrast to the statute at issue in Eriksen,
features virtually every vice which has historically caused our Supreme Court to find a law
unconstitutional under our Idaho Contracts Clause.
Almost identical considerations animated the Supreme Court decision in Bott v. Idaho

State Building Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 835 P. 2d 1282 (1992). In deciding the case the Court
stated:
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We are not persuaded that Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho
524, 275 P.2d 969 (1954), cited by the Authority, controls our decision. Penrose
involved an insurance statute which authorized attorney fee awards to
policyholders only. This Court barred its application to pre-existing contracts
because, in the words of a concurring justice, it "would create a new liability and
impose a burden not covered by the terms of the insurance policy." Id. at 540, 275
P.2d at 979 (Keeton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Our Court of Appeals has aptly distinguished that statute in Penrose from LC. §
12-120(3): "Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is different. That statute is party-neutral. It
mandates fee awards to prevailing parties but does not affect bargaining
relationships by designating favored parties. Therefore, the policy rationale of
Penrose does not apply to this case." Eriksen v. Blue Cross ofIdaho, 116 Idaho
693, 695, 778 P.2d 815,817 (Ct.App.1989). As in this case, Eriksen involved a
contract entered into before the applicable amendment, but where the lawsuit was
filed after the amendment. Accordingly, an award of attorney fees under L C. § 12120(3) to the prevailing party below is appropriate regardless of the fact that the
Agreement was formed prior to the amendments.
Id 480-81. Given that there is nothing "party neutral" about SB 1166aa, Bott lends no support to
a claim that Penrose should not be controlling in this case. SB 1166aa simultaneously imposes on
the Plaintiffs, without any recourse, an assessment because they are smaller policyholders or
because they suffered covered losses and also the burden of subsidizing favored policyholders
who benefit from the Manager's arbitrary decision to breach the contract. SB 1166aa does not
limit itself to changing future contracts but attempts instead to take away vested contractual rights
which bear directly upon the cost of the insurance - the consideration for the policy.
Agricultural Products Corp. v. Utah Power and Light Co., 98 Idaho 23, 557 P. 2d 617
(1976), also fails to lend support to the Fund's position. Rather, after recognizing the vitality of
the State Contract Clause, the Court acknowledges, through reference to its own decisions rather
than Federal authority, that the contracts of public utilities command a special place within the
law, due in large measure to the extensive regulation of their rates by the Public Utilities
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Commission. Of significance, here, is that the rate adjustments in question were all prospective,
and no retroactive tinkering was involved, unlike the case at bar. Hence the only lesson to be
derived from this case is the importance the Court gives to role of the Contracts Clause in
preventing Idaho contracts from being retroactively impaired by governmental action.

City a/Hayden v. Washington Water Power Co., 108 Idaho 467; 700 P. 2d 89 (1985),
holds that notwithstanding decisions such as Agricultural Products Corp. supra., legislative
enactments can be found to impair the contracts of even those entities regulated by the Public
Utilities Commission. The Court did observe that, in the context of public utility law,
governmental entities do have an "inherent right to enact valid police power regulations, even if
contracts are thereby affected." 108 Idaho 467, 469, but at the same time imposed a critical limit
to that right by stating " ...the police power is limited to governmental acts promoting the health,
comfort, safety and general welfare of society.......It does not embrace revenue measures."
Jd.(emphasis added) Here, as Plaintiffs have demonstrated in prior briefing, the retroactive repeal
of the dividend statute not only fails to promote the health, comfort, safety and general welfare of
society at large, but serves solely to provide post hoc validation for the Manager's disregard for
the contractual obligations of the Fund which have resulted in fmancialloss to tens of thousands
of Idaho businesses. SB 1166aa is nothing if it is not a measure intended to protect the Fund
from paying damages - it is all about revenue.

Steward v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 437,32 P.2d 843(1934); Tanner v. Shearmire, 115 Idaho
1060, 772 P.2d 267 (1987), and Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749(1993). Defendants
depict this trio of cases as being "easy" Contracts Clause cases given that in each instance the
unconstitutional legislative action operated to retroactively deprive a party of a legislatively
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created remedy (Steward-limiting right to foreclose, Tanner - terminating the right to foreclose
after a period shorter than provided for in the mortgage and Curtis- eliminating the right to sue on
a note secured by property) which was available to them under their respective contracts prior to
the passage of the challenged law. In commenting on the latter two cases, Defendants observe
that:
"The effect of the amendment, however was to effectively strip the right to act on
the note, requiring note-holders to seek foreclosure as a primary recovery
mechanism instead. Such a change would obviously be a 'substantial' impairment
of the notes, as the note-holders would largely be left with a right without a
remedy... "

De! Opp. p.34. Ironically Defendants accurately describe the net effect on Plaintiffs and the
members of the class herein of allowing the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 to be applied retroactively.
Unless this Court fmds and rules that the retroactivity aspect of SB 1166aa is unconstitutional, the
"net effect of the amendment" would be to totally leave the Plaintiffs with a right without any
remedy other than to seek the protection of the Contracts Clause. 5 • If Steward, Tanner, and

Curtis are "easy" cases, the case at bar may be the easiest of all cases to be brought before the
Courts of this State, for it not only seeks to retroactively excuse the Fund's years-long egregious
breaches of its contractual obligtions, but also would operate to deprive Plaintiffs of the ability to
utilize the Courts of this State to redress those wrongs. The vices inherent in making the repeal of
I.e. § 72-915 retroactive are readily apparent. Any constitutionally acceptable virtue is nonexistent.

5 It should be noted in all three cases the legislative action did not leave the protesting contract party with no
remedy at all but rather worked to deprive that party of
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C.

Even if it were appropriate to apply Federal decisional law analysis in determining
a SB 1166aa. the Fund wrongfully concludes that SB 1166aa is constitutional
under either the Idaho or the U.S. Constitutions.

The Fund at no point explains how 1166aa can be held to be constitutional utilizing the
analysis articulated and used in Idaho decisions. Instead, the Fund wants to divert the
consideration of the issue onto a side track which the Fund considers to be more favorable to its
position. The siding selected by the Fund is an analysis set out in RUI One Corp. v. City of
Berkely, 317 F3d at 1147. The majority and dissenting opinions set out a multiple part analysis
unlike anything ever employed by an Idaho Court. The Fund's arguments with respect to how the
case at bar should be resolved in its favor applying the analysis described in RUI One as they
appear in the Fund's Memorandum opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment are
virtually identical to the arguments set out in the Fund's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment. Compare, De! Memo. pp 21-37 with De! Opp. pp 14-30. Plaintiffs have
already responded to most of these arguments, Plf Opp. 16-30, and will not cut and paste those
responses into this memorandum. Instead the Plaintiffs will summarize those responses and go
beyond summary only where they deem it appropriate to expand upon or add to arguments
previously stated.
1.

The Idaho Legislature has caused a substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship.

The Court in R UI One would begin its analysis of this issue with an inquiry into whether
there was in the contract at issue an agreement as to the matter subject to the legislation. To
satisfy this requirement it should be sufficient for the Plaintiffs to show that SB 1166aa, in
attempting to repeal I.C. § 72-915 retroactive to January 1,2003, undertakes to remove a term
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from their contracts with the Fund. Given the Supreme Court's holdings in Kelso, supra, and

Hayden Lake, supra, it is apparent that the Supreme Court ofldaho considers I. C.§ 72-915 to be
an express term of the agreement between Fund and its policyholders. See also Farber v. State

Insurance Fund, supra,andPlf Opp. pp. 18-19.
One of the Fund's arguments is that Farber changed the law and, as a consequence, the
enactment ofSB 1166aa was merely an act to restore the law to its pre-Farber state. De! Opp. p.
16. That is absolutely untrue. The Fund appears to be laboring under the misapprehension that
the Manager's conduct and not the Legislative enactment determines the law of the state and, in
this case, the terms of the contract. Farber did no more than to recognize that the long-standing
existing law, incorporated as a contract provision, was clear and unambiguous. It changed no
part of that law, and rendered no "new" interpretation of the law. The "remedy" then adopted by
the Idaho Legislature was not a remedy in response to a change in the law or a shift in judicial
interpretation; it was a renege, pure and simple. To give it any more weight than that would be to
suggest that the Legislature has the power to overrule the Supreme Court. In legal terms, that
renege was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of the Fund to pay and the right of
the Fund policyholder to receive a pro rata share of the dividend corpus for each of the years
within the class period.

In its effort to avoid the clear import of the applicable Supreme Court holdings (one of
which, Hayden Lake, the Fund does not even acknowledge) the Fund makes a curious effort to
use the doctrine of "reasonable expectations" as both a sword and a shield.
Using it as a shield the Fund argues that the doctrine has been discredited and rejected in
Idaho. The Fund appears to perceive that this helps it because, in its view, the Plaintiffs' claims
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are premised not upon an actual right to receive a dividend but rather upon an expectation that
they will get a dividend. De! Opp. p.1S:"16. This perception is based upon the Fund's halfaccurate claim that there is no absolute, contractual right to a dividend under the contract of
worker's compensation insurance with the Fund. This claim is true up to a point but it is
irrelevant in the circumstances presented in this case where a dividend has been declared and
illegally distributed every year relevant to this action. Until the Manager decides to declare and to
distribute a dividend, no policyholder has any right to receive any dividend. However, as has
been established in Farber, supra, once the Manager of the Fund decides in his discretion that
there is ample surplus to safely declare a dividend (generally between five and twenty million
dollars), that contract,per Farber, clearly and unambiguously requires that the dividend corpus

must then be divided among all of the Funds time-qualified (held policy for more than 6 months)
policyholders on a pro rata basis. That is a contractual right, and the Fund's duty to pay those
dividends to all policyholders in the manner mandated by Farber is a contractual obligation. The
concept of "reasonable expectations" has nothing at all to do with Plaintiffs' claim that they have,
as long as they do so within the statue of limitations, a right to sue the Fund for breach of contract
as a result of the illegal dividend allocation policy utilized by the Manager which constitutes a
breach of contract.
Next. the Fund attempts to use the discredited doctrine of reasonable expectations as a
shield. In this regard, the Fund asserts that because the Manager consistently broke the law and
breached the contract the Plaintiffs "cannot paint a right to a strict pro rata dividend distribution as
some variety of expected or vested contractual right that has been disrupted by retroactive
application." De! Opp. pp. 16 -19. This assertion is premised upon several cases from other
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jurisdictions which must apparently give more credit to the doctrine of reasonable expectations
than is afforded to that doctrine by the Idaho Court. Throughout the whole discussion what the
Fund never attempts to deal with is the fact that as to breach of contract claims made within the
period of a statute of limitations (asserted defense here), and absent a (waiver -not a basis for the
current motion) a contracting party always has the right to sue the other party to the contract for
breaches of that contract (single or repetitive) and thus always has a very reasonable expectation
of a right to recover in the event of a breach.
The Fund begins by suggesting reliance upon Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utility

Commission of Texas, 615 S.W.2d 947,956-57 (Texas Civ. App. 1981) but this case is not
helpful to the Fund's position. At issue there was a retroactive adjustment of utility rates. The
decision in that case turned upon the court's conclusion that" ... no person can have a vested
right in any rate other than the last legal or official rate promulgated by the Commission." In the
context of this case, the last legal right given to the Fund's policyholders was that right conferred
in 1917 and unchanged until the tinkering 2009 Idaho Legislature attempted the unconstitutional
repeal.
The Fund cites three tests which were identified in Southwestern Bell as appropriate tests in
determining of a legislative change generates an impermissible impairment. De! Opp. p. 17. It
must be noted that until I.C. § 72-915 was repealed it was never changed. It was broken
repeatedly by the Manager but when the Supreme Court was asked by the Fund, in Farber, to
declare the law ambiguous and give it an interpretation which would validate the Manager it
refused to do so and found instead that the law has clearly and unambiguously provided from the
day of its enactment for a pro rata allocation of each declared dividend. Under these
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circumstances the analysis in Southwestern Bell is inapposite.
Even if this were not true, the tests articulated have no bearing upon this case.
The third test, "whether the statute surprises persons who have long relied on a contrary state of
the law" is surely not applicable here. Here again, the Fund confuses the illegal conduct of the
Manager of the Fund in ignoring I.C. § 72-915 with the existence or creation of "a contrary state
of the law." Here, though, the law did not change. I.C. § 72-915 was since its enactment constant,
clear and unambiguous. Farber did nothing to change this. The second test: "whether the
retroactive provision gives effect to or defeats bona fide intentions or reasonable expectations of
affected persons" similarly provides the Fund with no help. Policyholders had, until the passage
of 1166aa (the retroac~ive provision) a contractual right to a pro rata share of allocated dividend
and a bona fide right to sue to enforce their contract and to collect damages. Perforce they had a
reasonable expectation that, if they chose to act to recover on the contract, the Fund would be
compelled to honor that right. If the retroactive repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 were permitted to be
effective, this contractual right and the right to seek recovery would be taken away completely. It
follows that Southwestern Bell, as it deals with a change in the law, does not provide a helpful
evaluation.
Similarly, the cases cited by SIP, Boykin v. Boeing Co., 128 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1997) and
In re Marriage o/Giroux, 704 P.2d 160 (Wash. App. 1984) give no succor to the Fund as they are
wholly inapposite. In both instances there was an actual "change of law" situation as opposed to a
situation, as presented in this case, where the law had always been clear and all that changed was
one contracting party's attempts to ignore the law and, when caught violating it, a furtherattempt
to justify that conduct by claiming that the law was not clear.
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In the Giroux situation, the law in Washington was that a military pension was community
property. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a case styled McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981),
held that federal law prohibits state courts from dividing military retirement pay pursuant to state
community property laws. That decision completely changed Washington law relative to the
division of property in a divorce proceeding.
Congress did not like the McCarty decision, however, and enacted a statute effectively
reversing the McCarty holding and providing for the retroactive change to the date of the

McCarty decision. The Senate Report explained the intent as: "The purpose of this provision is
to place the Courts in the same position that they were in on June 26, 1981, the date of the

McCarty decision, with respect to treatment of non-disability military retired or retainer pay...."

In the context of the case, the serviceman thought that he had squeaked through a narrow window
of time between the McCarty decision and the remedial legislation passed by Congress which was
retroactive to the date of McCarty. He wanted to keep all of the retirement monies for himself.
The Court of Appeals of Washington did not allow this.

It is important to note that there is no analysis in this decision of any contractual language
or contract between Giroux and his spouse. Nor is there any analysis under the Contracts Clause.
The case is clearly decided based on due process grounds and under the separation of powers
clause in the Constitution. It is hardly applicable here. "Settled expectations" or "reasonable
expectations" might have some applicability in Washington in situation involving a change of
law in a non-contractual situation. However, where there is a contract, as here, then Idaho law is
very clear - Idaho courts must look to "traditional rules of contract construction" and reasonable
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expectations have no part in that process. Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 1
P.3d

80~

(2000).

Similarly, in the Boykin case the matter revolved around a wage dispute. This was a
class action brought by salaried engineers, management, professional and administrative
employees who were allegedly not receiving legally appropriate overtime compensation
for hours worked in excess of a 40 hour work week. This Ninth Circuit case is decided on
the separation of powers clause in the Washington Constitution; there is neither any
analysis of the Contract Clause nor even a citation to the Contracts Clause of either the
Washington State or Federal Constitutions.
The salaried employees had a collective bargaining agreement with Boeing which
allowed them some overtime payment but not at the 1.5 multiplier required for nonexempt employees. Both the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act and the Washington
Minimum Wage Act exempted the class of employees bringing the lawsuit from the 1.5
multiplier for overtime work. However, in 1995, the Washington Court of Appeals had
determined in a case styled Tift v. Professional Nursing Services, 886 P.2d 1158(1995)
that under State law a payment of any overtime on an hourly basis (as provided in the
collective bargaining agreement) defeats an the "salary" exemption which would otherwise
prohibit the employee from receiving overtime with a multiplier of 1.5. This changed the
applicable law. In direct response, the Washington legislature amended the Washington
Minimum Wage Act by stating "the payment of compensation or provision of
compensatory time off in addition to a salary shall not be a factor in determining whether a
person is exempted under RCW 49.46.010(5)(c)." Wash. Rev. Code Section
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49.46. 130(2)(a). The law was intended to apply retroactively and negated the Tift
decision.
This sequence of events brought the employees back to their contract with Boeing
and erased the change in the law created by Tift. They then argued that the Tift decision
gave them "rights" which could not be taken away by the subsequent Washington
legislature'S retroactive enactment which effectively cancelled Tift. They argued that they
had a "reasonable expectation" that Tift would continue to act in their favor and that it
could not be erased by a subsequent retroactive legislative act by the Washington
legislature.
The Fund has taken this Boykin case out of context and wants to equate Tift with

Farber. The difference between the two is immediately apparent, however, and the
comparison is an apples and oranges approach. Farber did not change the law. Farber
stated what the clear and plain meaning of the law was and essentially construed the
contract between the Fund and its policyholders to reach the conclusion that the
contractual obligation of the Fund was unambiguous and required a pro rata distribution
of the dividend corpus, once such corpus was created by the Manager. Tift, on the other
hand, did not interpret a contract or a contractual term but, rather, interpreted an
ambiguous Washington statute which was not a part of the contract either between the
Plaintiff/employees in that case or the Plaintiffs/employees at Boeing. Thus, there was no
interference with any contractual obligation which, of course, explains why there is no
Contract Clause analysis in the case. Boykin, accordingly, is not helpful to the Court's
analysis here, and it is of no avail to the Fund.
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All conditions precedent applicable to the policyholders, Plaintiffs here, have been
fulfilled. The policyholders paid their premiums. The Fund accepted those premiums.
The Fund also accepted its duties to comply with the terms and conditions of its contract
of insurance with its policyholders which include the existing Idaho statutes creating and
governing the Fund. See Kelso and Hayden Lake, supra. The rights of the policyholders
to receive the amount of dividend justly due them on a pro rata basis depends solely on
the clear and unambiguous language of the Funds contract with them. This is not a matter
of any "reasonable expectation" but an express contractual right. The Fund's argument
ignores contract law, mounts an offense based on a discredited and, in the context of this
case, wholly inapplicable legal principle and its mistaken view that the Manager has the
power to establish the law of the State and unilateral alter the terms of existing
policyholder contracts. But the Fund cannot avoid, ostrich-like, the clear, contractual right
of the Fund's policyholders to receive a pro rata portion of the dividend corpus. The
legislative abrogation of that right on a retroactive basis clearly is offensive to
constitutional principles.
2.

The retroactive repeal on.c. § 72-915 is a change in law that
impairs the contractual relationship between SIF and its
policyholders.

In framing its argument that there is no impairment of the contractual relationship

between the Fund and its policyholders, the Fund appears to seek to ignore the fact that
what Plaintiffs claim to be unconstitutional is not the fact that the Legislature elected to
repeall.C. § 72-915, but that it made the repeal retroactive, thereby completely eliminating
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the already fully accrued rights to receive apro rata share of the dividends that were
declared and distributed. De! Opp. p. 21. The Fund aggravates this oversight by
contending that what must be impaired is the "contractual relationship", when, in fact, the
wording of the Idaho Contracts Clause addresses and prohibits laws which impair "the
obligations of contracts." While this difference may seem insignificant at first blush, it
plainly is not, given that what Plaintiffs are asking this Court to do, in essence, is to go
back during each of the years of the class period, and order the Fund to pay to the
Plaintiffs the difference between what they did pay to them as dividends, and the amount
that they were obligated to pay to them out of each dividend that was distributed. This
case does not implicate the larger "contractual relationship" between the parties, but is
directed only at this one obligation of the Fund.
Nor does it avail Defendants to point out that the policy of insurance provides that:
"Terms of this insurance that conflict with the workers compensation law are changed by
this statement to conform to this law." De! Opp. p. 21. This provision is irrelevant to the
circumstances presented by this case. The term "workers compensation law" has no
application to any provision contained in Title 72, Chapter 9 of the Idaho Code, as that
term only applies to Chapters 1 through and including 8 of that Title. See 1

e. § 72-101

(1), and Statutory Notes to Ie. 72-101. 6 Chapter 9, which included I.C. § 72-915 is not
part of the ''workers compensation law" of Idaho. It is titled "State Insurance Fund" and

6 In 1971 the Legislature engaged in a "comprehensive recodification of the workmen's compensation law and
occupational disease law of the state ofIdaho." As part of that process it repealed Chapters 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11 and
12ofTitle72. Clearly, while the creation of the State Insurance Fund was part of the process of adopting a Worker's
Compensation system, the statutes establishing and regulating the Fund are not themselves part of the Workers's
Compensation law.
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consists of a specialized set of provisions creating and governing the Fund. None of its
provisions has any bearing upon the substantive law pertaining to worker's compensation.
Therefore, considering the plain language of the policy, the cited policy provision to
changes in the law regulating the conduct of the State Insurance Fund are inapposite
If it could be said that the phrase "worker's compensation law" intends to include
the statutes regulating the State Insurance Fund, the provision only has application if the
retroactive repeal is constitutional but it cannot work to render the retroactive repeal
constitutional. If the term of the contract at issue is "allocate any dividends distributed on

apro rata basis, it is not in conflict with I.C. §72-915 because it is I.C. §72-915. Thus,
there is nothing to change to create conformity with the law. If an attempt is made to
remove I.C. §72-915 in an unconstitutional retroactive manner, then that attempt will fail
and the terms of the contract will need no change to be in conformity with the law. It is
preposterous to suggest that some how an apparently unconstitutional retroactive repeal of
I.C. §72-915 could be rendered magically constitutional because at the instant of its
passage the contract was changed so that the pro rata allocation term disappeared leaving
no right to impair.
The truest test, however, of whether or not making the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915
retroactive impairs the obligations that the Fund owes to its policyholders for all of the
years in question lies in what the Fund is asking the Court to do. It is important to note that
all of the dividends which were paid by the Fund in the class period stated in this action
pertain to policies which were issued and held for at least 6 months prior to January 1,
2009, or several months prior to the issuance of the decision in Farber and the
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [I.R.C.P.
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introduction ofSB 1166aa.7 This being true, when the Fund asks the this Court to grant it
Summary Judgment based on the passage of 1166aa, its goal is to cause the claims of the
Plaintiffs
and the members of the class validated by Farber to be rendered unenforceable.
3.

Retroactive repeal ofI.C. 72 § 915"substantially impairs" the
contractual rights of the Plaintiffs and the putative class members.

The Fund claims that the retroactive removal of a term of the contract which bears
directly upon the cost of the coverage conferred by the contract is not substantial for
several reasons. First, the Fund claims that the core purpose of the policy is to provide
coverage for workers compensation claims and to not create circumstances in which a
policyholder might get a "fractional return on paid premiums." De! Opp. p. 23. This
argument ignores the fact that what insurance costs is critically important to people. What
is paid is the policyholders' portion of the consideration and consideration is at the very
heart of every contract. The Fund asserts that everyone gets the same coverage regardless
of how much they pay but what this ignores is that everyone pays the same premium
amount per dollar of payroll per class of employee. Which means that everyone gets the
same coverage per dollar of payroll per class of employee. What changes when the Fund
manipulates the dividend allocation is that some people end up paying more for per dollar
of payroll per class of employee despite the fact that they are getting no more coverage.

7Given that the Fund pays dividends approximately 18 months after the end of a dividend period, the dividend
of over $14 million which was paid in 2010 actually applied to the policy year 7/117 to 6/30/8. Hence the rights of
Plaintiffs' to the receipt of a pro rata share of the dividend paid in 20 10 would have vested approximately 9 months prior
to the Supreme Court's initial Farber opinion, and almost 11 months prior to the repeal of the statute.
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This is in effect an illegal assessment being imposed on some policyholders. 8 No matter
I

how this is twisted and turned the contract term at issue is a fmancial term and alterations
offmancial terms are inherently substantial. Plf. Memo. p.20.
Next the Fund argues that the retroactive repeal ofLC. §72-915 is not substantial
because Plaintiffs cannot prove that all policyholders received less than their pro rata
share of any dividend being allocated and corollary to this Plaintiffs' action, if permitted,
might lead to some disadvantage to those policyholders who got substantially more then
their "pro rata" share of any dividend being allocated. The Fund cites no authority for the
proposition that a certain percentage of the contracts of a State agency must be impaired by
a legislative enactment for that State action to be an unconstitutional impairment of
contract.

In essence the Fund is asking the Court to allow the legislature to deprive some

of the Funds' policyholders of their contract rights because the Fund did not breach all of
its contracts. It is not at all clear how this is a rational justification for ignoring the Idaho
Contracts Clause nor how it renders the damage to the Plaintiffs and the other members of
the class any less substantial. Nor does the Fund cite any authority that suggests the Court
should concern itself with the possibility (absent a retroactive repeal ofLC. § 72-915) that
the Fund might have a right to collect overpayments from some of its policyholders or by
depriving them of the opportunity to receive more then a pro rata share of the dividend.
While it is not at all clear that the Fund could ever recover voluntary overpayments or even
if they could, why that should be this Court's concer? While some policyholders were

8 I.C.§72-916 which permitted class wide assessments was repealed in 1951. See Doc Nos. 000132 and
000133, Second Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment hereinafter 2nd Aff.
Lojek.
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overpaid and while they may like being overpaid, this does nothing to lessen the
substantiality of the impairment of the rights of the Plaintiffs.
What the Fund cannot escape is that it is a legislatively created entity that had
contracts with its insureds and that those contracts by legislative mandate included a
provision which bears inexorably upon the cost of the insurance. The Fund, as to many of
its policyholders, ignored that provision and as a consequence the total cost of coverage
provided to many of its insureds exceeded by as much as 10% what was paid for the same
coverage by other insureds. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that it could not say a
contract price adjustment of 5% was insubstantial. City ofHayden v. Washington Water

Power Co., 108 Idaho 467,468; 700 P. 2d (Ct. App. 1985). There can be little doubt that
for those who have been deprived of their share of the adjustment to their policy costs, the
loss is substantia1. 9 The loss becomes even more substantial when it is understood that
Mr. Alcorn has acknowledge that the amount at issue could be millions of dollars. 10
4.

SB 1166aa is not based upon a significant and legitimate public
purpose which would support a retroactive repeal of LC. § 72-915.

As some length the Fund argues that there is a legitimate and significant public
purpose which is served by releasing the Fund, with its nearly $200 million in surplus and
its total financial separation from the State ofIdaho, from the liability that its Manager
and Board have created for it by choosing to ignore the clear unambigous language ofLC.

90ne ofthe Plaintiffs here has received nothing at all from the declared dividend surplus. See Doc N~OOO 134,
2 nd Aff. Lojek.
10 Lest the Court be shocked by the numbers involved it should be noted that the amount at issue is not likely
to be more than 10% of the Fund's existing surplus nor substantially more than the dividends it has been distributing for
the past several years.
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,.

§ 72-915. The arguments made in this regard are substantially identical to what is argued
in the Funds Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. Compare, De! Memo. p.32
to 36 with Del Opp. p.25 to 29.
These arguments seek to distract the Court's attention from the fact that there is no
basis upon which to conclude that the Legislature either did or could conclude that
relieving the Fund from its obligations to its policyholders benefitted the public health,
comfort, safety or general welfare. More significantly, they do not deal with the fact it is
presumptively unconstitutional under established Idaho precedent for the Legislature to act
to retroactively change or remove contract provisions which it mandated be included in
contracts with legislatively created entities. Straus v.Ketchen, supra. Beyond these brief
responses, Plaintiffs will rely upon and incorporate their responses to these arguments in
prior briefing. See Plf Opp. p. 21-28.
This Fund has also argued that the 2009 Idaho Legislature may state what the intent
of the 1998 Legislature was in passing House Bill 774aa in 1998. Del Opp. p. 25. It
seems to be hornbook law that " ...the view of a later Congress cannot control the
interpretation of an earlier enacted statute." 0 'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 90,
117 S.Ct.452, 458 (1996) citing U.S. v. Price, 361 U.S.304, 80 S.Ct. 326 (1960) and

Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940).
In Schrader, Schrader v. Idaho Dept. O/Health and Welfare, 768 F.2d 1107, 1114
(9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit stated: "It is well settled that the views of a later
Congress regarding the legislative intent of a previous Congress do not deserve much
weight." Similarly, the 9th Circuit earlier held: "Subsequent legislation, while not always
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [I.R.C.P.

56 (a), (c) and (d)]

- Page 35

000347

f •

~\

without significance, usually is not entitled to much weight in construing earlier statutes."

State o/Idaho v. Andrus, 720 F.2d 1491,1468 (9th Cir. 1983). The same may be said here.
The Legislature'S Statement of Public Purpose as it concerns a legislative intent 11 years
past, should not be recognized by this Court.
5.

SB 1166aa is not an action which is based upon reasonable
conditions and of a character appropriate to any significant or
legitimate public purpose.

Finally, the Fund argues that retroactive repeal ofLC.§ 72-915 is an action which
is reasonable and appropriate to a significant and legitimate public purpose. The
arguments made in this regard are identical to what is argued in the Fund's Memorandum
in Support of Summary Judgment. Compare, De! Memo. p. 36 to 37 with De! Opp. p.30.
While the Fund may well be able to establish that a prospective repeal ofLC. §72-915
makes sense, what the Fund has not done and cannot do is to demonstrate how a
retroactive repeal of a law which has been clear and unambiguous since its passage in
1917 in order to save the Fund from the financial consequences of its failure to follow that
law is a reasonable response to a Supreme Court decision which makes clear that the Fund
has no excuse for its conduct. Beyond this the Plaintiffs have already responded to the
Fund's arguments and rather than repeat those arguments here will incorporate them
herein. See Plf. Opp. pp. 28-31.
V.

CONCLUSION
This Court is obliged to apply Idaho decisional law to resolve Plaintiffs' Idaho

Contracts Clause challenge to making the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 retroactive, as our
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I.
Supreme Court has consistently done since at least the 1922 case of In re Fidelity State

Bank. Application of the body ofIdaho decisional law to the case at bar clearly results in a
finding that the retroactivity provision of SB 1166aa unconstitutionally impairs a
legislatively mandated obligation of the contracts of insurance between the Plaintiffs and
the members of the class on the one hand, and the Idaho State Insurance Fund on the other.
For these reasons, the Court should declare SB 1166aa unconstitutional, as being in
violation of Article 1, Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of December, 2010.

GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

By:

~_S.(2PJ7~
Philip Gordon

By:
Donald W. Lojek
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of December, 2010, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated
below, and addressed as follows:

[X ] Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail, postage paid
Overnight Express Mail
Facsimile Copy:
395-8585

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton
702 W. Idaho st. Ste. 700
PO Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

Donald W. Lojek
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Donald W. Lojek ISBN 1395
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
208-343-7733
208-345-0050
Facsimile:

F I

A'~W~

DEC 06 2010

Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208/345-7100
Facsimile: 208/345-0050

CANYON COUNTY Qt.~FlK

r3 AAYNe. [)EPUfV

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and DISCOVER
CARE CENTRE LLC OF SALMON,
CASE NO. CV 09-13607-C
Plaintiffs,
vs.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official capacity as
its Manager, and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE
MEYER, GERALD GEDDES, JOHN
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, MARK
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS,
TERRY GESTRIN AND MAX BLACK AND
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as
member's ofthe Board of Directors of the State
Insurance Fund,

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD W.
LOJEK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

Second Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment
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STATEOFIDAHO )
: ss.
County of Ada
)
DONALD W. LOJEK, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter, and I make this
Affidavit based upon my personal and direct knowledge, unless otherwise stated herein.

2.

Attached hereto as Doc. # 000132 is a true and correct of 1917 Session Laws, Chapter 81,
Section 93 and as Doc # 000133 is true and correct copy ofthe "Statutory Notes" from the
current Annotated Idaho Code which reflect that Section 93, after several recodifications and
no amendments became Idaho Code §72-9l6 and then was repealed in 1951.

3.

Attached hereto as Doc #000134 is a true and correct copy of a Loss Experience Analysis
Report which was supplied by the Idaho State Insurance Fund to Plaintiff Discovery Care
Centre LLC of Salmon.

-14

DATED: December £,2010.

LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

Donald W. Lojek
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

t~ay of December, 2010, I caused the fo~egoing document

to be delivered by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton
702 W. Idaho St. Ste. 700
Boise, Idaho 83701

t..-4fAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
_ _,FACSIMILE 208-395-8585

Donald W. Lojek

Second Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
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72-915

WORKER'S COMPENSATION AND RELATED LAWS

582

JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Cited in: Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747,242
P. 314 (1925); Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 753,

243 P. 654 (1926); Flynn v. Carson, 42 Idaho
141, 243 P. 818 (1926).

72-915. Dividends. - At the end of every year, and at such other times
as the manager in his discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate
shall be made for each of the several classes 9f employments or industries.
If at any time there is an aggregate balance remaining to the credit of any
class of'employment or industry which the manager deems may be safely
and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each individual
member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the state
insurance fund for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of
such readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly
entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last
readjustment of rates. [1917, ch. 81, § 92, p. 252; reen. C.L. 256:92; C.S.,
§ 630.3; I.C.A., § 43-1715; am. 1939, ch. 251, § 15, p. 617; am. 1941, ch. 20.,
§ 13,p. 37.]

.. I
!

JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Cited in: Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins.
Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000).

72-916. Assessments. [Repealed.]
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler's Notes. - This section, which
comprised S.L. 1917, ch. 81, § 93, p. 252; C.L.
256:93; C.S., § 6304; I.e.A., § 43-1716; 1939,

I

ch. 251,§ 16,p.617; 1941,ch. 20,§ 14,p.37,
was repealed by S.L. 1951, ch. 269, § I, p.
570.

72-917. Readjustment of payrolls. - If the amount of premium
collected from any employer at the beginning of any period is ascertained by
using the estimated expenditure ofwagesior the period of time covered py
such premium payment as a basis, and adjustment of the amount of such
premium shall be made at the end of such periO"d and the acturu amount of !
such premium shall be determined in accordance with the amount of the
actual expenditure of wages for such period; and if such wage expenditure
for such period is less than the amount of which' such estimated premium
was collected, such employer shall be entitled to receive a refund from the
state insurance fund of the difference between the amount so paid by him
and the amount so found to be actually due, or to have the amount of such
difference credited on succeeding premium payments at his option; and if
such actual premium, when so ascertained, exceeds in amount a premium so
paid by such employer at the beginning of such period, such employer shall
immediately upon being advised of the true amount of such premium due
forthwith pay to the manager an amount equal to the difference between the
amount actually found to be due and the amount paid by him at the
beginning of such period, for deposit in the state insurance fund. [1917, ch.
81, § 94, p. 252; reen. C.L. 256:94; C.s., § 630.5; I.C.A., § 43-1717; am.
1939, ch. 251, § 17, p. 617; am. 1941, ch. 20., § 15, p. 37.]
i
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State lnsurance Ma nager, \V ith the consent of thc Slate Auditor. may sell any ,If such securities. the pruceeds thereof to
l)e paid uver to the: Slate Treasurer for said State Insurance
Fnnd.
"'1 dill iwis Ira tivJ! lixpcJlscs.
SEC. 89.
The entire expense of administering: the State
] Ilsnr::lIJce Fund shall be paid in the first instance by the State,
{Jut uf moneys appropriated therefor.
In the month of July,
Nilllt'en Humlred Eighteen, and semi-annually thereafter in
S\1ch month, the State Insurance Manager shall ascertain the
juSt a1l1ount of expense incurred by him during the preceding
calelldar year, in the administration of the State Insurance
Fund. including expense incurred for the examination, determinatiun, and payment of losses anti claims, ::l11d shall refund
snch amount to the St:l!e Treasury.

\

Dt"idel/tis.

SI~C. 93. If the premiums fixetl for any class q;ld cullected
frum its members are subsequently fonnd by the State Insur-

~
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ance i\lanager to have been too small for any period, he may
determine what additional premiums are required f r0111 said
cb!'>~ for saill period, and may make assessments accurdingly,
and each of the memhers of sl1ch c1a!'-s sh:lll be liable to the
said l\lanager to pay Stich :lssessment su made upon hill1 within
thiny (lays after notice thereof.

Readjust/II"lIt of Po),rllils.
St.:\.'. 1)-\. ] { the amoUtlt IIi prell1iU111 col1ected from any
employer at the beginning IIf an)' perilld is ascertained by \.Ising
the estilll;1led expendit11n~ oi wages il)r the period of time
cO\'ered hy Stich premium paYltlent as a \):tsis. an adjtl51111ent at
the ;UWHlII( of slIch premium shall he made at the end of such
period and thl' arttl:!1 anl(llll1t of such premiul11 shall lIe detcr-

ACCOHllts.
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nt of the money paid in premil1111S by each of the sevel'al
.c;cs uf employments. :llld the expense of :lrll11inistering- the
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set np.

Assessments.

i

;rx. 91. The State Insnrallce M:lnager shall' keep an

State insurance [uud and the disbursel11ents 011 acc.)\ll1t 'jf injuries alld deaths of employees ill each of said classes. il1duding the setting up of reser\"t~S adcquate to 11ll.'et anticipated
:llld unexpected losses and to carry the claims to ll1aluritv: and
also an account of the money received fro\11 each individual
employer: and of the amount disbursed frol11 the State Insurance Fund for expenses. and 011 account of injuries and death
of the employees of such employer. inclmling the reSl'r\'cs so

SEC. 92. At the end of everY 'year, <\l1d at !'-llch other times
as the State Insurance Manager 'in his discretion may tletermine. a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of tl,e
several classes of employments or ind\1stries. If at any time
there is an aggregate balance remaining to the credit (If ally
class of employment or inr!nstry' which the State Insurance
Manager deems may he safely amI properly divide(1, he may
in his !liscretion credit to cach inc1ividualmember of such class
who shall ha\'e been a suhscriber to the State Insurance Fund
for a period of six months or more, prior to the time of such
read justment. such propl)fl ion of stich balance as he is properly entitle,l to. having regard to his prior paid premitll11s
sitKe the last readjustment of rates.

Classification of Risl?s and Adjlls/ment of PrcIJI£u.ms.
SEC. 90. Employments insured in the State Insurance Fund
;hall be divided by the State Insurance Manager, for the pur)05('5 of the said fund. into classes.
Separate accounts shall
Ie kept of the 3111(lllllts collected :lllll expended ill respect to
<tcll s11eh class for convenience in determining equitable
ate:;; but for the pnrpose of paying compensation the State
sunll1ce fund shall be deemed one and indivisible. The State
. mallce Manager shall have power to rearrange any of the
'ses by withdrawing any employment embraced .in it and
Sferring it wholly or in part to any other class, and from
I employments to set up new classes in his direction.
The
e Insurance Manager shall determine the hazards of the
en'llt classes and fix the rates of premiums therefor based
lOll the total payroll and number of employees in each of
ch classes of employment at the lowest possible rate COI1tent with the maintenance of a soh'eot State Insurance
mil and the creation of a reasoJlaule surplus and reserve;
:1 for stich purpose may adopt a system of schedule rating
sllch a manner as tn take account of the pecnliar hazard
eacll ilJdividual risk.
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STATE INSURANCE FUND
1215 W. STATE STREET P.O. BOX 83720 BOISE, IDAHO 83720
PHONE (208)332-2100 (800)334-2370
WWW.IDAHOSIF.ORG

LOSS EXPERIENCE ANALYSIS REPORT

DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE LLC OF SALMON
1475 N COLE RD
BOISE, ID 83704

Policy Number: 575180
Report Date:
12/29/2009

AGENCY: POST INSURANCE SERVICES INC

Effective
Oate(s)

Exp Mod

Billed Premium

Losses

Loss
Ratio

Dividend

Dividend
Ratio

Open
Claims

Total
Claims

01/01/2004

1.10

$70,629.00

$144,448.20

204.52

$0.00

0.00

0

7

01/01/2005

0.86

$59,078.00

$208,081.26

352.21

$0.00

0.00

0

10

01/01/2006

1.03

$78,476.00

$64,460.06

82.14

$0.00

0.00

0

9

01/01/2007

1.27

$101,264.00

$67,261.51

66.42

$0.00

0.00

0

31

01/01/2008

1.39

$107,507.00

$18,434.44

17.15

0

22

$416,954.00

$502,685.47

120 .56

0

79

Totals:
Current Year
01/01/2009

Estimated

1.23

Renewal Year
01/01/2010

$111,280.00
Estimated

1.09

$105,309.00

$0.00

YTD

$39,964.35

9

35.91

YTD

$0.00

0.00
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 'TH.t
I

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIffi COUNTY OF CANYON

CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF
SALMON,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 09~13607-C

ORDER

vs.
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN. in his
official capacity as its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS,
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the
State Insurance Fund,
Defendants.
I

I

I
I

BASED UPON written motions and oral argument thereon, and for the teaso~ as stated
on the record at the time of the hearing held on December 15,2010,

ORDER-l
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i

I

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that the Legislature's retroactive repeal of Idaho Code
I

I

§72-91S is constitutional under the United States Constitution and the Idaho

Co~titution .
I
I

i

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary JJgment is

I
i

DENIED;

I
II

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED in all respects;

i

!
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion, Pursuant to Ru1e 56(t), Ito Vacate
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and to Continue that Motion Pending

Di~OVery by
I
I

Plaintiffs is DENIED;

I

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of James M.
I
I

Alcorn and Selected. Exhibits Attached to the Affidavit of Counsel Both of Which wete Filed in

I

Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ~_ day of December, 2010.

~---

ORDER-l
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i
I

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December, 2010, I caused to b~ served a
true copy of the foregoing ORDER, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following;
i

:2J&

Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRBCHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

702 West ldaho~ Suite 700
P. O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 395-8585
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd.
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.; (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for PlaintiffS

Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise, 10 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
I

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

COA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF
SALMON,

Case No. CV 09-13607-C

Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

VS.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his
official capacity as its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A HIGGINS,
TERRY GESTRlN and MAX BLACK and
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the
State Insurance Fund,

Defendants.

THE ABOVE·ENmLED MATTER came before the Court for hearing on :December
,
,

,I

15,2010. Based upon the Order filed December: 28, 2010, the Court now enters

Judgment

JUDGMENT-l

I

:

i

000360

I

th~

,

following

-1?,/29/10
-.. --- .. - -

HALL FARLEY

1410031004

,

,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plainttlfs CDA
,

DAIRY QUEEN, INC.) and DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF SALMON tak.~ nothing
i

on their claims against defendants THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, JAMES M.
,
ALCORN, WILLIAM DEAL" WAYNE MEYER, GERALD GEDDES, JOHN OOEDDE,
i

ELAINE MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS. RODNEY A. HIGGINS, TERRY GESTRlN, MAX
i
:

1

BLACK and STEVE LANDON, that those claims are dismissed with prejudice, I and that
judgment be entered in favor of defendants.
DATED this _ _ day bfDecember, 2010.
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CLEIiK,s CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,
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O
.
,
: 1 : JAN .L. 1,Olb
I
I HEREBY CERTIFY tJ¥it on the _
(lay Ob e,ember, 201 0, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, by the method indicated below~ and addressed to each
of the following:
"il
,
II

:1
I,

Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL, FARLEY, OSERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
P. O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 395-8585
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
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Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd.
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintijft
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Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
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Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No,; (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintifft
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Donald W. Lojek ISBN 1395
LOJEK LAw OFFICES, CHTD
623 West Hays Street
PO Box 1712
Boise, 10 83701
Telephone: 208-343-7733
Facsimile:
208-345-0050
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Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, 10 83702
Telephone: 208/345-7100
Facsimile: 208/345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF
SALMON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official
capacity as its Manager, and WILLIAM
DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, GERALD
GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS,
RODNEY A. HIGGINS, TERRY
GESTRIN AND MAX BLACK AND
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the
State Insurance Fund,

CASE NO. CV 09-13607-C
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL
Filing Fee: $86.00 Idaho Supreme Court
$15.00 Canyon County

Defendants.

APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

OG~\(J\'~AL
000363

TO:

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, et al., AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD, HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT AND BLANTON. NOTICE IS HEREBY
GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants, CDA Dairy Queen and Discovery Care Centre,

LLC of Salmon, acting on behalf of themselves and the putative Class, appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment which was entered by the Honorable Renae Hoff
and filed on December 28, 2010 and from the Judgment of January 4, 2011 following that
Order.
The claims arising from the Plaintiffs' Complaint pertain to a series of dividend
distributions made or approved by the Defendants near the first of every year beginning in
January 2005 and continuing through January of 2010 (and potentially January 2011). The trial
court dismissed all of the claims of the Plaintiffs and the putative Class and there is a final
Order and a final Judgment in this regard. The Idaho Supreme Court will be asked to review,
de novo, the constitutionality of the Idaho Legislature's retroactive appeal of I.C. § 72-915.

2.

Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to

1.A.R.11(a)(1).
3.

Appellants intend to assert on appeal that the aforesaid Order and Judgment

constitute errors of law and should be reversed on appeal and remanded with instructions to the
District Court to allow the case to proceed which would include, inter alia, certification of a Class
and the determination of damages for each Class member.
4.

A reporter's hard copy transcript of the arguments of counsel and the spoken

decision of Judge Hoff rendered on December 15, 2010 at the conclusion of the hearing on
cross-motions for summary judgment on December 15, 2010 has been requested. This will
constitute the reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(c)(5), I.A.R.
5.

Documents to be included in the record in addition to those documents

APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

000364

automatically included pursuant to I.A.R. 28 are:
a.

All Motions for Summary Judgment.

b.

All Affidavits supporting all Motions for Summary Judgment.

c.

All memoranda in support of or opposing the cross-motions for

summary judgment.
6.

The undersigned certifies:
a.

That the clerk of the court has been paid the estimated fee for the
preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R. 27(c), i.e., in the
amount of $100.00;

b.

That the reporter's estimated fee for preparation of the transcript has
been paid to the Reporter in the amount of $399.75;

c.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter at
the address set out below:
Carole Bull
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell,lD

d.

That all appellate filing fees have been paid; and

e.

That service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant
to I.A.R. 20 and the Idaho Attorney General without, however, admitting
that the Idaho Attorney General must be served under I.C. § 10-1211 or
any other statute.

APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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~

~::#~.IF¥=~~1..l ED this 25

day of January, 2011.
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

By

(j:JdL'

Donald W. Lojek, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

S.~KBruce S. Bistline, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the2 6lrday of January, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and
addressed as follows:
[]

Hand Delivery
[~···U.S. Mail, postage paid
[]
Overnight Express Mail
[1 Facsimile Copy:

[ 1
[...}-

[ ]
[ ]

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail, postage paid
Overnight Express Mail
Facsimile Copy:

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700
Boise, 10 83702
Attorney for State Insurance Fund

Lawrence Wasden
Idaho Attorney General
Attorney General's Office
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720-0010

0.1L-

Donald W. Lojek
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., etc.,

)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)

Case No. CV-09-13607*C

)

-vs-

)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

)

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, etc., )
)

Defendants-Respondents.

)

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
is being sent as an exhibit:

NONE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this

~

tio!'!
day of Mareh, 2011.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and
the
of Canyon.
I
By:
1\
Deputy
~

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
CDA DAIRY QUEEEN, INC., etc.,

)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)

Case No. CV-09-13607*C

)

-vs-

)

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

)

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, etc., )
)

Defendants-Respondents.

)

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including documents requested.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
lL,

the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this

I

day ofM~~Cft, 2011.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
~~~ ....,,~~~ the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

000368

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., etc.,

)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
)
-vs)
)
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, etc., )
)
Defendants-Respondents.
)

Supreme Court No. 38492
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each
party as follows:
Donald W. Lojek, Lojek Law Offices, POBox 1712, Boise ID 83701
Richard E. Hall and Keely E. Duke, POBox 1271, Boise, ID 83701

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
l>
HDt' \
j

the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _~_ day of~, 2011.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
In
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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